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I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to 
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will 
faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as, 
according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the 
constitution and laws of the United States.1
The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is 
denied, and the petition for a writ of certiorari is dismissed. See Rule 
39.8.  As the petitioner has repeatedly abused this Court’s process, the 
Clerk is directed not to accept any further petitions in noncriminal 
matters from petitioner unless the docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) 
 1.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803) (quoting the judicial oath). 
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is paid and the petition is submitted in compliance with Rule 33.1.2
(citation omitted) 
Introduction 
The above disposition—what might well be termed a “Martin directive” 
to the clerk—appears formulaically and with regularity in the Supreme 
Court’s list of orders.3  One might wonder why, given the seemingly 
straightforward alternative of the Court’s simply denying the petition for 
certiorari without further elaboration, as is its prerogative.4  Instead, the 
Supreme Court has increasingly adopted the practice of categorically and 
prospectively barring its more pestersome petitioners from proceeding in
forma pauperis—that is, without paying a filing fee.5  At a gestalt level, the 
optics of closing the courtroom doors to those who cannot afford to pay are 
not particularly seemly.6  Nonetheless, the Court has persevered in and 
expanded this practice, to the point where such two-sentence directives 
interdicting the indigent are now included by rote in the Court’s order lists.7
In the beginning, however, the Court grappled thoughtfully with the wisdom 
of this practice.8  A quarter century after the Court’s final word to date, the 
topic is ripe for reexamination. 
This Article chronicles the emergence and evolution of Martin
directives in a series of cases featuring strident and occasionally fiery 
dissents, and revisits the question of whether the Court’s present trajectory 
effectively balances general principles of access to relief with judicial 
efficacy.  In Part I, this Article introduces the underpinnings of the American 
imperative of access to the courthouse, describing the statutory measures and 
constitutional prescriptions that animate the ideals of the Revolution and 
Framers of the Constitution.  Part II turns to the responses of lower courts to 
 2.  As this Article explains, this identical verbiage (or very similar, for petitioners seeking 
writs other than certiorari) could be cited to many hundreds of dispositions; amongst the first were 
Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau, 528 U.S. 1016 (1999) and In re Reidt, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).  See 
also Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Prisoners’ Rights, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 83, 102–03 (2007). 
 3.  See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (per curiam); infra Part IV. 
 4.  See Singleton v. C.I.R., 439 U.S. 940, 942 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of 
certiorari); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Maryland v. 
Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917–19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting denial of 
certiorari). 
 5.  See infra Part IV. 
 6.  See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 182 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (calling the practice 
“unseemly”).
 7.  See infra Part III. 
 8.  See infra Part IV. 
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litigants who importune the generous admittance of the judicial system, and 
the constitutionally suspect “extreme remedy” of proscribing prolific 
petitioners entirely.  The heart of the Article commences in Part III, which 
recounts in detail the origins of, debate over, and ultimate institutionalization 
of Martin directives effecting a similar remedy in the Supreme Court, leading 
to the current legal regime, which is reviewed substantively and statistically 
in Part IV.  Part V then undertakes the reexamination of these holdings that 
is so ripe, reweighing the arguments for and against in light of reason and 
experience over the last twenty-five years. 
Ultimately, the Article concludes that ensuring both the appearance and 
reality of evenhanded treatment of rich and poor alike outweighs other 
considerations, and thus that Martin directives are ill-advised at best.  This 
conclusion is of course contrary to the resolution reached by the Supreme 
Court in Martin and its predecessor cases.9  It is noteworthy, however, that 
Martin has no progeny substantively addressing its continuing cogency: this 
is presumably because a litigant seeking to challenge a Martin directive
would be barred by the directive itself from filing any such challenge.10
Besides illustrating the presumably unintended consequences of Martin
directives, that paradox also commends the subject to legal scholarship, for 
if scholars do not engage with Martin then no one will.11  Yet academia has 
afforded scant attention to Martin directives—and no article has appeared 
since a student comment by Cristina Lane some fifteen years ago.12  Given 
Martin’s continuing entrenchment in that time, it would become the Court to 
revisit the wisdom of this catch-22 to ensure at least that the Court itself still 
believes its application of Martin to be good law.13
 9.  See cases cited infra note 298. 
 10.  See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (per curiam). 
 11.  Cf. Cristina Lane, Comment, Pay Up or Shut Up: The Supreme Court’s Prospective 
Denial of In Forma Pauperis Petitions, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 335, 365–66 (2003) (noting that if the 
Court does not sua sponte change direction, only Congress has the ability to supersede the practice). 
 12.  See Lane, supra note 11; see also Stephen L. Wasby, Note, A Follow-up on Judicial 
Responses to One-person “Litigation Explosions” (or Can Frequent Filers Be Made to Fly Away?),
18 JUSTICE SYS. J. 94 (1995) [hereinafter Wasby 1995] (reviewing the Supreme Court and lower 
court cases prior to the advent of “Martin directives”); Stephen J. Wasby, Note, Judicial Responses 
to One-Person “Litigation Explosions,” 14 JUSTICE SYS. J. 113 (1990) [hereinafter Wasby 1990] 
(same).  By no means is reproach intended to the quality of these works: they are excellent 
treatments of the issues at stake, and this Article refers to them often.  Nonetheless, the Court’s 
increasing reliance on “Martin directives” has only become apparent in the intervening fifteen 
years. See infra Part IV. 
 13.  See Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297, 298 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)), quoted
infra note 696. 
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern 
for one’s own safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the 
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I.  The American Imperative of Access to the Courthouse 
The abrogation by the government of King George III of the nascent 
American people’s right to trial by jury was one of the “injuries and 
usurpations” enumerated in the Declaration of Independence.14  The 
revolutionaries reckoned that the British monarchy had systematically 
obstructed and corrupted the judicial system and its common law in service 
of “absolute Tyranny.”15  Thus in formulating their own basic law, the 
framers of the Constitution guaranteed the right to trial by jury in criminal 
matters,16 and those of the Bill of Rights clarified that the right inhered in 
both criminal and civil cases.17  At the dawn of the twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court branded the right of access to the courts as the bulwark 
against Hobbesian anarchy and fundamental to the commonwealth itself: 
“The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force.  In an 
organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and lies at the 
foundation of orderly government.”18  Nor is this right formalistic or 
process of a rational mind.  Orr was crazy and could be grounded.  All he had to 
do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have 
to fly more missions.  Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he 
didn’t, but if he was sane, he had to fly them.  If he flew them, he was crazy and 
didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to, he was sane and had to.  Yossarian was 
moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let 
out a respectful whistle.  “That’s some catch, that Catch-22,” he observed.  “It’s 
the best there is,” Doc Daneeka agreed. 
Cf. JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 at 46 (1961)  
 14. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries 
and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute 
Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid 
world. . . . He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to 
our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his Assent to their Acts 
of pretended Legislation: . . . For depriving us in many cases, of the benefit of 
Trial by Jury.   
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 15, 20 (U.S. 1776).  
 15.  Id. at paras. 2, 10, 11, 22 (“He has obstructed the Administration of Justice by refusing 
his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.  He has made Judges dependent on his Will 
alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. . . . For abolishing 
the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary 
government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument 
for introducing the same absolute rule into these Colonies.”); see also Daniel Jacob Hemel & Eric 
A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice (July 18, 2017). 106 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004876 (discussing British obstruction of American courts). 
 16.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, 
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been 
committed . . . .”). 
 17.  U.S. CONST. amends. XI, XII. 
 18.  Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); accord César 
Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Op-Ed., Keep ICE Arrests Out of Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 
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nominal: American jurisprudence has long sought—indeed, demanded—
that all subject to its jurisdiction enjoy a meaningful opportunity to obtain 
effective relief in its courts.19
A.  Of Princes and Paupers 
The objective of universal access cannot be realized when fees are 
required for filings.20  Inevitably, the more impecunious of society will lack 
the means to meet such fees; this may be literally true for the truly destitute, 
or prudentially so for those with some income but inadequate means to 
encompass court fees in addition the bare necessities of life.21  Absent some 
accommodation by the judicial system,22 the natural outcome would then be 
to bifurcate the body politic into moieties by their material wealth:23 Princes 
2017, at A23 (quoting Chambers); see Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070–71 
(1985); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–377 (1971); cf. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
ch. 13 (1651) (“Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to 
keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of 
every man, against every man.”). 
 19.  See, e.g., Talamini, 470 U.S. at 1070–71; Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 
473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985); Bill Johnson’s Rest., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983); Bounds 
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 20.  See Robert S. Catz & Thad M. Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search 
of Judicial Standards, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 655, 685 (1978) (“The principle of equality before the 
law requires the courts to afford everyone an opportunity to be heard.  Yet frequently the 
meritorious claims of indigents are neither fully adjudicated nor vindicated, due to the costs and 
expenses of litigation.  Only by eliminating expensive and unnecessary barriers to litigation can 
indigents be assured justice.”); e.g., Campbell v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 23 Wis. 490, 490-91 (1868) 
(dismissing for lack of financial ability to lodge security). 
21.  We cannot agree with the court below that one must be absolutely destitute to enjoy 
the benefit of the statute. We think an affidavit is sufficient which states that one 
cannot because of his poverty “pay or give security for the costs . . . and still be able 
to provide” himself and dependents “with the necessities of life.”  To say that no 
persons are entitled to the statute’s benefits until they have sworn to contribute to 
payment of costs, the last dollar they have or can get, and thus make themselves and 
their dependents wholly destitute, would be to construe the statute in a way that 
would throw its beneficiaries into the category of public charges.  The public would 
not be profited if relieved of paying costs of a particular litigation only to have 
imposed on it the expense of supporting the person thereby made an object of public 
support.  Nor does the result seem more desirable if the effect of this statutory 
interpretation is to force a litigant to abandon what may be a meritorious claim in 
order to spare himself complete destitution.  We think a construction of the statute 
achieving such consequences is an inadmissible one. 
See Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948) 
 22.  Cf. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to 
Protect One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1166 (1973) (“But judicial relief from 
equipage costs must, most clearly for civil plaintiffs but as well for civil defendants, take the 
‘affirmative’ form of requiring the state to undertake some combination of subsidizing the 
indigent’s litigation costs and substantially restructuring its judicial system.”). 
 23.  See Ben C. Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1270, 1270 
(1966) (“In short, this bill presents the question whether this Government, having established courts 
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who enjoy access to the legal system at their own initiative, and paupers 
whose only encounter with the courts will be when they are haled in by the 
government or their better-heeled compatriots.24  Although much wealth-
based inequality has been accepted throughout American history—indeed, 
early courts expressed moral disapprobation of indigents25—public policy 
has rightly recoiled from so stark a reification of the prerogatives of 
affluence.26  The Supreme Court has averred that the government may not 
afford the affluent access categorically unavailable to the indigent by means 
of fees or assessments,27 describing this “‘flat prohibition’ of ‘bolted doors’” 
to the courthouse as being “securely established.”28
The framework of the in forma pauperis system, codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915, serves as the backbone of the federal government’s accommodation 
of this dilemma.29  Yet despite the centrality of the courts to American 
values, Congress did not act to provide for indigent access until 1892,30
playing catch-up to the many states that had already provided the 
impoverished with access to state courts.31  Fittingly, the House of 
Representatives invoked lofty principles in its debate on the new law: “Will 
the Government allow its courts to be practically closed to its own citizens, 
who are conceded to have valid and just rights, because they happen to be 
to do justice to litigants, will admit the wealthy and deny the poor entrance to them . . . .”) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1892)). 
 24.  Duniway, supra note 23; see also Michelman, supra note 22, at 1163.  One is reminded 
of an old quip about Dublin: “[T]he River Liffey . . . historically has divided the wealthy, cultivated 
south side of the town from the poorer, cruder north side.  While there’s plenty of culture above the 
river, even today ‘the north’ is considered rougher and less safe.  Dubliners joke that north-side 
residents are known as ‘the accused,’ while residents on the south side are addressed as ‘your 
honor.’”  RICK STEVE & PAT O’CONNOR, RICK STEVE’S SNAPSHOT DUBLIN 14–15 (2014). 
 25.  See infra notes 596–601 and accompanying text. 
 26.  See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–12 (1996); Adkins, 335 U.S. at 338–40; Duniway, 
supra note 23, at 1270–72. 
 27.  See, e.g., M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110–12; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 607 (1974); Griffin 
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–20 (1956).  
 28.  M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110–112. 
 29.  See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[T]he ‘In Forma Pauperis’ statute, 
was enacted specifically to provide poor persons with equal access to the federal courts.”); see
generally Stephen F. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma Pauperis Statute– 
Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413 (1985); Kenneth R. Levine, Comment, In Forma 
Pauperis Litigants: Witness Fees and Expenses in Civil Actions, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461 (1984); 
Catz & Guyer, supra note 20; Duniway, supra note 23. 
 30.  Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252; see Feldman, supra note 29, at 413; Catz & 
Guyer, supra note 20, at 657. 
 31.  See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 314–15 (1989) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (also quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., 1–2 (1892)). 
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without the money to advance pay to the tribunals of justice?”32  Yet it took 
some time for Congress to sort out the details: The in forma pauperis system 
was revised repeatedly, in 1910, 1922, 1949, 1951, and 1959, to allow for 
incrementally greater access to the courts, first expanding the right of access 
to defendants and criminal actions, then waiving appellate fees, then the 
costs of printing the record for appeal, and finally allowing any indigent 
person (not merely citizens) the benefit of the system.33  Until recently,34 the 
legislative history of the modern statute thus reflects its expansion to allow 
ever-greater participation in the judicial system.35
As presently framed, the statute’s mandate is both expansive and 
straightforward:
[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the 
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or 
proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without 
prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits 
an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner 
possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give 
security therefor.  Such affidavit shall state the nature of the 
action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is 
entitled to redress.36
The statute goes on to provide that once a suit is so authorized, the 
officers of the court will serve the indigent litigant’s process and “perform 
all duties in such cases,”37 and that a court may direct the United States to 
pay the costs of any required appellate record,38 thus accounting for 
additional basic costs of participation in the legal system not strictly 
characterizable as court fees or security.39
Taken literally, the statutory language is permissive rather than 
obligatory, affording courts discretion to waive judicial costs and fees 
 32.  H.R. REP. NO. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892); see Feldman, supra note 29, at 413–
14 n.5 (quoting the House report). 
 33.  See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 657–59 (discussing the legislative evolution of the 
in forma pauperis system); Duniway, supra note 23, at 1272–76 (same). 
 34.  See infra Parts I-B & II-A (describing tightened provisions introduced by the Prisoner 
Litigation Reform Act). 
 35.  See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 657 (attributing the succession of loosening 
amendments to combatting restrictive interpretations of the 1892 Act’s scope). 
 36.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1996). 
 37.  Id. § 1915(d). 
 38.  Id. § 1915(c). 
 39.  See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 659–61. 
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according to their best judgment.40  Yet interpreting New York’s equally 
permissive in forma pauperis law only two years after the passage of its 
federal counterpart, the state court of common pleas reasoned: 
Is it discretionary with the court to accord or to refuse a plaintiff 
the liberty of suing as a poor person when he conforms to the 
prescribed conditions?  True, the language of the Code is that “the 
court may admit him to prosecute as a poor person;” but it is the 
settled rule of construction that when, by permissive words, power 
is conferred on an officer for the benefit of the public or third 
persons, “may” means “must,” and power is the equivalent of 
duty.41
This is consistent with the role of § 1915 as a remedial statute, passed 
“for the benefit of the public.”42  Moreover, the state court’s views are 
instructive because the federal statute was expressly intended “to give federal 
courts the same authority to allow in forma pauperis actions that the courts 
in the most progressive States exercised.”43  This formulation casts in forma 
pauperis status as an entitlement or right rather than a discretionary 
privilege.44  Yet federal judges have proven notably reluctant to adopt this 
reading.45  The Fifth Circuit in 1935 described it as a “statute of grace,” even 
whilst admitting somewhat begrudgingly that it “extends to those embraced 
in it, but only to those, the privilege of prosecuting, without paying or 
securing the costs, appeals which are substantially meritorious, and which, 
because of the appellant’s poverty, could not be prosecuted if bond or 
 40.  See E. Elizabeth Summers, Proceeding in Forma Pauperis in Federal Court: Can 
Corporations Be Poor “Persons”?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 219, 225 (1974); see also Feldman, supra
note 29, at 424 (“Section 1915(a) states that a court ‘may,’ not ‘shall,’ authorize an applicant to 
proceed in forma pauperis if he or she is financially eligible.”). 
 41.  Shapiro v. Burns, 27 N.Y.S. 980 (Com. Pl. 1894). 
 42.  Id.; see Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 663 (“Moreover, the federal courts recognized 
very early that Congress intended the first federal in forma pauperis statute as a remedial measure.  
Given its remedial purpose, section 1915 should be liberally construed, according to the ancient 
and fundamental rule of statutory construction.”). 
 43.  Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 314–15 (1989) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).
 44.  See generally Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 662–63 (Part III: “The Legal Nature of In 
Forma Pauperis: ‘Right versus Privilege’ Distinction”). 
 45.  See id. at 662 (“Many courts have justified denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis 
by characterizing it as a privilege rather than a right.”) (citing cases); Duniway, supra note 23, at 
1277–80 (“[T]he accepted doctrine [is] that the litigant does not have a right to proceed in forma 
pauperis, but only a privilege to do so.”). 
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security were required.”46  Other appellate panels have expressed similar 
views that in forma pauperis status is “not a right but a privilege the granting 
of which is within the discretion of the court to which the application is 
made” in affirming denials of in forma pauperis applications.47  Like the 
Fifth Circuit, however, these cases recite the privilege-not-right rubric in 
dismissing based on the applicant’s unsuitability under the statute itself, not 
in arbitrarily rejecting a qualified applicant.48
The proper perspective, then, is that the privilege-not-right language 
used by the lower courts is more semantic than substantive.49  In any event, 
the Supreme Court had discouraged such grudgingness anent in forma 
pauperis status in 1948 with Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co.50
Whilst affording a “limited judicial discretion in the grant or denial of the 
right” to preclude wholly meritless filings,51 the Court repeatedly described 
the statute as affording a right to the litigant that could not be gainsaid if the 
statute was complied with.52  Some commentators have described Adkins as 
more ambivalent,53 and the Court’s use of the word “right” hardly controls, 
but its holding that § 1915 vests in the indigent an affirmative entitlement is 
 46.  Boggan v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1935) (citations 
omitted). 
 47.  In re Pierce, 246 F.2d 902, 903 (9th Cir. 1957); accord, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 245 
F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1957) (“Leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is a 
privilege, not a right.”); Parsell v. United States, 218 F.2d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1955) (“An appeal in 
forma pauperis is a privilege and not a right. Refusing to grant one the right thus to appeal does not 
offend the requirements of due process.”); Higgins v. Steele, 195 F.2d 366, 367–68 (8th Cir. 1952) 
(“Leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 is a privilege, not a right.  An 
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
court . . . .”) (citations omitted); Clough v. Hunter, 191 F.2d 516, 518 (10th Cir. 1951) (“Assuming, 
as appellant contends, that he was denied the right in the sentencing court to appeal in forma 
pauperis, that did not make the remedy under Section 2255 inadequate.  An appeal in forma 
pauperis is a privilege and not a right.  Refusing to grant one the right thus to appeal does not offend 
the requirements of due process.”). 
 48.  See cases cited supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
 49.  See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 662–63. 
 50.  Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331 (1948); see Duniway, supra note 
23, at 1280 (arguing same). 
 51.  Adkins, 335 U.S. at 337. 
 52.  Id. at 340 (“We do not think that this petitioner can be denied a right of appeal under the 
statute . . . .”; “This case illustrates that such a restrictive interpretation of this statute might wholly 
deprive one of several litigants of a right of appeal, even though he had a meritorious case and even 
though his poverty made it impossible for him to pay or give security for costs.”); id. at 343 
(“Section 3 of the statute specifically states that litigants who make affidavits of poverty shall be 
entitled to the same court processes, have the same right to the attendance of witnesses, and the 
same remedies as are provided by law in other cases.”). 
 53.  E.g., Duniway, supra note 23, at 1282. 
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unmistakable.54  As the Fifth Circuit conceded along with its sister circuits, 
indigent litigants who fall within the statute are indeed entitled to its 
forgiveness of fees.55  Contrarily, as will be discussed below in Part II, in
forma pauperis petitioners may (indeed must) be statutorily barred from 
proceeding under § 1915 should their plea of poverty be false or their claims 
be patently baseless, but they cannot be barred based solely on the caprice of 
the court.56  What the privilege-not-right terminology forecloses is for courts 
to extrastatutorily permit indigent litigants to proceed when they violate the 
law’s minimal requirements.57
This approach avoids the constitutional problems that would 
occasioned by taking a wholly discretionary view.58  Time and time again, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that meaningful access to the courts is 
indeed a right of broad constitutional dimension, drawing from numerous 
clauses.59  In the early case of Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., the 
Court held that states could not discriminate against citizens of other states 
in access to their courts, relying on the Article IV Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.60  Several decisions stand for the principle that “the right of access 
to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the 
 54.  See Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 662 n.40. 
 55.  See Boggan v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 79 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1935).
 56.  See infra Section II-A. 
 57.  See Duniway, supra note 23, at 1279 (“Despite some pre-1892 cases which indicated a 
judicial power to permit in forma pauperis proceedings, it soon became established dogma that 
such proceedings are purely statutory and that the statute defines the limits of the benefits conferred.  
Thus the courts deprived themselves of the opportunity to remedy any deficiencies in the statute 
through case-by-case precedent.”); see also infra Part II-A (discussing framework for assessing 
requirements).
 58.  Compare Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959) (indigent prisoners must be forgiven 
docketing fees in appeals and habeas), and Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961), with Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974) (finding habeas indistinguishable for right of access 
purposes from other constitutional claims); see also Jody L. Sturtz, A Prisoner’s Privilege to File 
In Forma Pauperis Proceedings: May It Be Numerically Restricted?, 1995 DET. C.L. REV. 1349, 
1351 (1995) (“Since a vast majority of inmates are indigent, the constitutional right to access would 
be meaningless without the In Forma Pauperis Statute.  Without these provisions, financial 
obstacles would likely prevent a prisoner from filing suit. This monetary preclusion would raise 
critical constitutional issues.  An inmate’s fundamental constitutional right is closely connected 
with the Federal In Forma Pauperis Statute.”). 
 59.  See, e.g., Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause); Bill Johnson’s Rest., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) 
(First Amendment Petition Clause); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 
335 (1985) (Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 
(1987) (Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 
(1974) (Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) 
(same). But see also Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–78 (noting that “this Court has seldom been asked 
to view access to the courts as an element of due process”). 
 60.  Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148. 
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Government for redress of grievances.”61  The Court has also assessed 
whether a court’s “process allows a claimant to make a meaningful 
presentation” and thus comports with the Due Process Clause under the Fifth 
Amendment62 and Fourteenth Amendment.63  The Court has reviewed state 
court access as an equal protection issue under the Fourteenth Amendment.64
And it has specifically guaranteed plaintiffs access to courts if they would 
have no other forum to lodge a claim.65  Reading the in forma pauperis
statute to allow courts untrammeled discretion to deny access to those who 
could not otherwise pay would contravene this well-rooted right66—indeed,
one that is foundational to American society and democratic governance.67
B.  Of Prison and Paupers 
In practice, a palpable portion of in forma pauperis petitioners are 
prisoners, which poses particularly perplexing pragmatic policy problems.68
Commentators and courts alike have observed rightly that just as with the 
general populace,69 “[t]he right to have access to the courts is viewed as the 
basis of all rights possessed by prisoners.”70  But how to vindicate that right 
when their access is quite literally impeded by their incarceration?71  Given 
 61.  Bill Johnson’s Rest., Inc., 461 U.S. at 741; accord Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking 
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) and Ex 
parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941)). 
 62.  See Walters, 473 U.S. at 335.  
 63.  See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576–80; Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–78. 
 64.  Finley, 481 U.S. at 557. 
 65.  Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–77. 
 66.  See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–12 (1996); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–77; Smith 
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U.S. 12, 16–20 (1956); see also Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 337–43 
(1948) (limiting court discretion in view of the statute’s creation of an entitlement); Sturtz, supra
note 58, at 1351. 
 67.  See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) (“[T]he right to file a court action 
might be said to be [a prisoner’s] remaining ‘most fundamental political right, because preservative 
of all rights.’”) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)); Talamini v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070–71 (1985); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 375–77; Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio 
R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
 68.  See generally Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in 
Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 519 (1996); Sturtz, supra note 58; James E. Doyle, The Court’s 
Responsibility to the Inmate Litigant, 56 JUDICATURE 406, 412 (1973). 
 69.  Chambers, 207 U.S. at 148. 
 70.  Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1353; see id. at 1350 & nn.13–14 (citing 2 MICHAEL B.
MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 11.00, at 3 (2d ed. 1993)); McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 153 (quoting 
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370).
 71.  Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1351 (“The problem then arises as to how an indigent, 
unrepresented prisoner gains access to the federal courts.”). 
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the proliferation of prisoner suits,72 and the important constitutional 
questions implicated, the Supreme Court has addressed the issue often.73
First, in Ex parte Hull,74 a prison had repeatedly intercepted and obstructed 
an inmate’s attempts to file a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, relying 
on a regulation allowing the prison to screen all claims for proper form.75
The petitioner eventually managed to smuggle out copies of his attempted 
filings, and the Court reproved the prison, confirming that the fundamental 
right of access trumps even reasonable correctional regulations: 
The regulation is invalid.  The considerations that prompted its 
formulation are not without merit, but the state and its officers 
may not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal 
court for a writ of habeas corpus.  Whether a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is properly drawn and 
what allegations it must contain are questions for that court alone 
to determine.76
More reticulated constitutional protections than the barest ability to 
transmit a filing followed apace.  In Johnson v. Avery,77 another species of 
regulation categorically forbade any inmate from assisting another in 
preparing writs or other legal matters,78 and this too was struck down by the 
Court as effectively disallowing access to the court79—though the Court did 
allow the prison obviously has leeway in regulating how and when prisoners 
took advice.80
To be sure, the early cases of Hull and Avery cited “the fundamental 
importance of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme” above 
 72.  See Procup v Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (en banc)
(“Recent years have witnessed an explosion of prisoner litigation in the federal courts.”); Abdul-
Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F. 3d 307, 311–12 (3d. Cir. 2001). 
 73.  See, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); 
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539, 539  (1974); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 
355 (1996). 
 74.  Hull, 312 U.S. at 548.  
 75.  Id. at 547–49. 
 76.  Id. at 549. 
 77.  Johnson, 393 U.S. at 483. 
 78.  Id. at 484–85. 
 79.  Id. at 486–87 (affirming and quoting the district court’s conclusion that “[f]or all practical 
purposes, if such prisoners cannot have the assistance of a ‘jail-house lawyer,’ their possibly valid 
constitutional claims will never be heard in any court.”). 
 80.  Id. at 488–900. 
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and apart from judicial access generally.81  But the Court unanimously 
extended Avery to all civil rights actions in Wolff v. McDonnell,82 holding 
that the “right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is 
founded in the Due Process Clause, and assures that no person will be denied 
the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations 
of fundamental constitutional rights.”83 Bounds v. Smith84 held prisons must 
take affirmative steps to vindicate the general right of access, by providing 
stationary, writing utensils, notarial services, and postage85—along with 
well-stocked law libraries!86  Finally, Lewis v. Casey extended these rights 
to prisoners’ claims that “challenge the conditions of their confinement.”87
As with those concerning indigents generally, these holdings call into 
question lower courts’ privilege-not-right view of in forma pauperis status: 
If prisons may not constitutionally restrict prisoners’ meaningful access to 
justice (including providing libraries and notaries),88 it is difficult to believe 
that a law effectively forbidding the courts entirely to such indigent prisoners 
by means of an unpayable fee could possibly stand.89  Some commentators, 
however, have intimated as much, resting on the traditional privilege-not-
right terminology.90  As will be discussed later, there is significant if not 
 81.  Johnson, 393 U.S. at 485–86 (noting cases finding unconstitutional the imposition of 
filing fees or denial of transcripts in habeas cases). 
 82.  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). 
 83.  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577–80 (The Court simply could not distinguish the two in principle: 
“First, the demarcation line between civil rights actions and habeas petitions is not always clear.  
The Court has already recognized instances where the same constitutional rights might be redressed 
under either form of relief.  Second, while it is true that only in habeas actions may relief be granted 
which will shorten the term of confinement, it is more pertinent that both actions serve to protect 
basic constitutional rights.”) (citations omitted). 
 84.  Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 
 85.  Id. at 824–25. 
 86.  Id. at 828 (“We hold, therefore, that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the 
courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal 
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons 
trained in the law.”); accord Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 87.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). 
 88.  See cases cited supra note 73. 
 89.  Compare Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959) (indigent prisoners must be forgiven 
docketing fees in appeals and habeas), Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (same), and Bounds,
430 U.S. 817 (citing both), with Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576 (1974) (finding habeas
indistinguishable for right of access purposes from other constitutional claims). 
 90.  See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1360–61 (“The right to proceed in forma pauperis is statutory 
and not constitutional in nature.  There is no absolute right to proceed in forma pauperis in federal 
court.  The benefits extended by the In Forma Pauperis Statute are granted as a privilege and not as 
a matter of right. Proceeding in forma pauperis is a statutory privilege extended to persons unable 
to pay filing fees when the action is not frivolous or malicious.  Since the right to proceed in forma 
pauperis is statutory, Congress may amend the statute with more ease than would be the case if it 
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irresoluble tension between Supreme Court decisions commanding 
meaningful access for all indigent plaintiffs and the many lower court 
decisions barring meaningful access based on a history of frivolous filings.91
In any event, Congress initially included prisoners as much as anyone 
else within the ambit of the in forma pauperis statute.92  Nonetheless, in light 
of the special difficulties attending prisoner lawsuits, Congress did 
eventually amend § 1915 in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) to 
create a sui generis payment regime for such suits.93  The required affidavit 
of poverty must be supplemented with a copy of the prisoner’s institutional 
trust fund account,94 in order that the prisoner be compelled to contribute to 
the necessary fees according the resources available in that account: 
(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a civil 
action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be 
required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.  The court shall 
assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any 
court fees required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent 
of the greater of— 
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account; or 
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for 
the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the 
complaint or notice of appeal. 
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall 
be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the 
preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account.  The 
agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments 
were a constitutional right. Even though the In Forma Pauperis Statute affects a prisoner’s right to 
access, which is a constitutional right, Congress may limit prisoner use of the statute without 
completely denying such persons this constitutional right.  What Congress created Congress may 
limit or eliminate.”). 
 91.  See infra Part II-B-3. 
 92.  See Doyle, supra note 68, at 407 (discussing application to prisoners prior to PLRA); 
Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1351 (same). 
 93.  Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); see Abdul-Akbar v. 
McKelvie, 239 F. 3d 307, 311–12 (3d. Cir. 2001); Joshua D. Franklin, Three Strikes and You’re 
Out of Constitutional Rights—The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Three Strikes Provision and Its 
Effect on Indigents, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 191 (2000). 
 94.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (West 1996). 
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from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the 
amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid. 
(3) In no event shall the filing fee collected exceed the amount of 
fees permitted by statute for the commencement of a civil action 
or an appeal of a civil action or criminal judgment. 
(4) In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil 
action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that 
the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial 
partial filing fee.95
Although this regime places a higher burden on prisoners than other 
indigent litigants, the safety valve provided at § 1915(b)(4) saves the 
provision from potential constitutional infirmity:96 although contributions 
are required if available even from the destitute, the lack thereof cannot 
prevent a litigant from filing.97
Then-chief-judge of the Second Circuit Jon O. Newman provided a 
thoughtful view of the importance of prisoner litigation in 1996,98 the same 
year that Congress passed the PLRA seeking to curtail prisoner lawsuits.99
Whilst acknowledging that “nearly all are filed pro se, and the vast majority 
are dismissed as frivolous,” Judge Newman could recite a lengthy roll of 
“serious matters that pose[d] substantial issues” and “resulted in significant 
victories.”100  The judge went on to debunk sensationalist accusations by 
attorneys general of rampant ridiculous claims, quoting, for example, a New 
York Times description of “the inmate who sued because there were no salad 
bars or brunches on weekends and holidays,” who in fact challenged 
“dangerously unhealthy prison conditions, not the lack of a salad bar.”101  All 
 95.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). 
 96.  See Franklin, supra note 93, at 204. 
 97.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text; cf. Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1351.  That said, 
a separate provision added by the PLRA to address prolific prisoner petitioners may indeed raise 
serious constitutional concerns.  See infra Section II-B. 
 98.  Newman, supra note 68. 
 99.  Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321; see Newman, supra note 68, 
at 522–23. 
 100.  Newman, supra note 68, at 519–20 & n.2. 
 101.  Id. at 520–22.  Judge Newman also readily debunked grossly inaccurate characterizations 
of “the case where a prisoner is suing New York because his prison towels are white instead of his 
preferred beige; and . . . the case where an inmate sued, claiming cruel and unusual punishment 
because he received one jar of chunky and one jar of creamy peanut butter after ordering two jars 
of chunky from the prison canteen.”  Id.
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in all, Judge Newman was optimistic about the PLRA’s schema of asking in
forma pauperis prisoners to make some financial investment in their suits 
whilst keeping the courthouse doors open to those who lack funds for even 
a minor contribution, concluding that in any case, “courts will continue to 
have the important task of looking through the ‘haystacks’ of prisoner 
lawsuits for the ‘needles’ of meritorious prisoner claims.”102
Judge Newman’s attention to these claims has been echoed by other 
sitting judges as well.103  The courts’ far-reaching solicitude to preserving 
prisoners’ right of access to the courthouse underlines how fundamental that 
right is to the American system.104  Even those who have duly forfeited their 
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty itself after criminal 
conviction do not thereby surrender their right to judicial review and relief, 
the wellspring of all others.105
C.  Of Pro Se and Pro Bono
Of course, in forma pauperis system scarcely places the indigent 
(whether imprisoned or not) and affluent on level playing field.  Most 
fundamentally, there are numerous miscellaneous outlays associated with the 
proper prosecution or defense of litigation that do not fall within the neat 
confines of the statute, including the costs of investigation, discovery, and 
fees payable to witnesses both lay and expert.106  To take witness fees as an 
example: a note by Kenneth R. Levine observes that, absent such fees’ 
payment, “witnesses are not required, nor may they be able, to attend the 
trial.  As a result, impoverished civil litigants may be given access to the 
courts by § 1915 only to have their claims dismissed because they cannot 
afford to bring along their evidence.”107  This outcome is perverse given the 
statute elsewhere prescribes that “witnesses shall attend as in other cases.”108
 102.  Newman, supra note 68, at 526–27. 
 103.  See, e.g., Doyle, supra note 68. 
 104.  Compare, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), with Chambers v. Baltimore & 
Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907). 
 105.  See supra notes 69-70 accompanying text; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 
555–56 (1974) (holding rights only forfeited in prison to the extent demanded by “exigencies of 
the institutional environment”). 
 106.  See Duniway, supra note 23, at 1274–75 (“An even more glaring weakness of the act is 
that it makes no provision for actual payment of the miscellaneous expenses of litigation,” including 
investigation and discovery); Michelman, supra note 22, at 1163; John MacArthur Maguire, 
Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1923); see also generally David Medine, 
The Constitutional Right of Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281 
(1990) (expert witnesses); Levine, supra note 29, at 1463–70 (witness fees). 
 107.  Levine, supra note 29, at 1464. 
 108.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d) (West 1996). 
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Levine argues persuasively that some combination of that prescription and 
the court’s authority to order the attendance of witnesses under the Federal 
Rules allow the in forma pauperis litigant to avoid payment of fees,109 but 
acknowledges that the near-universal consensus of courts is to the 
contrary.110
Those poor enough to qualify as indigent will not have funds for a 
lawyer either, and thus will often depend on pro bono counsel if they are to 
have counsel at all.111  The in forma pauperis statute contemplates that a 
judge might “request” counsel to represent the indigent litigant,112 but the 
Supreme Court has squarely held that courts cannot thereby compel counsel 
to serve in like manner as in other appointments.113  As the case illustrates, 
lawyers who are busy or profess to lack the proper “training or temperament” 
may well decline to take on indigent applicants absent compulsion,114
notwithstanding the profession’s ethical duty to provide pro bono 
representation.115  Responding to this conundrum, commentators early on 
opined that “Congress should provide for mandatory appointed counsel for 
any in forma pauperis plaintiff—whether a prisoner or not—whose 
complaint is not frivolous,” so that “an indigent plaintiff would actually have 
a reasonable chance for success on the merits of a meritorious claim.”116
Congress, however, has not done so in the thirty years since the suggestion 
was offered.117
 109.  Levine, supra note 29, at 1470–81. 
 110.  Id. at 1467–68 n.26 (“Courts have nearly unanimously held that the term ‘fees and costs’ 
does not encompass witness fees and expenses.”) (expansively citing and discussing cases); but see
id. at 1472 (discussing, as a notable exception, U.S. Marshals Serv. v. Means, 741 F.2d 1053, 1057–
60 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). 
 111.  See Duniway, supra 23, at 1274 (“[T]he act made no provision for compensation of 
counsel; nor does it make such a provision today.”); Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 684 
(“Indigents have no monopoly on malicious or frivolous actions, although they do have a virtual 
monopoly on being unrepresented by counsel.”). 
 112.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to represent any person 
unable to afford counsel.”). 
 113.  Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. Of Ia., 490 U.S. 296, 301–08 (1989). 
 114.  Id. at 299–300. 
 115.  Id. at 310 (observing that “lawyers’ ethical obligation to volunteer their time and skills 
pro bono publico is manifest”); accord id. at 310-11 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Lawyers also have 
obligations by virtue of their special status as officers of the court.  Accepting a court’s request to 
represent the indigent is one of those traditional obligations.”). 
 116.  Feldman, supra note 29, at 437; see also Duniway, supra note 23, at 1274 (“The provision 
for counsel is less than adequate.”). 
 117.  The four-justice dissent in Mallard, of course, was of the opinion that Congress had quite 
clearly provided for compelling attorneys to serve under the in forma pauperis statute absent good 
reason. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 315–16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is evident that the drafters of this 
statute understood these terms to impose similar obligations and simply assumed that members of 
our profession would perform their assigned tasks when requested to do so by the court.”); id. at 
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Poor litigants might also find counsel to represent them on a 
contingency basis (and to pay needful expenses, obviating the need for the 
statute), but such representation will depend on the financial return expected 
from their claims, which does not necessarily correlate with merit.118  A poor 
defendant, moreover, can anticipate no judgment with which to compensate 
counsel, and must choose between pro se and default if no pro bono counsel
appears.119  True, there are fee-shifting measures like those under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act,120 which provide for awarding fees and costs to certain 
parties prevailing against the government, allowing litigants and their
counsel to be compensated for the outlays made in demonstrably meritorious 
actions.121  As the statute’s name suggests, its purpose is to provide a further 
measure of equal opportunity to all litigants, regardless of their financial 
means,122 in part by attracting competent counsel to deserving but unfunded 
causes.123  Yet there are countervailing pitfalls as well: Counsel may be wary 
of taking on an in forma pauperis matter, as the statute expressly provides 
that the United States cannot be assessed for costs even under ordinary fee-
shifting rules.124
Needless to say, a litigant lacking pro bono or contingency counsel and 
compelled to proceed pro se is at a severe disadvantage to an adversary with 
experienced representation.125  Many commentators and courts have 
adverted to the burdens placed on both the litigant and courts when the 
317 (“In context, I would therefore construe the word ‘request’ in § 1915([e]) as meaning 
‘respectfully command.’  If that is not what Congress intended, the statute is virtually 
meaningless.”).
 118.  See generally Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The 
Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998); 
Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act: A Qualified Success, 11 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 458,  464 (1993); cf. Duniway, supra note 23, at 1285 (“The poor plaintiff who 
has a meritorious money or property claim can nearly always find a lawyer who will take his case 
because of the almost universal use of the contingent fee to finance the litigation––and even the 
litigant.”). 
 119.  Duniway, supra note 23 (“The situation of a poor defendant with a meritorious defense 
(unless he also has a good money cross-claim) is different. It may be that some defendants in federal 
cases simply default because they cannot afford to litigate.”). 
 120.  Act of Aug. 5. 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985). 
 121.  5 U.S.C. § 504 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2011); see generally Krent, supra note 118. 
 122.  See Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 883 (1989); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 
(1983).
 123.  See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984) (discussing Hensley, 461 U.S. 424). 
 124.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(f)(1) (West 1996). 
 125.  See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437–38 (1991); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832–
34 (1975); Doyle, supra note 68, at 410; Feldman, supra note 29, at 437; see generally Jona 
Goldschmidt, How Are Courts Handling Pro Se Litigants?, 82 JUDICATURE 13 (1998). 
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former proceeds both in forma pauperis and pro se.126  In one of its more 
famous cases, Gideon w. Wainwright, the Supreme Court noted that a 
“defendant’s need for a lawyer is nowhere better stated than in the moving 
words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama” in 1932:127
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it 
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.  Even the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill 
in the science of law.  If charged with crime, he is incapable, 
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is 
good or bad.  He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.  Left 
without the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper 
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible.  He lacks both 
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one.  He requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.  Without it, 
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because 
he does not know how to establish his innocence.128
Apropos of Justice Sutherland’s words, it must be noted that much of 
the preceding discussion contemplates a civil case; the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees that defendants in criminal actions enjoy the assistance of 
counsel.129  Strikingly, however, criminal defendants were excluded from the 
in forma pauperis statute until the revisions of 1910.130  Similarly remarkable 
is that the Amendment’s seemingly self-executing guarantee of a defendant’s 
right “to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”131 was not held to 
entitle the indigent to counsel in all federal criminal trials until 1938.132  The 
Supreme Court did not confirm a right to counsel on appeal until 1957,133
 126.  See Kay, 499 U.S. at 437–38; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832–34; Goldschmidt, supra note 125; 
Doyle, supra note 68, at 410 (sitting judge detailing the issues occasioned by pro se prisoner 
litigants). 
 127.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 334, 344 (1963). 
 128.  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)). 
 129.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 130.  Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-317, 36 Stat. 866 (1910); see Catz & Guyer, supra
note 20, at 657–58. 
 131.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 132.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 133.  Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565, 566 (1957) (per curiam); accord Ellis v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 674, 674–75 (1958); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) 
(citing Johnson and Ellis in constitutional context).  It is questionable, however, whether these per 
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even though provision for in forma pauperis appellate proceedings had 
similarly been added in 1910.134  Nor was it until 1963 than the same basic 
right to counsel was recognized via the Fourteenth Amendment in state 
criminal proceedings, original135 and appellate.136  And even though an 
attorney be guaranteed, the efficacy of legal representation may suffer from 
chronic governmental understaffing and underfunding, despite the best 
efforts of a dedicated corps of public defenders.137
Nonetheless, under the in forma pauperis regime, impoverished 
litigants at least have their “day in court,” whatever their disadvantages be 
against their adversaries.138  Failing the forgiveness of required fees, many 
of society’s most needy would lack even that.139  The law cannot endow 
everyone with equal resources to prosecute and defend their claims in a 
nation of such disparate means, but it can at least ensure the courthouse doors 
themselves are open to all.140
II.  Pestersome Paupers in the Lower Courts 
To be sure, the right of access to judicial process and the in forma 
pauperis system no more affords indigents a prerogative to bring frivolous 
or malicious actions than any other litigant.141  The risks of such actions are 
at least nominally heightened for indigent litigants because they will not be 
retarded by the requirement of putting their money where their mouth is, 
curiam decisions implicate constitutional grounds rather than statutory interpretation of the § 1915 
entitlement, though the effect is largely the same.  See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to 
Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1246–50 (2013). 
 134.  Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-317, 36 Stat. 866 (1910); see Catz & Guyer, supra
note 20, at 658 
 135.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 334, 335 (1963).   
 136.  Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–58. (1963) 
 137.  See generally Emily Rose, Note, Speedy Trial as a Viable Challenge to Chronic 
Underfunding in Indigent-Defense Systems, 113 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2014); David A. Simon, Equal
before the Law: Toward a Restoration of Gideon’s Promise, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581 
(2008); Robert L. Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis Is Chronic: 
Balanced Allocation of Resources Is Needed to End the Constitutional Crisis, 9 CRIM. JUST. 13 
(1994).
 138.  See Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of 
Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 179, 212, 250–51 (1972); see also
In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 14 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 139.  Levine, supra note 29, at 1461 n.3; Maguire, supra note 106, at 362. 
 140.  See supra Section I-A. 
 141.  In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982) (“No person, however, ‘. . . rich or poor, 
is entitled to abuse the judicial process.’”) (quoting Hardwick v. Brinson, 523 F.2d 798, 800 (5th 
Cir. 1975)); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A) (same); see generally 
Mary Van Vort, Controlling and Deterring Frivolous In Forma Pauperis Complaints, 55 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1165 (1987). 
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 47 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/15/2018 7:58 PM
78 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:1 
increasing the incentives to lodge any and every claim they might dream up, 
regardless of merit.142  Anticipating these concerns, the in forma pauperis 
statute provides recourse for courts confronting baseless claims to dispose of 
them with expedition.143  Unfortunately, the lower courts—both state and 
federal—have not uncommonly confronted so-called “prolific petitioners” 
who are seen to strain the gratis system afforded them by sheer volume.144
When statutory mechanisms fail, courts have turned to their inherent powers 
and the expansive All Writs Act to craft novel solutions to address the claims 
of their most pestersome paupers.145
A.  Statutory Mechanisms for Meritless Filings In Forma 
Pauperis
Meritless in forma pauperis filings may be dismissed for failure to state 
a claim, the same as any case;146 indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide several mechanisms for clarifying or disposing of fundamentally 
incoherent complaints.147  But Congress was aware of the unusual potential 
for abuse absent fees,148 and thus the in forma pauperis statute contemplates 
a unique screening mechanism for all claims, under which the presiding 
judge must make a peremptory evaluation of whether the stated allegations 
merit consideration:149
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may 
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the 
court determines that— 
 (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or 
 (B) the action or appeal— 
 142.  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 
1071–72 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam); see also Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1180–81; 
Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1362. 
 143.  See infra Section II-A. 
 144.  See Procup, 792 F.2d at 1071–72; see generally Wasby 1995, supra note 12; Wasby 1990, 
supra note 12. 
 145.  See infra Section II-B. 
 146.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see Lane, supra note 11, at 342–43. 
 147.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b), (c), (e) & (f). 
 148.  See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); see also Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 
239 F.3d 307, 311–12  (3d. Cir. 2001) (specifically in prisoner context). 
 149.  See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1358–61; Feldman, supra note 29, at 415–23; Van Vort, 
supra note 141, at 1167–79. 
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 48 Side A      10/23/2018   13:43:40
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 48 Side A      10/23/2018   13:43:40
SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/15/2018 7:58 PM
Fall 2018] THE PUTATIVE PROBLEM OF PESTERSOME PAUPERS 79
(i)   is frivolous or malicious; 
(ii)  fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is 
immune from such relief.150
Despite its simplicity, the details of executing the statute’s mechanism 
have proven controversial.151  Originally, the provision employed the 
familiar permissive language found elsewhere in the statute, allowing that a 
court “may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if 
satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious,” and omitted any mention 
of preemptive screening for whether the claim was properly pled.152  In 
Neitzke v. Williams, the Supreme Court thus found that the provision, as then 
written, did not permit courts to dismiss indigent claims for failure to state a 
claim.153  This mattered because the bar for dismissal under Federal Rule 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim was higher than that for frivolousness 
under § 1915(e).154  In passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996,155
however, Congress both replaced the permissive construction with the 
current obligatory “shall” and added the clause at § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which 
the lower courts have found “clear[ly] . . . not only permits but requires a 
district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a 
claim.”156  In doing so, it was equally clear that Congress intended to 
supersede Neitzke and thus force the courts’ hand.157
Courts, therefore, must now sua sponte assess frivolousness, 
maliciousness, and baselessness, but the question of how to do so has 
occasioned a great variety of doctrine throughout the statute’s history.158  On 
one end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that dismissal of in 
forma pauperis suits on grounds of frivolousness is proper only in the same 
circumstances as would warrant sua sponte dismissal of a paying litigant’s 
 150.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2) (1996). 
 151.  See Feldman, supra note 29, at 415–23; Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1167–79. 
 152.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d) (1994). 
 153.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 
(9th Cir. 2000) (discussing the history of the dismissal provision). 
 154.  Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 320–29; see Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1359–60 (discussing case). 
 155.  Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321. 
 156.  Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27 (citing Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 
1998)); see Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 157.  Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126. 
 158.  Compare, e.g., id. at 1126–27, with Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 
1999).
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suit without argument159—a high standard to meet.160  Representing the 
other, the Eighth Circuit admonished the lower courts anent their liberal 
allowances of meritless appeals: 
We realize that the serious consideration which this Court has 
given to appeals in forma pauperis in hopeless cases may have led 
the District Judges in this Circuit to believe that such appeals 
should be allowed with extreme liberality.  We are now of the 
opinion that much greater care should be taken in screening such 
cases, in order to separate those which are clearly without merit 
from those which are meritorious or which at least present some 
substantial question worthy of consideration.161
Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s philosophical evenhandedness are a 
number of decisions questioning whether in forma pauperis litigants may be 
granted leave to amend given a dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  Multiple 
circuits have agreed in principle that “a pro se plaintiff who is proceeding in 
forma pauperis should be afforded the same opportunity as a pro se fee-paid 
plaintiff to amend his complaint prior to its dismissal for failure to state a 
claim.”162  But Congress’s clear intention to enforce rigorous standards for 
indigent litigants cannot be ignored either.163  If the process and standard for 
dismissal is identical regardless of in forma pauperis status, the 
 159. The District Court ‘may’ authorize the commencement of a civil action in forma 
pauperis, and thereafter “may dismiss the case * * * if satisfied that the action is 
frivolous.”  It follows that the District Court was authorized to deny leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appeared from the face of the proposed 
complaint that the action was frivolous.  This authority is to be exercised with great 
restraint, and generally only where it would be proper to dismiss the complaint sua 
sponte before service of process if it were filed by one tendering the required fees.  
Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 141 (9th Cir. 1962) (citations omitted). 
 160.  See Harmon v. Superior Court, 307 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1962) (cited in Reece, 310 F.2d at 140). 
 161.  Higgins v. Steele, 195 F.2d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 1952). 
 162.  Gomez, 171 F.3d at 796; see Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 
(10th Cir. 1999); see also Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (assuming leave 
to amend is available); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same).  
Contra Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 
F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 1997).  The Ninth Circuit in Lopez provides a thorough discussion of these 
cases and, after evaluating policy considerations, aligns itself with the majority.  See Lopez, 203 
F.3d at 1127–30. 
 163.  See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129 n.10 (“It is true that 1915(e)(2)’s provision for dismissal for 
failure to state a claim itself penalizes indigent non-prisoner plaintiffs for the alleged abuses of 
prisoner plaintiffs.  However, Congress inserted 1915(e)(2) into the in forma pauperis statute, and 
we must follow this clear statutory direction.”). 
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particularized statutory language would be largely surplusage, in defiance of 
the canon against superfluities.164
As is often the case, a middle-of-the-road approach is likely the best.165
Congress has now directed that courts proactively police the claims of in
forma pauperis litigants,166 presumably to expeditiously dispose of those 
unquestionably meritless.167  If a filing can be saved by amendment from a 
failure to state a claim, then the court retains discretion to permit such 
amendment,168 and likely will.169  But claims that are wholly frivolous or 
malicious, lacking even “an arguable basis in law or in fact,”170 can and must 
be weeded out to prevent unwarranted burden on the court, fulfilling 
Congress’s design.171  Whilst imposing some disparate treatment upon the 
poor,172 it is hard to complain that those choosing to press utterly baseless 
claims without the payment of fees are afforded no more attention than 
necessary.173  If courts prove more likely to dismiss in forma pauperis claims 
as frivolous than to do so sua sponte of paying claims, as the Ninth Circuit 
feared,174 the disparity may well be the unfortunate but unavoidable result of 
indigent claimants lacking the advice of counsel or the deterrent of filing 
 164.  See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06, 1, 181–86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)); Mkt. Co. v. Hoffman, 101 
U.S. 112, 115 (1879) (describing the canon as a “cardinal rule”). 
 165.  Cf. Gray v. Bicknell, 86 F.3d 1472, 1482–84 (8th Cir. 1996) (evaluating three options 
regarding privilege––a “lenient,” “strict,” and “middle of the road” approach––and finding the 
“middle test is best suited to achieving a fair result”). 
 166.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see supra notes 149-157 and accompanying text. 
 167.  See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126–27; see also Higgins v. Steele, 195 F.2d 366, 369 (8th Cir. 
1952) (expressing concerns prior to PLRA about overliberal allowance of in forma pauperis
proceedings).
 168.  Gomez v. USAA Federal Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999); see Perkins v. 
Kansas Department of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999); see Feldman, supra note 
29, at 430–32. 
 169.  See Feldman, supra note 29, at 430–32. 
 170.  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see Feldman, supra note 29, at 431–32. 
 171.  See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127–30. 
 172.  See Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1169–71. 
 173.  See id.; Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1361–68.  
 174.  See Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 141 (9th Cir. 1962). 
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fees.175  No litigant, rich or poor, is entitled to long maintain a patently 
groundless claim.176
B.  The Predicament Presented by Prolific Petitioners 
Most in forma pauperis litigants can be and are duly accommodated by 
the expedited statutory regime contemplated by § 1915(e).177  But there has 
long been a distinct class of litigants sometimes denominated prolific 
petitioners (or, more drolly, “frequent filers”178), who file dozens or even 
hundreds of petitions with the courts seeking redress of dubious injuries, and 
who pose a more perplexing predicament to the judiciary.179  In 1981, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals described one Reverend Clovis Carl Green Jr. 
as “in all likelihood the most prolific prisoner litigant in recorded history,” 
tallying as many as seven hundred filings amongst various state and federal 
courts.180  Another circuit court of appeals named him the “instigator of 
hundreds of frivolous and malicious pro se actions.”181  And the New York 
Times’s doyenne of Supreme Court coverage, Linda Greenhouse,182 called 
him a “specter haunting American courts.”183
1.  Initial Judicial Responses to Prolific Petitioners 
The varying responses of the courts importuned by Reverend Green 
provide a survey of early judicial responses to the problem posed by prolific 
petitioners.  Given its jurisdiction over the site of Reverend Green’s 
 175.  See supra Section I-C; e.g., In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445–46 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting the 
uniform frivolity of the petitioners’ filings dismissed theretofore); see also, e.g., In re McDonald, 
489 U.S. 180, 180–82 nn.1–5 (1989) (per curiam) (noting same of petitions for certiorari and 
extraordinary writs). 
 176.  In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446 (“No person, however, ‘. . . rich or poor, is entitled to abuse 
the judicial process.’”) (quoting Hardwick v. Brinson, 523 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1975)); Green 
v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A) (same). 
 177.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 341–43. 
 178.  Wasby 1995, supra note 12, at 94, 95, 97. 
 179.  See Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071–72 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per 
curiam); see generally Wasby 1995, supra note 12; Wasby 1990, supra note 12. 
 180.  In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 181.  Green, 649 F.2d at 287. 
 182.  See Linda Greenhouse, 2,691 Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2008, at WK1.  
Greenhouse covered the court for thirty years, spanning the mentioned 2,691 decisions, wrote 
nearly 3000 articles, and won the Pulitzer Prize before her retirement in 2008, a celebration for 
which seven of the sitting Supreme Court judges attended.  See id.; Tony Mauro, A Goodbye for 
Greenhouse, BLT: THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES, (June 12, 2008), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/ 
blt/2008/06/goodbye-to-gree.html.
 183.  Linda Greenhouse, Paper Siege by Prisoner Provokes Ire, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1983.  The 
comment on flinching, of course, is presumably artistic license. 
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imprisonment, the Missouri State Penitentiary, the Eighth Circuit provides 
the most thorough tour.184  In 1978, it confronted an appeal of a conviction 
for criminal contempt in that Green violated an injunction against his 
assisting fellow inmates in making their own frivolous filings.185  The court 
of appeals recognized that Johnson v. Avery protected such conduct 
generally,186 but found the injunction tailored to discipline Green as one 
might any other practitioner of law,187 “an inveterate writ writer for his own 
benefit and for the benefit of other convicts from whom he receives fees for 
his services.”188  In entering the injunction, the district court had found that 
Green “engaged in a flagrant and gross abuse of the judicial process, that he 
repeatedly files frivolous and harassive lawsuits, that he has deliberately and 
intentionally deceived this Court with respect to his financial status, that he 
fails to follow the rules and procedures of the Court in filing actions.”189  The 
Eight Circuit agreed, and affirmed the contempt conviction.190
The following year, the Eighth Circuit convened en banc to consider 
what to do about Green.191  Green had filed a striking sixty-six petitions for 
writ of mandamus over the course of the year, all of which had been patently 
frivolous,192 and the district judge charged with addressing Green’s filings 
had lodged an earnest plea to the court of appeals to afford him some relief, 
explaining that the court simply could not handle the volume of Green’s 
filings.193  The court of appeals barred Green from further mandamus filings 
on the same subject as the sixty-six already filed, and advised the district 
court to dismiss in forma pauperis claims that were facially frivolous, as well 
 184.  See, e.g., In re Green, 586 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126 (8th 
Cir. 1979) (en banc); Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
 185.  In re Green, 586 F.2d at 1247. 
 186.  Id. at 1251. 
 187.  Id.
 188.  Id. at 1249. 
 189.  In re Green, 586 F.2d at 1250 (quoting Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732, 743 (W.D. 
Mo.1976)). 
 190.  Id. at 1253. 
 191.  Id. at 1127. 
 192.  Id. at 1127–28. 
 193.  Id. (“Green has continued to abuse the judicial process at all levels of the state and federal 
judiciary.  That abuse of the judicial process has now become critical.  It is now approaching the 
point that the time and resources of several judicial officers, both on the trial and appellate level, 
are substantially engaged in the processing of Green’s cases.  In light of the size of our criminal 
and civil dockets, we cannot afford to expend this amount of judicial effort in processing the 
litigation of one person.  Quite frankly we do not have the judicial resources to give Green 
immediate service upon the myriad of matters which he raises in this court by way of his unending 
flow of paper.”). 
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 50 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 50 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/15/2018 7:58 PM
84 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:1 
as any cumulative claims recapitulating those already filed.194  In crafting 
this narrowly tailored remedy, the court reaffirmed that “[i]t is axiomatic that 
no petitioner or person shall ever be denied his right to the processes of the 
court.”195
But the Eighth Circuit returned to the Reverend Green yet again a year 
later in 1980, as he had persisted obstinately in his importunities.196  In 
desperation, the district court had entered an order under the All Writs Act 
enjoining Green from filing in forma pauperis at all.197  The court of appeals 
held the district court had gone too far, and thus required the “deletion of the 
requirement that the petitioner pay a filing fee with every writ, petition or 
complaint or motion he files and that enjoins him from ever proceeding in 
forma pauperis.”198  The court did, however, “severely limit” Green’s future 
in forma pauperis filings, limiting them to those that “specifically allege 
constitutional deprivation by reason of physical harm or threats thereof to 
petitioner’s person.”199  The other aspects of the order, requiring Green to 
list any previous filings on the same subject and verify all pleadings, were 
upheld.200  In the end, Green’s recognized “right to the processes of the 
court” was trimmed to a narrow set of causes of action—but not wholly 
eliminated.201
By 1981, other circuits too had been driven to curtail the Reverend 
Green’s access to the courts in response to the deluge.202  The D.C. Circuit 
confronted orders entered by similarly desperate district courts: one that had 
directed its clerk not to accept any further filings at all, and another that 
prohibited in forma pauperis filings and required a fee uniformly.203  Whilst 
sympathizing with the need to curb Green’s “flagrant and serious abuse,” the 
court of appeals nonetheless found such punitive measures to “violate 
Green’s statutory and constitutional rights of access to the courts” and 
vacated them.204  This was because:  
 194.  In re Green, 586 F.2d at 1128. 
 195.  Id. at 1127. 
 196.  Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
 197.  Id. at 1055. 
 198.  Id.
 199.  Id.
 200.  Id. at 1056. 
 201.  In re Green, 598 F.2d at 1127. 
 202.  See, e.g., Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A); In re Green, 669 F.2d 
779 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 203.  In re Green, 669 F.2d at 780–81, 784–85. 
 204.  Id. at 781. 
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[T]he court has in effect entered a conclusive presumption that 
anything Green submits to the district court will be duplicative, 
frivolous or malicious.  While methods that other courts have 
employed to deter Green from continuing to harass them amount 
in effect to rebuttable presumptions that Green is submitting 
papers in bad faith, those orders have left the courthouse door ajar, 
if only slightly.205
Instead, the court of appeals ordered that Green must in future seek 
leave of the court to make any filing, and certify the claims lodged were 
novel, on penalty of contempt if the certification proved false.206  Calling 
even this lesser penalty “severe,” the court nevertheless concluded that only 
the threat of further incarceration via contempt conviction could deter Green 
whilst still observing his constitutional and statutory right of access via 
feeless filing.207
By contrast, even whilst citing the D.C. Circuit’s measured 
disposition,208 the Fifth Circuit instead mimicked the Eighth in drastically 
restricting the Reverend Green’s ability to file in forma pauperis within its 
jurisdiction, directing its own clerk to refuse to docket any such filings unless 
they alleged “constitutional deprivation by reason of physical harm or threats 
to petitioner’s person,” and allowing its district courts to do the same.209
There, however, the court relied on its “general supervisory power to control 
its docket,” rather than the All Writs Act.210  Its reasoning was clear: 
“Flagrant abuse of the judicial process can enable one person to preempt the 
 205.  In re Green, 669 F.2d at 785–86. 
 206.  Id. at 787.  The Seventh Circuit reached a very similar result when confronted with Green.  
See Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring affidavit that claim is novel and 
leave of court to file).
 207.  First, the order does not impose any financial restrictions that might operate to 
preclude Green from filing a new and legitimate complaint.  Green is free to seek to 
proceed in the district court (and this court on appeal, if necessary) in forma 
pauperis.  However, Green must in each case satisfy, in addition to the terms of the 
order, the requirements of section 1915.  Second, Green is entitled to the processes 
of the district court to file any claim upon a satisfactory demonstration of the novelty 
of the claim and its bona fide nature.  This condition is not at all onerous and 
certainly does not interfere with Green’s right of access.  In determining” whether a 
claim Green wishes to raise is a new one, the district court shall employ traditional 
notions of res judicata.  Failure to certify that the claim has not been decided before 
in any federal court or a false certification will render Green in violation of this order 
and in contempt of court.  Although the penalty for any further abuse of the 
processes of this court is potentially substantial, the order does not preclude or even 
unduly burden Green from submitting a new and nonfrivolous complaint. 
In re Green, 669 F.2d at 787–88 
 208.  Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A). 
 209.  Id. at 287. 
 210.  Id.
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 51 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 51 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/15/2018 7:58 PM
86 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:1 
use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious 
claims of other litigants,”211 and “others have honest claims upon our limited 
capacities of time and judgment.  The attention which Green’s spurious ones 
have demanded insures that other claims of arguable merit must tarry.”212
Like the D.C. Circuit, however, the Fifth relied on the prospect of contempt 
should Green persist in his attempts despite the injunction.213
To be sure, proscriptions have not been limited to the Reverend 
Green.214  The Eleventh Circuit faced its own bête noir in the person of 
prisoner Robert Procup, the proponent of over three hundred baseless 
lawsuits.215  A beleaguered district court had enjoined Procup from bringing 
any suits pro se, relying on the All Writs Act to require an attorney approve 
a claim before the clerk would file it.216  This farfetched remedy was 
ostensibly necessary because the court thought no other course—including 
the precertification of the D.C. Circuit, or even drastic interdictions of the 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits—could suffice.217  On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit 
was unsparing: it found the injunction “overbroad,” noted that no other 
circuit had gone so far, and concluded that the order’s: 
[U]nlimited scope denies Procup adequate, effective, and 
meaningful access to the courts. Moreover, inherent in a judicial 
ruling which completely forecloses an individual’s pro se access 
to federal court is an ominous abandonment of judicial 
responsibility, the import of which far exceeds the actual abuse 
attributable even to the exceptional prisoner litigant. The efficient 
operation of our judicial system does not require the issuance of 
an unlimited restriction on this pro se litigant’s access to the 
courts.218
 211. Green, 649 F.2d at 287. 
 212.  Id. at 286. 
 213.  Id. (“In the event that Green’s pattern continues, we commend the contempt sanction to 
any panel upon which he seeks to impose.”). 
 214.  The short survey here should not be construed to imply there have not been many other 
decisions addressing prolific petitioners.  E.g., In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982); Peck v. 
Hoff, 660 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1981); Gordon v. United States Department of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 
(1st Cir. 1977); see, e.g., Wasby 1995, supra note 12, at 96–98 (discussing cases); Wasby 1990, 
supra note 12, at 113–16 (same). 
 215.  Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 150–151 (M.D. Fla. 1983), rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107 
(11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 216.  Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 160–61. 
 217.  See id. at 159–160 (considering and rejecting verification under penalty of contempt, 
limitation to constitutional claims of harm, and plenary judicial preapproval). 
 218.  Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 
F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
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That was not the final word, however.  The court of appeals 
reconsidered the case en banc and, whilst reaching the same result, stressed 
that the district court had ample options to curtail Procup’s excesses.219  True, 
“courts must carefully observe the fine line between legitimate restraints and 
an impermissible restriction on a prisoner’s constitutional right of access to 
the courts.”220  This left the district court with much latitude, however: 
“Procup can be severely restricted as to what he may file and how he must 
behave in his applications for judicial relief.  He just cannot be completely 
foreclosed from any access to the court.”221
For like reasons, other circuits have often forborne from absolutist 
prohibitions in favor of requiring lesser measures such as prescreening or 
leave of court to file.222  Likewise, in Cello-Whitney v. Hoover and In re 
Tyler, district courts approved novel but well-targeted remedies restricting a 
claimant to a certain number of in forma pauperis filings per month or year 
(as well as precertification), neatly maintaining access as well as 
constraining prolificacy.223 Tyler, moreover, did so whilst also allowing a 
familiar exemption from the limit on annual filings in the event of an 
allegation of imminent harm.224  This thoughtful approach has been approved 
on appeal as well in the Tenth Circuit in Rubins v. Roetker.225
2.  Prolific Petitioners After the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act 
Aside from the courts themselves, commentators had suggested the 
judiciary possessed the inherent power and indeed duty to curtail access to 
prolific litigants who persisted in frivolous in forma pauperis filings.226  Jody 
L. Sturtz endorsed a categorical three-per-year approach as a necessary evil 
to combat the alleged reality that “courts can no longer control its [sic]
management of the ever increasing number of frivolous, meritless suits.”227
Faced with these burgeoning demands, Sturtz rejected case-by-case 
 219.  Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072–73. (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 220.  Id. at 1072. 
 221.  Id. at 1074. 
 222.  See Procup, 567 F. Supp. 157–60 (surveying approaches), rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th 
Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
 223.  Cello-Whitney v. Hoover, 769 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (three per year); 
In re Tyler, 677 F. Supp. 1410, 1414 (D. Neb. 1987) (one per year); see Sturtz, supra note 58, at 
1373–76 (discussing cases). 
 224.  In re Tyler, 677 F. Supp. at 1414. 
 225.  Rubins v. Roetker, 737 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (D. Colo. 1990) (one per year), aff’d, 936 
F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 226.  See generally Sturtz, supra note 58. 
 227.  Id. at 1368–91, 1378. 
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adjudication as unworkable and proponed a universal rule for all prisoners.228
As in many courts,229 the predicament presented by prolific prisoners was 
framed as especially acute.230
Congress evidently agreed in drafting the PLRA, under which such 
prisoners are subjected to categorically stringent treatment when seeking to 
proceed in forma pauperis under § 1915 and prevailing precedent.231  The 
most remarkable statutory mandate is provided in subsection (g), and 
parallels some of the more extreme responses of courts prior to the PLRA’s 
passage:232
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a 
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the 
prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or 
detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of 
the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is 
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 
serious physical injury.233
Congress thus far exceeded Sturtz’s recommendation, by imposing a 
permanent ban on all future petitions once the threshold of three dismissals 
was reached.234  But courts encountering this new provision found nothing 
out of ordinary, observing that courts had “routinely revoked a prisoner’s 
ability to proceed [in forma pauperis] after numerous dismissals,” pointing 
to the saga of Reverend Green.235  Perhaps because of this history, the courts 
thus found nothing constitutionally objectionable about a statute barring civil 
access to the federal judiciary almost entirely.236  Indeed, the vanishingly 
slender residual exception for claims involving “danger of serious physical 
 228.  See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1373–74. 
 229.  See supra Section I-B. 
 230.  See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1377–79. 
 231.  141 CONG. REC. 14,570 (1995); see supra Section I-B. 
 232.  Franklin, supra note 93, at 192 (“One of the more controversial changes to section 1915 
was the addition of subsection 1915(g) . . . .”). 
 233.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (1996). 
 234.  See id. 
 235.  Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Green v. Carlson, 649 
F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)).
 236.  See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317–18 (3d. Cir. 2001); Rivera v. Allin, 
144 F. 3d 719, 723–28 (11th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1998); 
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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injury”237 transparently evokes the similarly absolutist regimes approved by 
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.238  Yet such a bar would seemingly contravene 
firmly established Supreme Court precedent.239
The Third Circuit in Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie provided particularly 
creative reasoning in defense of the PLRA.240  There, the Third Circuit read 
Supreme Court precedents to hold that due process demands only there be 
some avenue for a prisoner to bring his claim.241  As the prisoner in question 
could avail himself of the Delaware in forma pauperis statute, the court 
found that barring access to the federal courts entirely would not preclude a 
judicial hearing of his § 1983 complaint,242 and thus eschewed strict scrutiny 
and reviewed the PLRA’s restriction only under rational basis review, which 
it could easily pass.243  The court also expressed doubt that Abdul-Akbar’s 
claim was in the “narrow category” of civil claims to be guaranteed access 
to the courts.244
Yet the Abdul-Akbar dissent readily illustrated the failings of the 
majority’s arguments.245  The claim at issue was manifestly constitutionally 
grounded, protected under Supreme Court precedent.246  And the ability to 
remove a state action to federal court (where it would be promptly dismissed 
for lack of a filing fee) would afford the defendant effective immunity.247
Moreover, the constitutionality of a general federal statute cannot turn on the 
happenstance of state law,248 a principle the Court has long recognized:249
 237.  See Franklin, supra note 93, at 193. 
 238.  See Green, 649 F.2d at 287; Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 
1980) (per curiam).
 239.  See generally Franklin, supra note 93. 
 240.  Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317–23. 
 241.  Id. at 317–18 (analyzing M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) and the “seminal case” of 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 301, 371, 382–383 (1971)). 
 242.  Id. at 318. 
 243.  Id. at 318–19. 
 244.  Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 317–18 (quoting M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 113 (1996)); see also 
Asemani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 797 F.3d 1069, 1076–77 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(quoting M.L.B.).
 245.  Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 325–33 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
 246.  Id. at 325–28 (“That these rights are fundamental to our constitutional system cannot be 
gainsaid.”).
 247.  Id. at 330. 
 248.  Id. at 329–30. 
 249.  See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394–95 (1971); Wayne 
A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the Applicability of 
Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 145–46 (2009) (discussing Court 
cases that condemned “permitting federal rights to depend on state laws”); see also Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 28 n.2 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Bivens). But see Carlson, 446 
U.S. at 23 (majority) (“The question whether respondent’s action for violations by federal officials 
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what result were Abdul-Akbar incarcerated across the Delaware River in 
Pennsylvania, where the state applied a parallel “three strikes limitation” on 
in forma pauperis status, and thus no avenue existed?250  Upholding § 
1915(g) would then deny prisoners any forum for their claims,251 in apparent 
defiance of the Supreme Court’s precedents on the right of access.252  This 
result is particularly jarring because the Third Circuit, in a case involving the 
same prolific petitioner, had previously held such a bar unconstitutional—
until the PLRA endorsed it.253  The preponderance of appellate courts, 
however, have upheld the PLRA against constitutional challenge, even the 
Eleventh and D.C. Circuits.254
3.  The Case for the Constitutionality of Access 
The consensus in favor of § 1915(g) thus invites closer examination of 
the constitutionality of access to the courtroom.255  The Third Circuit in 
Abdul-Akbar rightly noted that the Supreme Court has classified certain 
species of civil claims as not implicating the constitution right of access, 
including bankruptcy filings and welfare benefit determinations.256  But 
equally surely, the Court has made clear that the right to lodge a 
constitutional claim, writ of habeas corpus, or suit challenging conditions of 
confinement is protected under the due process clauses.257  It has held more 
generally that a plaintiff has a right of access if there is no other forum in 
which the claim can be lodged.258  And it has found that a fee that effectively 
forbids an indigent litigant from filing infringes this right, notwithstanding 
of federal constitutional rights should be left to the vagaries of the laws of the several States admits 
of only a negative answer in the absence of a contrary congressional resolution.”). 
 250.  Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 329–30 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). 
 251.  Id.
 252.  See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577–80 (1974); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 
371, 374–377 (1971); see also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 253.  Abdul-Akbar, 239 F.3d at 319–20 (“While not expressly repudiating our holding in 
Watson, [901 F.2d 329,] the majority nonetheless essentially holds that what the District Court was 
then precluded from doing by the Constitution it is now required to do by statute.”). 
 254.  See, e.g., id.; Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1998); Carson v. 
Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997); Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719 (11th Cir. 1998); 
Asemani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 797 F.3d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  But see Lyon 
v. Kroll, 940 F. Supp. 1433 (S.D. Iowa 1996); Franklin, supra note 93, at 205–08 (discussing Lyon). 
 255.  See generally Franklin, supra note 93. 
 256.  Franklin, supra note 93 (citing United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1972) and 
Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973)).  Critically, such claims are creatures solely of 
statute rather than constitutional in nature. 
 257.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996); Wolff, 418 U. S. at 577–80 (1974); see generally
Franklin, supra note 93, at 200–01, 219. 
 258.  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–77 (1971). 
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the court is technically available—if only the litigant (contrafactually) had 
the funds to avail.259  All of this follows straightforwardly from the Court’s 
view that without a real right of access to the courts to vindicate claims, no 
other rights can have substance, and civil society itself is endangered.260
Indeed, while Sturtz robustly defended the constitutionality of an 
annual limit on in forma pauperis filings, she noted that this was only so 
“because the prisoner could still file a limited number of in forma pauperis
lawsuits” and thus the limit “in no way closes the courthouse doors to the 
indigent prisoner.”261  Several courts support this distinction.262  Absent such 
a yearly allowance, Sturtz too would seemingly find the sort of “total denial 
of the right to access” implicated by a perpetual ban infringes on the Petition 
Clause of the First Amendment.263
Undeniably, more measured approaches to the abuses of prolific 
petitioners leave some potential for further abuse: As the Procup district 
court declaimed at length, litigants may perjure themselves in sworn 
precertifications, deluge the court with requests for leave to file, and prove 
undeterred by the threat of contempt if already set for long incarceration.264
Yet such is the price of a constitutionally sound system of justice open to all, 
as evidenced by the Eleventh Circuit’s sharp reversal on constitutional 
grounds,265 as well as that of the D.C. Circuit.266  Eschewing absolutist 
interdictions like those of the PLRA along with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits 
still affords district courts plentiful tools, if not the most convenient nuclear 
 259.  See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–12 (1996); Boddie, 401 U.S. at 376–77; Smith 
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
U. S. 12, 16–20 (1956); see also Franklin, supra note 93, at 195–201. 
 260.  See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); Boddie, 401 U.S. 
at 374–377. 
 261.  Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1374–76. 
 262.  See Rubins v. Roetker, 737 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (D. Colo. 1990), aff’d, 936 F.2d 583 
(10th Cir. 1991); Cello-Whitney v. Hoover, 769 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1991); In re
Tyler, 677 F. Supp. 1410, 1414 (D. Neb. 1987). 
 263.  Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1374–76.
 264.  Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 158–160 (M.D. Fla. 1983), rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107 
(11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 265.  See Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1111–15 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated and 
remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam) (“The centerpiece of the Section 
1915 procedures is the district court’s exercise of its discretion on a case-by-case basis, however 
tedious this exercise of discretion may become. The statute places the responsibility of reviewing 
prisoner complaints in the district court alone, and ‘any order that does not allow a district court 
the appropriate exercise of discretion under § 1915 is invalid.’”) (quoting In re Green, 669 F.2d 
779, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1981)), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per
curiam).
 266.  In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785–87 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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option of permanently barring the courthouse doors to virtually all claims.267
If nothing else, the monthly or annual limits endorsed by Cello-Whitney,
Tyler, Rubins, and Sturtz provide a robust check on volume.268
To say the Fifth and Eight Circuits’ interdictions leave the courthouse 
doors remain “ajar, if only slightly” is euphemistic at best:269 In fact, such 
orders prejudge that “in forma pauperis claims not involving actual or 
threatened physical harm are ipso facto duplicative, frivolous, or 
malicious.”270  Avoiding such prejudice is of constitutional scope: It is nigh-
impossible to square the Eight Circuit’s en banc recognition of an 
“axiomatic” right of access to the courts with a panel’s peremptory 
interdiction of nearly all claims heedless of their frequency, novelty, or 
merit.271  (Remarkably, the Procup district court found even the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits nigh-absolute proscriptions insufficient, on the theory that 
Procup would simply insert spurious claims of physical injury into every 
filing.272)  Even to burden, let alone bar, a fundamental right requires the 
statute be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”273
Another case from the Third Circuit, In re Oliver, provides perhaps the 
best accounting of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ approval of these far-
reaching penalties.274  There the court confirmed the use of similar 
interdictions against prolific petitioners,275 even whilst noting “any such 
order is an extreme remedy, and should be used only in exigent 
 267.  Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072–73 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 268.  See Cello-Whitney v. Hoover, 769 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Sturtz, supra
note 58. 
 269.  See In re Green, 669 F.2d at 785–86 (quoted supra note 207). 
 270.  Procup, 760 F.2d at 1111–12 (questioning “whether such an injunction should ever be 
employed”).
 271.  Compare In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc), with Green v. White 
(In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054, 1055–56 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
 272.  Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 159 (“Likewise, the approach taken by the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits in dealing with Green––allowing Green to file suit in forma pauperis only if he alleges a 
constitutional deprivation stemming from physical injury––does not appear to be a wholly 
satisfactory method of curbing Procup’s abuse.  While such an order would curtail Procup’s 
complaints concerning the living conditions of his confinement, the Court is concerned that it would 
merely ensure that Procup’s future allegations included a claim of physical harm to his person.”), 
rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en 
banc) (per curiam).
 273.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982) (quoted in Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F. 
3d 307, 316, 325 (3d. Cir. 2001)); see Franklin, supra note 93, at 194. 
 274.  In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 275.  Id. at 446 (“We agree with the First and District of Columbia Circuits, however, that a 
continuous pattern of groundless and vexatious litigation can, at some point, support an order 
against further filings of complaints without the permission of the court.  The case before us appears 
to reveal a situation sufficient to justify exercise of the court’s power, under the All Writ’s [sic]
Act, to do so.”). 
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circumstances.”276  Indeed, in the same breath the court professed that 
“[a]ccess to the courts is a fundamental tenet of our judicial system; 
legitimate claims should receive a full and fair hearing no matter how 
litigious the plaintiff may be” and that “the ‘In Forma Pauperis’ statute, was 
enacted specifically to provide poor persons with equal access to the federal 
courts.”277  Barring frivolous claims would not implicate the right of access 
to the courts, however,278 and this distinction is critical to the Third Circuit: 
The record suggests that Oliver’s claims have been not only 
numerous but patently without merit—none has yet stated a claim 
sufficient to require a hearing.  The express language of the order 
mandates that “the Clerk . . . accept no future case for filing from 
Mr. Oliver, absent a specific Order from a Judge of this Court.”  
In reviewing the Court’s order we understand that, Oliver’s 
propensity for filing numerous frivolous suits notwithstanding, the 
district court would permit the filing of any nonfrivolous claim 
submitted by Oliver.279
This “understanding” is evident in circuits only requiring sworn 
precertification or leave of court to file.280  And it seems to be the (unstated) 
understanding of the more draconian Fifth and Eighth circuits in approving 
absolutist interdictions as well.281  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit, amongst others, 
has reaffirmed that in enacting the PLRA, “Congress did not intend to ‘freeze 
out meritorious claims or ossify district court errors.’”282  Yet given the 
unfailing frivolousness of past filings, these courts apparently presume 
 276.  In re Oliver, 682 F.2d  at 445. 
 277.  Id. at 446 (emphasis added). 
 278.  Id. (“No person, however, ‘. . . rich or poor, is entitled to abuse the judicial process.’”); 
see Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1377 (arguing right of access not implicated for frivolous filings); 
Feldman, supra note 29, at 433–34 (same). 
 279.  Id. at 446. (second emphasis added). 
 280.  See, e.g., Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir. 1983); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 
787 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Gordon v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977); see Procup v. 
Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 1985) (discussing cases), vacated and remanded, 792 
F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam).
 281.  See, e.g., Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371, 374 (8th Cir. 1981); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 
285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A); Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 
1980) (per curiam).
 282.  Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir.1999) 
(quoting Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir.1996)); Thompson v. DEA, 492 F.3d 
428, 432–33 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting same). 
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future filings will follow suit, raising no constitutional concerns.283  If a claim 
rebuts that presumption, there remains the supposition, as in Oliver, that the 
claim will somehow be allowed to proceed.284  The devilish fallacy of this 
happy supposition lies, as usual, in the details:285  However are judges to 
even become aware of a meritorious claim if their clerks are invisibly and 
automatically rejecting every filing without regard for its merit?286  (Some 
panels have implied that indigent petitioners are expected to somehow 
accrue the means to pay a fee in order to signal that this claim is worth 
reviewing287—unless the statute of limitations expires first.288)
Commentators have split over whether such a regime can pass constitutional 
muster.289  At the end of the day, however, the Supreme Court appears to 
 283.  See Procup, 760 F.2d at 1111 (“Imposing this type of injunction creates, in effect, a 
conclusive presumption that future in forma pauperis claims not involving actual or threatened 
physical harm are ipso facto duplicative, frivolous, or malicious.”) (discussing Green, 649 F.2d 
285, and In re Green, 616 F.2d 1054), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en
banc) (per curiam); Peck, 660 F.2d at 374 (“It had experienced a number of meritless complaints 
filed by inmate Peck.  When it entered its order of June 11, 1981, it had every reason to expect the 
pattern to continue, as indeed it did.”); see also Feldman, supra 29, at 434–35. 
 284.  In re Oliver only makes explicit what is implicitly so of any court: a later judge or panel 
can surely enter an order expressly directing the docketing of a meritorious claim notwithstanding 
a standing interdiction. 
 285.  Cf. United States v. Villalpando, 588 F.3d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Unfortunately for 
Villalpando, the devil is in the details.”); United States v. Turcotte, 405 F. 3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 
2005) (“As the old adage instructs, the devil is in the details.”). 
 286.  The answer that the interdicted litigant in possession of a meritorious claim could write 
to the issuing judge by letter to plead its worth hardly solves anything: Presumably judges issuing 
interdictions of this sort are not expecting to simply transfer their review of the merits of a tidal 
wave of claims from their formal docket to their inboxes, and will not accommodate prolific 
petitioners who engage in such a letter-writing campaign, but rather discard letters as peremptorily 
as formal filings. See Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 160 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (“The approach 
taken by the First and Third Circuits and by the Western District of Missouri in dealing with 
Green—prohibiting him from filing any further pleadings of any sort without leave of court—could 
possibly be effective in preventing Procup from engaging in further abuse of the judicial process.  
Unless Procup convinced the Court that his complaint was meritorious, he would be barred from 
prosecuting any further actions.  Upon closer examination, however, such a sanction does not 
appear likely to alter significantly the present situation.  The Court would, in all likelihood, continue 
to be deluged by Procup’s frivolous filings; they would merely be accompanied by his requests to 
obtain the Court’s permission to proceed with his cases.  Those requests would necessitate repeated 
preliminary reviews similar in form to those presently given.  Therefore, in substance, the Court 
would not have effectively curtailed Procup’s abusive filing practices.”). 
 287.  See, Peck, 660 F.2d at 374 (approving interdiction in part because an indigent petitioner 
can still supposedly access the court by paying the required fee). 
 288.  Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 328 (3d. Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J., dissenting) 
(“If they cannot buy entry into court, they must wait until they can; and if the wait is too long, 
justice will be denied to them.”). 
 289.  Compare, e.g., Franklin, supra note 93 (detailing constitutional problems with the 
PLRA), and Michelman, supra note 22 (discussing constitutional problems in the Supreme Court 
right of access decisions), with Lane, supra note 11, at 353–63 (finding no constitutional argument 
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have at least obliquely sanctioned this brand of “extreme remedy”290 in citing 
such cases with approval whilst fashioning its own brand of interdictions.291
III.  The In Forma Pauperis Supreme Court Cases 
Notwithstanding the various approaches and occasional “extreme 
remedy” levied by the lower courts,292 the Supreme Court itself had managed 
its caseload for the vast majority of its history without resort to proscribing 
any of its petitioners.293  It was not until 1989—exactly two centuries after 
the Court’s establishment294—that the putative problem of pestersome 
paupers goaded the Court into action.295  But change came swiftly thereafter, 
especially for such a ponderous institution: just three years later, the Court 
had revised its rules and adjusted its jurisprudence to bar the courthouse 
doors against what would become a lengthy roll of indigent litigants.296  Nor 
was the Court unacquainted of the import of its interdict, as the first decisions 
were narrow 5-4 votes, and all featured increasingly fiery dissents decrying 
the cost to the Court.297  The majority, by contrast, consistently wrote without 
attribution—per curiam.298  Figure 1 illustrates the shrinking dissenting 
coalition over the course of the eight cases. 
against the Supreme Court’s use of the practice), and Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1374–78 
(distinguishing constitutionality of various degrees of interdiction). 
 290.  In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d. Cir. 1982). 
 291.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 & n.8 (1989) (citing Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 
1069 (11th Cir. 1986), Peck, 660 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1981), and Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th 
Cir. 1981)); see infra Section III-B; see also Lane, supra note 11, at 355 (“As a result, it is safe to 
say that a right of access for IFP litigants will not be recognized any time soon, absent an explicit 
law by Congress, because the current membership of the Court is unlikely to establish one.”). 
 292.  See supra Section II-B. 
 293.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184; see also id. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 294.  An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, 1st Cong., § 1, 1 Stat. 73 
(Sept. 24, 1789) (“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 
of America in Congress assembled, That the supreme court of the United States shall consist of a 
chief justice and five associate justices, any four of whom shall be a quorum . . . .”). 
 295.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180.
 296.  See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992); In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 
13 (1991). 
 297.  See infra Figure 1. 
 298.  See Martin, 506 U.S. 1; Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16 (1991) (per curiam); In re
Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13; In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16 (1991) (per curiam); In re Sindram, 
498 U.S. 177 (1991) (per curiam); Wrenn v. Benson, 490 U.S. 89 (1989)  (per curiam); In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180; Brown v. Herald Co., 464 U.S. 928 (1983) (per curiam).
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Figure 1: Votes in the In Forma Pauperis Supreme Court Cases 
Brown Burger Brennan White Marshall Blackmun Powell Rehnquist Stevens O’Connor 
McDonald Rehnquist Brennan White Marshall Blackmun Stevens O’Connor Scalia Kennedy 
Wrenn Rehnquist Brennan White Marshall Blackmun Stevens O’Connor Scalia Kennedy 
Sindram Rehnquist White Marshall Blackmun Stevens O’Connor Scalia Kennedy Souter 
Demos Rehnquist White Marshall Blackmun Stevens O’Connor Scalia Kennedy Souter 
Rule 39 Rehnquist White Marshall Blackmun Stevens O’Connor Scalia Kennedy Souter 
Zatko Rehnquist White Blackmun Stevens O’Connor Scalia Kennedy Souter Thomas* 
Martin Rehnquist White Blackmun Stevens O’Connor Scalia Kennedy Souter Thomas 
Presumed Majority          Minority         With Written Dissent    
*  Did Not Participate. 
A. Brown v. Herald Co. 299 — October 31, 1983 
Six years earlier, the Court had undertaken a subtle change in its 
practice that would herald the coming upheaval in courtroom access.  In the 
therefore aptly captioned Brown v. Herald Co., a two-sentence per curiam
opinion denied the petitioner leave to file in forma pauperis, reserving any 
judgment on the merits of the petition until the filing fee was paid (or a 
renewed motion for leave made).300  In dissent, Justice William Brennan, 
joined by Justices Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun, observed that 
“when at least some of us proclaim that we are sorely pressed for adequate 
time to do our work, this treatment is both unfair and wasteful.”301
Previously, the Court evaluated whether a claim merited its plenary review 
without regard for the validity of the affidavit attesting to pauper status.302
The dissent observed that this made ample sense: what possible value could 
 299.  Brown, 464 U.S. at 928. 
 300.  Id.
 301.  Id. at 929 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 302.  Id. at 928–30 (“Each year, roughly 1,000 motions supported by affidavit are made for 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  These motions usually accompany a petition for a writ of 
certiorari or a jurisdictional statement, and our practice heretofore has almost always been not to 
pass on the in forma pauperis motion but to proceed directly to grant or deny the petition based on 
the merits of the questions presented in the petition or statement.”). 
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there be in directing parties to resubmit their claims if they had no merit?303
Fairer and more efficient to continue as the Court always had: to deny 
certiorari on the merits rather than encourage relitigation of collateral 
matters.304  The imperative was only amplified by the fact that eligibility for 
in forma pauperis filings lacked “an articulated set of standards” by which 
the decision could even be made.305
Justice John Paul Stevens too dissented, agreeing that “we should 
simply deny unmeritorious certiorari petitions without scrutinizing the 
petitioner’s right to proceed in forma pauperis,” but writing separately to 
address the circumstance where an in forma pauperis petition did show 
merit.306  In such cases, Justice Stevens emphasized that the question of 
whether the petitioner was truly indigent must then be taken up, and if the 
“examination disclosed the kind of disrespect for our rules that has motivated 
the Court’s unusual action in these cases, I would deny the petition even if it 
would otherwise have merited review.”307  Such an approach would amply 
police any abuse of the in forma pauperis system, in providing a compelling 
motivation to avoid fraudulent claims by withholding the dearest gift in the 
Court’s grasp: a grant of plenary review.308  By contrast, Justice Stevens 
could “see no purpose . . . in insisting that these petitioners—none of whom 
is represented by counsel who could advise them that their petitions stand no 
chance of being granted—pay a fee for the privilege of having their petitions 
denied.”309
The Supreme Court’s reversal of the order of affairs may seem 
picayune, but it was not nugatory.  Formerly, all petitions were assessed for 
merit in the first instance, regardless of the status of the petitioner.  By now 
putting the proverbial cart before the horse, the Court refashioned the 
petitioner’s filing status into a gatekeeper that could forbid even an initial 
review of the merits.  Such a reversal is all the more perplexing given that 
 303. Brown, 464 U.S. at 931 (“What possible justification can support the scrutiny of 1,000 
affidavits in support of in forma pauperis motions each year?”). 
 304.  Id. at 930–31. 
 305.  Id. at 930. 
 306.  Id. at 931 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 307.  Id.
 308.  Id. (“That would remove any incentive a petitioner might otherwise have to seek in forma 
pauperis status although ineligible for such status, without requiring the Court to assume the burden 
of examining every motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  In borderline cases the petitioner 
should, of course, be given an opportunity to pay the required costs before final action is taken on 
his application.”). 
 309.  Brown, 464 U.S. at 931. 
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the new ordering would multiply the Court’s work pointlessly.310  Indeed, 
Justice Stevens had previously written that “given the volume of frivolous, 
illegible, and sometimes unintelligible petitions that are filed in this Court, 
our work is facilitated by the practice of simply denying certiorari once a 
determination is made that there is no merit to the petitioner’s claim.”311  And 
in the first intimation that these kind of questions matter, Justice Brennan 
also added in a footnote that “[m]otions to proceed in forma pauperis are a 
special case since they will determine whether an individual gains access to 
this Court.”312
B. In re McDonald 313 — February 21, 1989 
The proscriptive potential of Brown’s newly fashioned gatekeeping 
approach to in forma pauperis filings did not go untapped overlong.  Over 
the course of the 1980s, one Jessie McDonald had applied to the Supreme 
Court seventy-three times; every appeal, petition, and motion had been 
denied.314  His latest filing not-too-coherently sought an extraordinary writ 
of habeas corpus, as well as, like his other filings, leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis.315  Without reaching the merits, the Court denied leave and gave 
McDonald three weeks to come up with the cash for filing fees,316 despite 
the Court’s underlining that the Court had never before denied him in forma 
pauperis status,317 and there being no question he was in fact 
impoverished.318  (The standard court fee represented the entirety of 
McDonald’s stated monthly income.319)  Rather, the court viewed the statute 
 310.  Brown, 464 U.S. at 930 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 931 (“Our time certainly 
can be spent in more productive effort than the determination of whether a petitioner or appellant 
is able to pay $200 plus the cost of printing and still provide himself and his dependents with the 
necessities of life.”). 
 311.  Davis v. Jacobs, 454 U.S. 911, 914 (1981) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting denial of 
certiorari) (quoted in Brown, 464 U.S. at 931). 
 312.  Brown, 464 U.S. at 930 n.4. 
 313.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (5-4) (per curiam).
 314.  Id. at 181–82. 
 315.  Id. at 180. 
 316.  Id.
 317.  Id. at 182 (“We have never previously denied him leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). 
 318.  Id. at 182 n.6. 
 319.  Compare In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 182 (“In the affidavit in support of his present 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, petitioner states that he earns approximately $300 per 
month.”) with In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13 (1991) (per curiam) (“Filings under our paid 
docket require a not-insubstantial filing fee, currently $300, and compliance with our printing 
requirements.”).
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prescribing in forma pauperis filings as permissive, allowing courts to deny 
leave based on concerns other than lack of penury.320
But the Court went further.  Noting that pro se in forma pauperis
litigants lack the deterrents of fees to penalize meritless claims, the Court 
found that McDonald’s continuing drain on the Court’s limited resources 
warranted a novel penalty:321  “We also direct the Clerk not to accept any 
further petitions from petitioner for extraordinary writs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1651(a), 2241, and 2254(a), unless he pays the docketing fee.”322  The 
Court recognized its ban on McDonald ever again seeking an extraordinary 
writ in forma pauperis was without precedent in its own jurisprudence.323
But the Court looked to precedents in the lower courts to justify its newfound 
approach.324  In defense of the ban, the Court emphasized that extraordinary 
writs are virtually never granted in any event, and petitioner remained free 
to seek relief via the ordinary routes of certiorari or appeal.325  Tellingly, the 
majority repeatedly characterized in forma pauperis status as a privilege that 
could be retracted, rather than a right.326
The four dissenters from Brown again rebelled, arguing that the Court 
lacked the power to preemptively deny in forma pauperis status in any and 
all extraordinary petitions.327  Taking the pen once more, Justice Brennan 
admitted McDonald likely abused the Court’s process, but disagreed “that 
he poses such a threat to the orderly administration of justice that we should 
 320.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 183–84 (“Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides that ‘[a]ny court 
of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action 
or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security 
therefor.’ . . .  Each year, we permit the vast majority of persons who wish to proceed in forma 
pauperis to do so.”). 
 321. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184 (“But paupers filing pro se petitions are not subject to 
the financial considerations filing fees and attorney’s fees that deter other litigants from filing 
frivolous petitions.  Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or 
frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s limited resources.  A part of the Court’s 
responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of 
justice.  The continual processing of petitioner’s frivolous requests for extraordinary writs does not 
promote that end.”). 
 322.  Id. at 180. 
 323.  Id. at 184; see also id. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In the first such act in its almost 
200-year history, the Court today bars its door to a litigant prospectively.”). 
 324.  Id. (majority) (citing Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986), Peck v. Hoff, 
660 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1981), and Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 325.  Id. at 185. 
 326.  See id. at 184 (“Each year, we permit the vast majority of persons who wish to proceed 
in forma pauperis to do so; last Term, we afforded the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis
to about 2,300 persons.”); id. at 185 (“Petitioner remains free under the present order to file in
forma pauperis requests for relief other than an extraordinary writ, if he qualifies under this Court’s 
Rule 46 and does not similarly abuse that privilege.”). 
 327.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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embark on the unprecedented and dangerous course the Court charts 
today.”328  Turning to the statute, Justice Brennan noted that it allowed the 
court to dismiss only “if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that 
the action is frivolous or malicious.”329  And that statutory language was thus 
fatal to the Court’s sweeping interdiction: “Needless to say, the future 
petitions McDonald is barred from filing have not been ‘found to be’ 
frivolous.  Even a very strong and well-founded belief that McDonald’s 
future filings will be frivolous cannot render a before-the-fact disposition 
compatible with the individualized determination § 1915 contemplates.”330
Justice Brennan also observed that the Court’s own rules mandated that its 
clerk docket properly filed papers, and the Court now placed the clerk in the 
unhappy predicament of being directed to violate those very rules.331  “Of 
course,” he chided, “we are free to amend our own rules should we see the 
need to do so, but until we do, we are bound by them.”332
Justice Brennan’s peroration on the wisdom of the Court’s course, 
which would prove prescient, bears reproduction in full: 
Even if the legality of our action in ordering the Clerk to refuse 
future petitions for extraordinary writs in forma pauperis from this 
litigant were beyond doubt, I would still oppose it as unwise, 
potentially dangerous, and a departure from the traditional 
principle that the door to this courthouse is open to all.  The 
Court’s order purports to be motivated by this litigant’s 
disproportionate consumption of the Court’s time and resources.  
Yet if his filings are truly as repetitious as it appears, it hardly 
takes much time to identify them as such. 
I find it difficult to see how the amount of time and resources 
required to deal properly with McDonald’s petitions could be so 
great as to justify the step we now take.  Indeed, the time that has 
been consumed in the preparation of the present order barring the 
door to Mr.  McDonald far exceeds that which would have been 
necessary to process his petitions for the next several years, at 
least.  I continue to find puzzling the Court’s fervor in ensuring 
that rights granted to the poor are not abused, even when so doing 
actually increases the drain on our limited resources. Today’s 
 328.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 329.  Id.
 330.  Id. at 186. 
 331.  Id.
 332.  Id.
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order makes sense as an efficiency measure only if it is merely the 
prelude to similar orders in regard to other litigants, or perhaps to 
a generalized rule limiting the number of petitions in forma 
pauperis an individual may file. Therein lies its danger. 
The Court’s order itself seems to indicate that further measures, at 
least in regard to this litigant, may be forthcoming.  It notes that 
McDonald remains free to file in forma pauperis for relief other 
than extraordinary writs, if he “does not similarly abuse that 
privilege.” But if we have found his 19 petitions for extraordinary 
writs abusive, how long will it be until we conclude that his 33 
petitions for certiorari are similarly abusive and bar that door to 
him as well?  I am at a loss to say why, logically, the Court’s order 
is limited to extraordinary writs, and I can only conclude that this 
order will serve as precedent for similar actions in the future, both 
as to this litigant and to others. 
I doubt—although I am not certain—that any of the petitions 
Jessie McDonald is now prevented from filing would ultimately 
have been found meritorious.  I am most concerned, however, that, 
if, as I fear, we continue on the course we chart today, we will end 
by closing our doors to a litigant with a meritorious claim.  It is 
rare, but it does happen on occasion that we grant review and even 
decide in favor of a litigant who previously had presented multiple 
unsuccessful petitions on the same issue. 
This Court annually receives hundreds of petitions, most but not 
all of them filed in forma pauperis, which raise no colorable legal 
claim whatever, much less a question worthy of the Court’s 
review.  Many come from individuals whose mental or emotional 
stability appears questionable.  It does not take us long to identify 
these petitions as frivolous, and to reject them.  A certain 
expenditure of resources is required, but it is not great in relation 
to our work as a whole.  To rid itself of a small portion of this 
annoyance, the Court now needlessly departs from its generous 
tradition and improvidently sets sail on a journey whose landing 
point is uncertain.  We have long boasted that our door is open to 
all. We can no longer.333
 333.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 186–88 (citations omitted). 
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As telling as the language of the majority opinion is that of the dissent, 
speaking of the “rights granted to the poor” to make in forma pauperis
filings.334  This distinction seemingly animates the entire disagreement 
between the two sides: the minority saw access to the courtroom as a vested 
entitlement, whereas the majority saw it as a privilege forfeitable for 
misbehavior.
C. Wrenn v. Benson 335 — April 17, 1989 
Less than two months later, the Court returned to the subject of prolific 
in forma pauperis petitioners; Wrenn v. Benson, however, was considerably 
less seismic than McDonald.  Over the preceding three years, one Curtis 
Wrenn had filed twenty-two petitions for certiorari, almost all of them 
seeking to proceed in forma pauperis.336  In each case, the Court had 
examined the required affidavits, determined Wrenn was not in fact eligible 
to proceed, and denied leave, following the inverted process approved in 
Brown.337  Wrenn had nonetheless continued to seek in forma pauperis 
status, and having seen that the previous nineteen rejections had not curbed 
Wrenn’s enthusiasm, the majority now “direct[ed] the Clerk of the Court not 
to accept any further filings from petitioner in which he seeks leave to 
proceed in forma pauperis under this Court’s Rule 46.1, unless the affidavit 
submitted with the filing indicates that petitioner’s financial condition has 
substantially changed.”338
By way of reasoning, the majority pointed to the rationale expressed in 
McDonald that “[e]very paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter 
how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s 
limited resources.  A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these 
resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.”339
Unlike McDonald, however, the chastisement for Wrenn was considerably 
more measured.340  In directing the clerk to evaluate future affidavits to 
determine whether they stated a change of circumstance supporting a plea of 
poverty, the Court was simply delegating that fundamentally ministerial 
function to its clerk rather than expending its own time; it was not preventing 
Wrenn from proceeding in forma pauperis if in fact he lacked the funds to 
 334.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187. 
 335.  Wrenn v. Benson, 490 U.S. 89 (1989) (6-3) (per curiam).
 336.  Id. at 89. 
 337.  Id. at 89–91. 
 338.  Id. at 92. 
 339.  Id. (quoting In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184). 
 340.  Compare In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184, with Wrenn, 490 U.S. at 92. 
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pay.341  (Notably, Wrenn had paid the filing fee for one of his many petitions; 
he apparently could not or did not want to pay the others.342)
Perhaps because of this more modest accommodation, Justice 
Blackmun registered no disagreement with the per curiam decision.  The 
remainder of the Brown and McDonald dissenting wing remained defiant, 
however, with both Justices Brennan and Stevens writing.343  Neither had 
anything to add to the dialogue however: Justice Brennan simply stated his 
dissent for the same reasons given in Brown and McDonald;344 Justice 
Stevens did the same, reiterating only his belief that “the preparation and 
enforcement of orders of this kind consume more of the Court’s valuable 
time than is consumed by the routine denial of frivolous motions and 
petitions.”345  This uncharacteristic brevity likely bespeaks the fact that the 
majority’s remedy was not particularly problematic in terms of access to the 
Court, and certainly less so than the sweeping interdiction of McDonald or 
the more extreme remedies yet to come.346
D. In re Sindram 347 — January 7, 1991 
A brief hiatus followed Wrenn, but nonetheless only two more years 
passed before the next advance in the Court’s move to bar its doors.  Michael 
Sindram had applied to the Court for relief forty-three times over three years, 
and twenty-four times in that very term; all had been denied.348  Returning 
now with a request for an extraordinary writ and leave to proceed in forma 
pauperis, the Court denied leave, citing McDonald.349  Indeed, the opinion 
of the Court closely tracked that of the earlier case, once again noting the 
lack of deterrents to in forma pauperis litigants and its concern that the “goal 
of fairly dispensing justice, however, is compromised when the Court is 
forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and 
frivolous requests.”350  This time, however, the Court responded to one of 
Justice Brennan’s prior arguments in dissent, explaining that the “risks of 
 341.  Wrenn, 490 U.S. at 91–92. 
 342.  Id. at 89. 
 343.  Wrenn, 490 U.S. at 92 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 344.  Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 345.  Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 346.  See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989); Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3 (1992). 
 347.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177 (1991) (6-3) (per curiam).
 348.  Id. at 177–78. 
 349.  Id. at 177–79. 
 350.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 179–80.  Too, the Court noted its previous generosity in 
permitting Sindram to proceed in forma pauperis, and that other avenues for relief remained open.  
Id. at 179–80 & n.2. 
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abuse are particularly acute with respect to applications for extraordinary 
relief, since such petitions are not subject to any time limitations and, 
theoretically, could be filed at any time without limitation.”351  Perceiving 
not only the ability but the “duty” to protect itself against abusive in forma 
pauperis litigants, the Court once more directed its clerk to accept no further 
petitions for extraordinary writs in forma pauperis.352
The same justices as McDonald yet again dissented, sans only Justice 
Brennan, who had retired from the bench in the interim.353  Given the 
thorough airing of the issues in McDonald, Justice Marshall was sparer, but 
no less critical: serial litigants are at worst a “minor inconvenience,” and 
simply denying their petitions is likely easier than those with paid counsel 
given the skill of the latter at making weak claims seem meritorious.354
Singling out the frivolous filings of the poor, he opined, “in response to a 
problem that cuts across all classes of litigants strikes me as unfair, 
discriminatory, and petty.”355  Brief mention was given to the statutory 
argument that the Court lacks the power to prescribe the poor,356 but the 
gravamen of the dissent once again lay in its peroration: 
Our longstanding tradition of leaving our door open to all classes 
of litigants is a proud and decent one worth maintaining. 
Moreover, we should not presume in advance that prolific indigent 
litigants will never bring a meritorious claim.  Nor should we lose 
sight of the important role in forma pauperis claims have played 
in shaping constitutional doctrine.  As Justice Brennan warned, 
“if . . . we continue on the course we chart today, we will end by 
closing our doors to a litigant with a meritorious claim.”  By 
closing our door today to a litigant like Michael Sindram, we run 
the unacceptable risk of impeding a future Clarence Earl Gideon.  
This risk becomes all the more unacceptable when it is generated 
by an ineffectual gesture that serves no realistic purpose other than 
conveying an unseemly message of hostility to indigent 
litigants.357
 351.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180. 
 352.  Id.
 353.  Id. at 180–82 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 354.  Id. at 180–81. 
 355.  Id. at 181. 
 356.  Id.
 357.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (citations omitted). 
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Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented separately to 
highlight that Sindram did not merely repeat McDonald’s sin but advanced 
it.358  McDonald, it could well be argued, truly had abused the Court’s 
process for extraordinary writs, having applied nearly twenty times for 
patently unavailable relief; Sindram, however, had applied only twice.359
Observing that a mere two such petitions could not credibly be construed as 
a serial abuse of process, Blackmun discerned a more dangerous step: that 
Sindram was in fact being punished indirectly for his many frivolous filings 
for certiorari.360  Such a move intimated that the Court might turn its eye to 
interdictions not against the rarefied extraordinary writs seen in McDonald
and Sindram, but the ordinary backbone of the Court’s docket, petitions for 
certiorari. 
E. In re Demos 361 — April 29, 1991 
The Court’s next foray warrants little further comment, for it mirrors 
Sindram almost entirely and came but a few months later: the petitioner had 
brought a great many petitions, and the Court now revoked his right to file 
any future petitions for extraordinary writs because of that abuse, for the 
reasons before stated.362  Justice Marshall dissented with Stevens and 
Blackmun: 
I continue to oppose this Court’s unseemly practice of banning in
forma pauperis filings by indigent litigants.  As I have argued, the 
Court’s assessment of the disruption that an overly energetic 
litigant like Demos poses to “the orderly consideration of cases,” 
is greatly exaggerated.  The Court is sorely mistaken if it believes 
that the solution to the problem of a crowded docket is to crack 
down on a litigant like Demos. 
Two years ago, Justice Brennan sagely warned that in “needlessly 
depart[ing] from its generous tradition” of leaving its doors open 
to all classes of litigants, the Court “sets sail on a journey whose 
landing point is uncertain.”  The journey’s ominous destination is 
becoming apparent.  The Court appears resolved to close its doors 
to increasing numbers of indigent litigants—and for increasingly 
 358.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182–83 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 359.  Id. at 183. 
 360.  Id.
 361.  In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16 (1991) (6-3) (per curiam). 
 362.  Id. at 17. 
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less justifiable reasons.  I fear that the Court’s action today 
portends even more Draconian restrictions on the access of 
indigent litigants to this Court. 
In closing its doors today to another indigent litigant, the Court 
moves ever closer to the day when it leaves an indigent litigant 
with a meritorious claim out in the cold.  And with each barrier 
that it places in the way of indigent litigants, and with each 
instance in which it castigates such litigants for having “abused 
the system,” the Court can only reinforce in the hearts and minds 
of our society’s less fortunate members the unsettling message 
that their pleas are not welcome here.363
Even more so than Sindram, the dissent foreshadowed—indeed 
predicted—the Court’s forthcoming expansion of its interdiction 
jurisprudence to writs of certiorari.364
F. In re Amendment to Rule 39 365 — April 29, 1991 
First, however, there was the matter of Justice Brennan’s irksome 
observation that the Court was violating its own rules its zeal to prune its in
forma pauperis docket.366  But as he had noted, the Court could always 
change its rules, and so it had done on the same day as Demos, amending 
Rule 39 to add an eighth clause: “If satisfied that a petition for a writ of 
certiorari, jurisdictional statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ, as 
the case may be, is frivolous or malicious, the Court may deny a motion for 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”367  Retreading its traditional arguments, 
the majority explained the change was necessary to permit the Court to police 
its in forma pauperis docket, which was not susceptible to control by the 
ordinary application of damages and costs as sanctions, to ensure that “the 
right to file in forma pauperis not be encumbered by those who would abuse 
the integrity of our process by frivolous filings, particularly those few 
persons whose filings are repetitive with the obvious effect of burdening the 
office of the Clerk and other members of the Court staff.”368  It is ironic that 
 363.  In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 18–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 364.  Compare id. at 18 n.*, with id. at 183 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 365.  In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13 (1991) (6-3) (per curiam). 
 366.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186 (1989) (per curiam); supra note 332. 
 367.  In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14. 
 368.  Id. at 13–14. 
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the Court only referred at last to a “right” to in forma pauperis filings in the 
course of restricting it.369
Not unexpectedly, Justices Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissented.  
Justice Marshall, writing for himself, was pithy in his final word on the 
subject:
This Court’s rules now embrace an invidious distinction.  Under 
the amendment adopted today, an indigent litigant may be denied 
a disposition on the merits of a petition for certiorari, jurisdictional 
statement, or petition for an extraordinary writ following a 
determination that the filing “is frivolous or malicious.”  
Strikingly absent from this Court’s rules is any similar provision 
permitting dismissal of “frivolous or malicious” filings by paying 
litigants, even though paying litigants are a substantial source of 
these filings. 
This Court once had a great tradition: “All men and women are 
entitled to their day in Court.” That guarantee has now been 
conditioned on monetary worth.  It now will read: “All men and 
women are entitled to their day in Court only if they have the 
means and the money.”370
Pointedly, these symbolic losses transcended whatever clerical 
concerns animated the measure: “Our inviolable obligation to treat rich and 
poor alike is echoed in the oath taken by each Justice prior to assuming 
office.  ‘I . . . do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect 
to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich . . . .’”371
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, was more measured, 
though not by much.372  He reaffirmed that he saw no great crisis in the 
Court’s workload and that the Court’s new rule was thus a step in the wrong 
direction, as it was generally easier to simply deny a petition, and 
symbolically erected distinctions between the rich and poor, to the detriment 
of the Court’s mission.373
 369.  Cf. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I continue to find puzzling 
the Court’s fervor in ensuring that rights granted to the poor are not abused.”). 
 370.  In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14–15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 371.  Id. at n.* (citations omitted). 
 372.  Id. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 373.  Id.
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 62 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 62 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/15/2018 7:58 PM
108 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:1 
G. Zatko v. California374 — November 4, 1991 
The first use of the new Rule 39.8 came soon enough: only a few 
months later, in the ensuing October term.375  Petitioners Vladimir Zatko and 
James L. Martin had filed seventy-three and forty-five petitions respectively 
over the last decade in forma pauperis, and all were denied without 
dissent.376  Now, the court invoked Rule 39.8 to deny Zatko and Martin leave 
to file in forma pauperis for their latest petitions for certiorari, expressing 
the “the hope that our action will deter future similar frivolous practices.”377
Although citing Sindram, Zatko represented the first time that leave to file 
ordinary petition for certiorari rather than for an extraordinary writ was 
blocked as frivolous.378  The majority did not address how such a step 
squared with its explanation in McDonald and Sindram that the extreme 
measures taken were justified by the continued availability of the ordinary 
writ of certiorari to indigent defendants.379
Rather, noting the numerous other in forma pauperis petitioners it 
afforded the traditional opportunity of review, the Court reemphasized the 
symbolic purpose of its denial, a “limited step of censuring two petitioners 
who are unique—not merely among those who seek to file in forma pauperis,
but also among those who have paid the required filing fees—because they 
have repeatedly made totally frivolous demands on the Court’s limited 
resources.”380  Given such language of censure, the Court clearly viewed 
Rule 39.8 as a parallel form of sanctions only to be levelled against the poor 
by denying them in forma pauperis status.381  Ominously, the majority 
concluded by noting that “[f]uture similar filings from these petitioners will 
merit additional measures.”382
Justice Marshall had retired, reducing the dissenting wing of the Court 
to two, for whom Justice Stevens wrote.383  Justice Stevens turned his latest 
 374.  Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16 (1991) (7-2) (per curiam).
 375.  Id. at 17 (“Today, we invoke Rule 39.8 for the first time . . . .”). 
 376.  Id.
 377.  Id.
 378.  Id.
 379.  See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179–80 & n.2 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, 
489 U.S. 180, 185 (1989) (per curiam).
 380.  Zatko, 502 U.S. at 18. 
 381.  See id. at 16–17 (“Because in forma pauperis petitioners lack the financial disincentives–
filing fees and attorney’s fees–that help to deter other litigants from filing frivolous petitions, we 
felt such a [r]ule change was necessary to provide us some control over the in forma pauperis
docket.”); id. at 17 (“We conclude that the pattern of repetitious filing on the part of Zatko and 
Martin has resulted in an extreme abuse of the system.”). 
 382.  Id. at 18. 
 383.  Id. at 18–20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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opinion to the practical logistics, observing that nearly one thousand 
petitions by paupers had already been denied per the usual process that 
year—well over half frivolous—without any appreciable impact on the 
integrity of the Court’s process.384  Questioning the purpose of Rule 39.8, he 
went on to note the “practical effect of such an order is the same as a simple 
denial,” but that “the symbolic effect of the Court’s effort to draw 
distinctions among the multitude of frivolous petitions—none of which will 
be granted in any event—is powerful,” for different reasons that the majority 
thought.385  To wit: It may communicate that the poor have less entitlement 
to justice than the rich, and assessing petitions of the rich and poor under 
different standards risks the latter not receiving due attention.386  In the 
balance, Justice Stevens concluded, “the Court has little to gain and much to 
lose by applying Rule 39.8 as it does today.”387
H. Martin v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals 388 — 
November 2, 1992 
The majority’s threat in Zatko of “additional measures” did not prove 
idle.  One year later, the Court decided Martin v. District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals, after the same James L. Martin filed another eleven petitions for 
certiorari in the interim.389  Adverting again to the deleterious effect of 
voluminous frivolous filings, the Court levelled its most severe penalty yet 
on Martin: no future noncriminal petitions for certiorari would be 
accepted.390  (In fairness, Martin’s escalation rather than acquiescence 
following his censure in Zatko seems at best petty and at worst gallingly 
provocative;391 Justice Felix Frankfurter’s admonition four decades earlier is 
apt: “The old saw that hard cases make bad law has its basis in experience.  
But petty cases are even more calculated to make bad law.  The impact of a 
sordid little case is apt to obscure the implications of the generalization to 
which the case gives rise.”392)
Martin represented a dramatic expansion of McDonald and Sindram.
Both had prospectively interdicted indigent petitioners only from filing for 
 384.  Zatko, 502 U.S. at 19. 
 385.  Id.
 386.  Id. at 19–20. 
 387.  Id. at 20. 
 388.  Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (7-2) (per curiam). 
 389.  Id. at 2–3. 
 390.  Id. at 2. 
 391.  Cf. In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 181 (1991) (quoted supra note 355). 
 392.  United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 63 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
40701-hco_46-1 Sheet No. 63 Side B      10/23/2018   13:43:40
SUNSHINE_MACROED TM FINAL 10.15 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/15/2018 7:58 PM
110 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 46:1 
extraordinary writs.393  Indeed, the rationale for those interdictions rested 
critically on the role of extraordinary writs on the Supreme Court’s docket.  
In defense of its holding, McDonald had explained that “we have not granted 
the sort of extraordinary writ relentlessly sought by petitioner to any 
litigant—paid or in forma pauperis—for at least a decade,” and that 
“extraordinary writs are, not surprisingly, ‘drastic and extraordinary 
remedies,’ to be ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes,’ in which ‘appeal 
is clearly an inadequate remedy.’”394 Sindram had added that the “risks of 
abuse are particularly acute with respect to applications for extraordinary 
relief, since such petitions are not subject to any time limitations and, 
theoretically, could be filed at any time, without limitation.”395  And both 
had justified their holding on the basis that relief could readily be sought via 
certiorari for any meritorious claim.396
Now, however, despite its reliance on those two decisions, the Court 
expanded the scope of interdictions to the ordinary writ of certiorari that had 
purportedly provided a crucial safety valve in its previous decisions.397
Ironically, one of Martin’s intervening petitions for certiorari had not even 
been frivolous.398  Yet the Court provided no defense of the expansion other 
than Martin’s serial abuse, professing sorrow in the ostensibly compelled 
result:
Although this case does not involve abuse of an extraordinary 
writ, but rather the writ of certiorari, Martin’s pattern of abuse has 
had a similarly deleterious effect on this Court’s “fair allocation 
of judicial resources.”  (citation omitted).  As a result, the same 
concerns which led us to enter the orders barring prospective 
filings in Sindram and McDonald require such action here. 
We regret the necessity of taking this step, but Martin’s refusal to 
heed our earlier warning leaves us no choice.399
 393.  See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 184; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 180 (1989) (per 
curiam).
 394.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184–85 (citations omitted). 
 395.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180. 
 396.  Id.; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185. 
 397.  Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 ,3 (1992) (7-2) (per curiam). 
 398.  Id. (“With the arguable exception of one of these petitions, see Martin v. Knox, 502 U.S. 
999 (1991) (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., respecting denial of certiorari), all of Martin’s 
filings, including those before us today, have been demonstrably frivolous.”). 
 399.  Id.
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Still standing at two members, the minority had little more to add after 
all the rhetoric of yesteryear: They had already written all they had to say in 
predicting this ultimate result.400  In what would prove to be the last major 
dissent on the subject, Justice Stevens only pointed to his own prior opinions 
and those of Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, concluding that 
“[t]he theoretical administrative benefit the Court may derive from an order 
of this kind is far outweighed by the shadow it casts on the great tradition of 
open access that characterized the Court’s history prior to its unprecedented 
decisions.”401
IV.  Trends and Tendencies in Supreme Court Cases After 
Martin
With Martin, the Supreme Court’s evolution was complete.  Thereafter, 
the Court could and has referred straightforwardly to that holding in issuing 
directives to its clerk to enforce the reasoning of the Martin decision and 
refuse to accept any civil petitions from litigants absent payment.402  From 
1992 to October 1999, the Court cited Martin twenty-six times to bar 
litigants from future filings.403  Notably, these later dispositions no longer 
included the thoughtful dialectics between majority and dissent that had 
characterized the cases up to and including Martin; the issue was evidently 
settled in the eyes of the justices.404  Early on, Justice Stevens announced that 
 400.  See, e.g., In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 18–19 & n.* (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re
Sindram, 498 U.S. at 183 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 401.  Martin, 506 U.S. at 4 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 402.  Lane, supra note 11, at 350. 
 403.  Demos v. Storrie, 507 U.S. 290 (1993) (52 filings); Day v. Day, 510 U.S. 1 (1993) (35 
frivolous filings); In re Sassower, 510 U.S. 4 (1993) (21 filings); Whitaker v. Super. Ct. of Cal. 
S.F. Cty, 514 U.S. 208 (1995) (24 filings); Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297 (1996) (9 frivolous 
filings); Jones v. ABC-TV, 516 U.S. 363 (1996) (32 filings); Shieh v. Kakita, 517 U.S. 343 (1996) 
(10 filings); In re Gaydos, 519 U.S. 59 (1996) (19 filings); In re Vey, 520 U.S. 303 (1997) (26 
filings); Vey v. Clinton, 520 U.S. 937 (1997) (27 filings); Brown v. Williams, 522 U.S. 1 (1997) 
(8 filings); Arteaga v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 522 U.S. 446 (1998) (21 filings); 
Glendora v. Porzio, 523 U.S. 206 (1998) (15 filings); In re Kennedy, 525 U.S. 153 (1998) (12 
filings); Schwarz v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 526 U.S. 122 (1999) (35 filings); Rivera v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Corrs., 526 U.S 135 (1999) (14 filings); Lowe v. Pogue, 526 U.S. 273 (1999) (33 filings); Cross v. 
Pelican Bay State Prison, 526 U.S. 811 (1999) (16 filings); Ferstel-Rust v. Milwaukee Cty. Mental 
Health Ctr., 527 U.S. 469 (1999) (8 filings); Whitfield v. Texas, 527 U.S. 885, reconsideration 
denied, 528 U.S. 805 (1999) (9 filings); Antonelli v. Caridine, 528 U.S. 3 (1999) (19 filings); 
Dempsey v. Martin, 528 U.S. 7 (1999) (10 filings); Prunty v. Brooks, 528 U.S. 9 (1999) (57 filings); 
Brancato v. Gunn, 528 U.S. 1 (1999) (8 filings); Judd v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W.D. Tex., 528 U.S. 5 
(1999) (12 filings); In re Bauer, 528 U.S. 16 (1999) (12 filings). 
 404.  E.g., Demos, 507 U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I continue to adhere to my 
previously stated views on this issue . . . .”); Jones, 516 U.S. at 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“For 
the reasons I have previously expressed, I respectfully dissent.”). 
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“I shall not encumber the record by noting my dissent from similar orders 
denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis, absent exceptional 
circumstances.”405  (In reality, Justice Stevens continued to register his 
dissent like clockwork, even absent any noted egregiousness to the case.406)
As for the majority, the cases briefly recited the same litany: the 
petitioner had filed many meritless claims; the petitioner had been warned; 
addressing meritless claims impedes the Court’s business; the petitioner was 
now prospectively banned from future such filings absent a fee.407  Yet of 
the twenty-six cases, there seems little rhyme or reason as to why the 
proscribed petitioners had been singled out: on the same day in October 
1999, one petitioner was barred for a lifetime total of fifty-seven meritless 
petitions,408 whilst another received the same punishment for eight.409  Figure 
2 illustrates the general randomness of result, though there is a very weak 
trend downward, reflecting that the Court was overall requiring fewer and 
fewer frivolous filings to justify an interdiction. 
Figure 2: Meritless Petitions at Time of Ban, by Year, From Martin
Through Oct 1999 
A few of these cases warrant further comment.  The first to cite Martin
was Demos v. Storie, where the Court used its newly-minted precedent to 
 405.  Day, 510 U.S. at 3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 406.  See cases cited supra note 403. 
 407.  E.g., Glendora, 523 U.S. at 206; In re Kennedy, 525 U.S. 153; Schwarz, 526 U.S. at 122; 
Lowe, 526 U.S. at 273. 
 408.  Prunty v. Brooks, 528 U.S. 9 (1999). 
 409.  Brancato v. Gunn, 528 U.S. 1 (1999). 
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withdraw the right to petition for certiorari from John R. Demos Jr., the 
litigant who had previously been barred from filing extraordinary writs in in 
the 1991 Demos case.410  Most jurisprudentially noteworthy is Whitaker v. 
Superior Court of California, where the majority noted a further reason why 
proscription of certiorari filings was required: The petitioner, having already 
been barred from filing in forma pauperis for extraordinary writs, had taken 
to labelling such petitions as if they were for certiorari.411  Much like the 
petitioner’s pettiness in Martin, such inane subterfuge sheds light on why the 
Court felt goaded into action.412  On the other side, Justice Stevens only 
became more convinced of the wastefulness of the Martin process over time, 
observing in 1996 that “experience with the administration of orders like the 
one the Court is entering in this case today has merely reinforced my 
conviction that our ‘limited resources’ would be used more effectively by 
simply denying petitions that are manifestly frivolous.”413
But even such minor elaborations on Martin cases were soon to end, 
perhaps driven by the annus horribilis of 1999, when the Court issued no 
less than twelve prospective proscriptions through October, nearly as many 
as it had issued in all prior years.414  In November, the Court formulated the 
shorthand “Martin directive” quoted at the start of the Article, which could 
be applied summarily to any case barring indigent petitioners, thus allowing 
the incidence of such dispositions to be tracked mechanically (and making it 
easier for cases to be disposed of mechanically).415  Tabulating that incidence 
demonstrates unequivocally that, armed with such a time-saving device, the 
Supreme Court has resorted to the expedient of Martin directives ever more 
frequently over time, with the total number verging on five hundred by 
 410.  Demos v. Storrie, 507 U.S. 290 (1993); see supra Section III-D. 
 411.  Whitaker v. Super. Ct. of Cal. S.F. Cty, 514 U.S. 208, 209–09 (1995). 
 412.  See supra Section III-H. 
 413.  Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297, 298 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
Demos, 507 U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 414.  Schwarz v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 526 U.S. 122 (1999); Rivera v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 526 
U.S 135 (1999); Lowe v. Pogue, 526 U.S. 273 (1999); Cross v. Pelican Bay State Prison, 526 U.S. 
811 (1999); Ferstel-Rust v. Milwaukee Cty. Mental Health Ctr., 527 U.S. 469 (1999); Whitfield v. 
Texas, 527 U.S. 885, reconsideration denied, 528 U.S. 805 (1999); Antonelli v. Caridine, 528 U.S. 
3 (1999); Dempsey v. Martin, 528 U.S. 7 (1999); Prunty v. Brooks, 528 U.S. 9 (1999); Brancato,
528 U.S. 1; Judd v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W.D. Tex., 528 U.S. 5 (1999); In re Bauer, 528 U.S. 16 
(1999).
 415.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 350.  The first two such cases were Baba v. Japan Travel 
Bureau, 528 U.S. 1016 (1999), and In re Reidt, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999), both issued on November 
29, 1999.  Confirming the regularity of the new practice, the next such disposition, Cunningham v. 
Moreno, 528 U.S. 1059 (1999), appeared only two weeks later, on December 13, 1999.  Two 
precursors may be found earlier in November in In re Tyler, 528 U.S. 983 (1999), and In re Tyler,
528 U.S. 984 (1999), where the language differed only by a few articles and punctuation.   
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2015.416  Figure 3 illustrates the number of Martin directives issued in each 
year, as well as a linear regression line demonstrating a robust upward trend; 
Figure 4 presents the annual and total number of Martin directives. 
Figure 3: Martin Directives Issued by Year from 1999, with Least-Square 
Linear Regression 
Figure 4: Historical Annual and Total Martin Directives 
Year Annual Total Year Annual Total 
1999 3 3 2008 28 172 
2000 15 18 2009 45 217 
2001 15 33 2010 60 277 
2002 13 46 2011 55 332 
2003 22 68 2012 38 370 
2004 18 86 2013 37 407 
2005 22 108 2014 45 452 
2006 16 124 2015 44 496 
2007 20 144 2016 46 542 
 416.  The many pages necessary to provide citation to well over five hundred cases is not 
recommended here, given the expedient of a simple text search on Westlaw or Lexis.  E.g., Lane, 
supra note11, at 351.  However, the data set from which these figures are derived, current through 
calendar 2016, is on file with the author and is available to interested academics or researchers upon 
request via the editorial board of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly.
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Taken together, these figures paint a picture starkly different from that 
intimated in the in forma pauperis Supreme Court decisions of Part III.  
Whereas one might have imagined that only some minuscule number of 
long-term troublemakers would warrant banishment, and that these would be 
swiftly identified and disposed of, the reality has not borne out that optimistic 
presumption.417
The initial cases targeted petitioners who had importuned the Court 
many dozens of times;418 with Martin on the books, troublemakers were 
banned after as few as eight filings.419  And once the formulaic Martin
directive was put into practice, the Court has not even quantified the degree 
of abuse that justified its ultimate punishment being meted out to hundreds 
of indigent litigants.420  Thus rather than one or two, dozens more paupers 
are being added the rolls of the proscribed every year—permanently—
yielding a rapidly growing list of litigants denied access to the highest 
court.421  What was intended as an “extreme remedy” for “exigent 
circumstances” to be deployed “with particular caution” has become rote.422
If the Court has not found and banned the vast majority of pestersome 
paupers over the last two decades, one must be skeptical that its mission will 
ever be complete.423  Rather, Martin directives and concomitant barring of 
the courtroom doors seem set to continue indefinitely into the future, as a 
ceaseless supply of paupers commend themselves to the attention of the 
Court’s censorial tendencies.424
And of course Martin directives have no effect on those who can afford 
to subsidize their filings, as those of means are ineligible for in forma 
 417.  See, e.g., Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 18 (1991) (“For that reason we take the limited 
step of censuring two petitioners who are unique—not merely among those who seek to file in
forma pauperis, but also among those who have paid the required filing fees—because they have 
repeatedly made totally frivolous demands on the Court’s limited resources.”). 
 418.  E.g., Zatko, 502 U.S. at 176 (73 and 45 filings); In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16 (1991) (32 
filings); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 177–78 (1991) (42 filings); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 
181–82 (1989) (73 filings). 
 419.  E.g., Ferstel-Rust, 527 U.S. at 470 (8 filings); Whitfield, 527 U.S. at 886 reconsideration
denied, (9 filings); Brancato, 528 U.S. at 2 (8 filings). 
 420.  See, e.g., Baba, 528 U.S. 1016 and In re Reidt, 528 U.S. 1018. 
 421.  See supra figs. 3 & 4.  Eventually, one imagines, the list will begin to see some diminution 
as banned litigants perish.   
 422.  In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 
1079 (1st Cir. 1980)). 
 423.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 351 (quoting ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT 
PRACTICE § 8.2 (8th ed. 2002)). 
 424.  Id.
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pauperis status in the first place.425  The result: of those petitioners, past and 
future, that the Supreme Court deems sufficiently pestersome to act, the 
wealthy may freely continue their importunities to the Court by paying for 
the right to do so, whilst the impoverished are increasingly categorically 
barred, whatever the merits of their claims.426  The key to the highest 
courtroom can be bought.427
V.  Reassessing the Arguments For and Against Martin
Directives
Given the Court’s increasingly rote use of Martin directives, a 
reassessment of the merits of the practice is timely.  There is a broad 
difference between, on the one hand, Martin’s vision of proscribing a 
singularly wayward petitioner as an example to all, and on the other hand, 
the present trajectory of perfunctorily banishing an ever-growing list of 
indigent petitioners.  In the following part, the arguments raised by the two 
sides in the Court’s in forma pauperis dialectic are addressed roughly in 
order of their cogency, resulting in a chiastic structure that begins with the 
dissent’s weakest arguments, proceeds through the majority’s more or less 
legitimate concerns, and finally returns to what this Article concludes to be 
the strongest argument, by the minority. 
A. Minority — Prospective Proscription Exceeds the Court’s 
Power 
The most straightforward argument the minority musters is also the 
weakest: that the Court lacks the power to prospectively proscribe its 
petitioners.  This argument came in two flavors, the first of which was that 
the Court’s own Rule 39.4 disallowed the clerk from doing what the Court 
had directed: refusing to docket a properly filed in forma pauperis petition.428
The Court ostensibly corrected this oversight when it altered its rules to allow 
for dismissals in In re Amendment to Rule 39.429  Oddly, although the 
 425.  See Smith, supra note 2, at 103 (observing that “the rule only applied to petitioners—
such as prisoners—who are too poor to pay the $300 filing fee”); Franklin, supra note 93, at 202. 
 426.  Cf. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F. 3d 307, 327–30 (3d. Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J., 
dissenting).
 427.  See id. (“If they cannot buy entry into court, they must wait until they can; and if the wait 
is too long, justice will be denied to them.”).
 428.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to an earlier 
version of the Supreme Court Rules in which the operative rule was numbered 46); see Sup. Ct. R. 
39.4 (“When the documents required by paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Rule are presented to the Clerk, 
accompanied by proof of service as required by Rule 29, they will be placed on the docket without 
the payment of a docket fee or any other fee.”). 
 429.  In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13 (1991) (per curiam).
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majority there apparently believed that its amendment would now empower 
the clerk to refuse any interdicted claims, there is nothing in the amendment 
that perceptibly effectuates that goal.430  This is underscored by the fact that 
Martin directives expressly depend on Rule 39.8 only for the dismissal of 
the petition sub judice—which Rule 39.8 clearly does permit; authority for 
the prospective ban relies only on Martin.431  Whether the Court’s clerk may 
properly refuse to file a petition under the unmodified Rule 39.4 is not 
resolved by the text of Rule 39.8.432  Nonetheless, this argument fails more 
fundamentally because, whatever its rules seem to say, the Court surely has 
the power to reinterpret them as it sees fit.433
Similarly, the dissent argued that the federal statute governing in forma 
pauperis filings, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, did not permit prospective denials, 
because the court’s discretion to dismiss was limited to complaints “found to 
be frivolous or malicious.”434  A hypothetical as-yet-unfiled claim, of course, 
could not be found to be anything.435  This is a rather pretty argument, but is 
undercut by the permissive language in the statute, to which the majority 
adverted pointedly: A court “may” allow filing in forma pauperis, but it is 
not required to.436  The dissent admits this almost parenthetically, but then 
moves beyond the text itself in favor of inferring a statutory mandate 
incumbent on the Court from the “comprehensive scheme” laid out, which 
is hardly conclusive.437  True, courts have read § 1915 to at least require 
access to trial courts and an appeal of right when the statute’s requirements 
are complied with, avoiding potential constitutional infirmity.438  But the 
Supreme Court has elsewhere reserved the question of whether discretionary 
appeals enjoy the same constitutional position as those of right.439  Whatever 
 430.  Lane, supra note 11, at 360. 
 431.  See, e.g., Baba v. Japan Travel Bureau, 528 U.S. 1016 (1999); In re Reidt, 528 U.S. 1018 
(1999).
 432.  Lane, supra note 11, at 360. 
 433.  Id.  (“As a practical matter, however, the technical language of Rule 39.8 is irrelevant 
because the Court promulgates its own rules and, thus, the Court’s intent behind or interpretation 
of those rules is all that matters.”).  But cf. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 186 (“Of course, we are 
free to amend our own rules should we see the need to do so, but until we do we are bound by them.”). 
 434.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185–86. 
 435.  Id.; see also In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 181–82 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 436.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 183 (per curiam). 
 437.  Id. at 185 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 438.  See Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 337–40 (1948); see also 
supra Section I-A.  But see Shapiro v. Burns, 7 Misc. 418, 420, 27 N.Y.S. 980 (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pl. 
Mar. 1, 1984) (employing statutory construction to find an analogous statute should be read as 
obligatory rather than permissive). 
 439.  Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (“We are not here concerned with 
problems that might arise from the denial of counsel for the preparation of a petition for 
discretionary or mandatory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which the claims 
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the mandate for in forma pauperis filings, the statute’s text does not clearly 
answer the question as to the Supreme Court. 
In any event, to advance a rules-based or statutory argument to delimit 
the Court’s authority is likely futile.  It is well established that all courts have 
the inherent power under Article III of the Constitution to protect their 
process against abuse by litigants and maintain the efficiency of their 
docket.440  Similarly, the expansive All Writs Act provides a basis for courts 
to issue any orders needful to their function, including the sanctioning of 
petitioners:441
It is well within the broad scope of the All Writs Act for a district 
court to issue an order restricting the filing of meritless cases by a 
litigant whose manifold complaints raise claims identical or 
similar to those that already have been adjudicated.  The interests 
of repose, finality of judgments, protection of defendants from 
unwarranted harassment, and concern for maintaining order in the 
court’s dockets have been deemed sufficient by a number of courts 
to warrant such a prohibition against relitigation of claims. . . .  
We agree with the First and District of Columbia Circuits, 
however, that a continuous pattern of groundless and vexatious 
litigation can, at some point, support an order against further 
filings of complaints without the permission of the court.  The case 
before us appears to reveal a situation sufficient to justify exercise 
of the court’s power, under the All Writ’s [sic] Act, to do so.442
Such power is not cabined by procedural rules or statute, and is by its 
nature malleable to the circumstances demanding its deployment.443  Even if 
the Court’s rules and the in forma pauperis statute prescribe different forms, 
therefore, the Court may resort to unique measures if the standard framework 
proves lacking and the integrity of the judicial function itself is threatened.444
have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court. We are dealing only 
with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike from a criminal conviction.”) 
(citiation omitted). 
 440.  See Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Joseph C. Anclien, Broader Is 
Better: The Inherent Power of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37, 44–49 (2008); 
Robert J. Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845, 
861–62 (1984). 
 441.  28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
 442.  In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445–46 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 443.  See id.; Anclien, supra note 440, at 37–41 (inherent powers). 
 444.  See Anclien, supra note 440, at 47–48 (noting that “one of the most common and 
important roles of inherent powers is to allow courts to craft flexible sticks to sanction 
contumacious parties” and providing examples); see, e.g., In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 780–81 & 
784–85 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (entering order sanctioning prolific petitioner under the All Writs Act); 
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(Whether pestersome paupers pose such a threat is a factual question distinct 
from that of the Court’s inherent power.445)  To borrow an idiom, judicial 
procedural rules are not a suicide pact.446  Justice Brennan recognized as 
much in conceding arguendo that his statutory objections to Martin
directives were less than dispositive.447  The minority’s repeated reproach 
that the majority had identified no “statute or rule giving it the extraordinary 
authority” for its practice gained no greater cogency with repetition.448  The 
judiciary’s inherent power, and the breadth of the All Writs Act, are
extraordinary.449
B. Minority — Proscription Offends Due Process by Prejudging 
a Petitioner’s Claims 
A related argument is that a prospective proscription improperly 
adjudicates a petitioner’s future claims to be meritless before they are even 
filed (or, in all likelihood, even conceived).  Rather than couch this 
observation as violating a court rule or statute, this stronger argument implies 
that such prejudice would offend a petitioner’s right to due process.  
Curiously, however, the dissents only adumbrated this idea, perhaps best 
expressed in Sindram when Justice Marshall opined that “we should not 
presume in advance that prolific indigent litigants will never bring a 
meritorious claim.”450  Yet having posed that provocative point, Marshall 
pivoted directly to a more generalized argument about the effects that 
Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A) (same but citing inherent powers); 
Oliver, 682 F.2d at 445–46 (same). 
 445.  See, e.g., infra Sections V-C, V-D. 
 446.  Cf., e.g., Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 663 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The Constitution is 
not a suicide pact.”). 
 447.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Even if the legality 
of our action in ordering the Clerk to refuse future petitions for extraordinary writs in forma 
pauperis from this litigant were beyond doubt . . . .”). 
 448.  E.g., In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 17 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see In re Sindram, 
498 U.S. 177, 181–82 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 449.  United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904 (2009) (discussing “the All Writs Act and the 
extraordinary relief the statute authorizes” via the coram nobis writ); Penn. Bureau of Corr’s v. 
U.S. Marshall Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) (observing that “the Act empowers federal courts to 
fashion extraordinary remedies when the need arises”); ITT Comm. Development Corp. v. Barton, 
569 F.2d 1351, 1358 (5th Cir. 1978) (referring to “[t]he authority of a district court to invoke the 
extraordinary powers conferred by the All Writs Act and the inherent powers doctrine”).  N.b.:
Whilst a court’s inherent power and the All Writs Act may well allow it to supersede rules or 
statutes that inadequately address a problem, they presumably would not permit transgression of a 
discrete constitutional dictate. 
 450.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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discouraging in forma pauperis claims might have on the justice system.451
But the proposition that the judiciary injures the individual petitioner by 
prejudging a hypothetical future claim warrants more attention that the cases 
explicitly afford. 
After all, lower courts had repeatedly rejected overly sweeping bans on 
indigent litigants as violating due process and the constitutional right of 
access to the courts.452  Although Martin directives leave open the possibility 
of a proscribed petitioner objecting to a criminal penalty, their complete ban 
on pursuing any civil matter whatsoever cannot be characterized as 
interdicting only matters on which a petitioner has already clearly 
demonstrated that no valid claim inheres; such a ban preemptively cuts off 
scrutiny of even wholly novel claims.453  The lower courts have stated that 
this brand of prejudice offends due process: “It is axiomatic that no petitioner 
or person shall ever be denied his right to the processes of the court.”454  And 
the Supreme Court exceeded even the most extreme remedies of the PLRA 
and Fifth and Eight Circuits: Whereas all had permitted narrow exemptions 
for cases alleging corporal jeopardy, a Martin directive’s interdiction of civil 
petitioners is absolute and unqualified.455  Even the Eighth Circuit expressly 
rejected such a remedy as transgressing due process,456 and the Fifth Circuit 
followed the Eight Circuit’s precedent.457
It is problematic to fault the Supreme Court in this regard, however—
perhaps this is why the minority never emphasized the point.  The circuit 
courts of appeals differ crucially from the Supreme Court: Whilst the direct 
appellate court must consider appeals as a matter of right,458 the Court’s 
certiorari docket is purely discretionary.459  No petitioner has any entitlement 
to a writ of certiorari from the Court,460 and thus even its peremptory denial 
 451.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (“Nor should we lose sight of the important role in forma 
pauperis claims have played in shaping constitutional doctrine.”); see also infra Section V-E. 
 452.  E.g., Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1071 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc); In re Green, 
669 F.2d 779, 785–87 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
 453.  See Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 
187–88 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 454.  In re Green, 598 F.2d at 1127. 
 455.  Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).
 456.  See Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 457.  See Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 286–87 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Green, 616 F.2d 1054  
and In re Green, 598 F.2d 1126). 
 458.  28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Descretionary Review in Federal 
Courts of Appeals, 34 SW. L.J. 1151, 1151 & n.2 (1980) (“Federal litigants in both civil and criminal 
cases have been given the right of appellate review in the courts of appeals since the Act of 1891 
creating the federal courts of appeals.”); Lane, supra note 11, at 363. 
 459.  See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kapral v. 
United States, 166 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1999); Lane, supra note 11, at 363. 
 460.  See Brown, 344 U.S. at 491–93. 
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has not abridged any process due a litigant.461  In short, if the Court may deny 
certiorari for any reason (or no reason at all), the method of its denial cannot 
implicate due process as such.462  It is for this very reason that the Court has 
long stated that its denial of certiorari expresses no opinion on the merits of 
a petition.463  The Court’s peremptorily denying certiorari on a litigant’s 
future petitions similarly does not call into question their merit; it invokes 
the Court’s unquestioned power to grant—or not grant—review as a matter 
of grace, not obligation.464  Due process demands no more.465
C. Majority — Absent Proscription, a Prolific Petitioner 
Imperils the Court’s Efficacy 
Leaving aside the minority’s initial arguments, the Supreme Court’s 
majority originally fastened on a singular argument in defense of the logic 
behind Martin directives: that proscription was necessary to prevent a 
prolific petitioner from diminishing the Court’s ability to effectuate its 
mission.  This was expressed in some form in each of the earlier cases, 
beginning with McDonald:
Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how 
repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution’s 
limited resources.  A part of the Court’s responsibility is to see 
that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the 
 461.  See also Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371, 373 (8th Cir. 1981) (“We also find no basis for a 
due process claim. It is well settled that in order to be entitled due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, there must be some legal entitlement, right or liberty interest that is protected under 
state or federal law.”) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1976), and Montanye v. 
Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). 
 462.  See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917–19 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., 
respecting denial of certiorari).
 463.  E.g., id.; Singleton v. C.I.R., 439 U.S. 940, 942 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of 
certiorari); House v. Mayo, 324 U. S. 42, 48 (1945); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros. & 
Co., 240 U.S. 251, 258 (1916). 
 464.  See Brown, 344 U.S. at 491–97 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Maryland, 338 U.S. at 
917–19; Singleton, 439 U.S. at 942.  
 465.  It might be argued that––analogous to precedent on peremptory strikes that require no 
justification––a court’s ability to deny a petition for no reason at all does not confer a concomitant 
right to deny a petition for an invidious reason.  Cf., e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).  
Whether discrimination based on wealth constitutes such an invidious purpose, whether Martin
directives do discriminate in a constitutional sense, and indeed whether such an analogy is cogent 
in the context of the Supreme Court’s plenary discretion, went undiscussed in the Supreme Court 
cases, and are questions for another scholar.  Given serious difficulties with such an argument given 
precedent that indigence is not a “suspect” classification, see sources cited infra note 630, and the 
Court’s pretermitting any such consideration in its dialectic, this Article rests on prudential rather 
than constitutional reasons for the Court to reverse course.  See also Lane, supra note 11, at 335–
58 (considering and rejecting a constitutional argument against Martin directives). 
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interests of justice.  The continual processing of petitioner’s 
frivolous requests for extraordinary writs does not promote that 
end.466
Sindram and Demos would echo the same logic, whilst amplifying it.  
Sindram opined that “the goal of fairly dispensing justice” was 
“compromised” and “the fair administration of justice” was “unsettl[ed]” by 
addressing the petitioner’s serially meritless requests, and therefrom 
discerned a duty to deny Sindram further feeless access to its courtroom.467
Demos went even further, espying malice in its petitioner, whose “method of 
seeking relief . . . could only be calculated to disrupt the orderly 
consideration of cases.”468  In all of these early cases, the concern of the 
Court was squarely aimed at the potential of the prolific litigant sub judice
to substantively impede the business of the Court if not prospectively 
proscribed.
But the Court’s fear cannot be credited as stated.  Inferior courts too 
have adverted to the possibility of a single prolific petitioner clogging their 
clerks with demands for attention, and more importantly, demanding the 
plenary review of the Court time and time again.469  But as the discussion of 
due process highlighted, whilst a lower court bound to hear an appeal must 
substantively do so, the discretionary docket of the Supreme Court mandates 
no such dedication of time.470  The dissenting justices observed recurrently 
that the denial of a frivolous petition for certiorari requires almost no time 
and is a most efficient way to address such a petition.471  The eminent Henry 
M. Hart, Jr. estimated that time at a mere five minutes.472  True, an interdicted 
petitioner will never again waste that scintilla of attention, but even a lifetime 
vaingloriously dedicated to tilting at the windmills of futile claims, spanning 
many hundreds of petitions, could never have an appreciable effect on the 
 466.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam).
 467.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179–80 (1991) (per curiam).
 468.  In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 16–17 (1991) (per curiam).
 469.  E.g., Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 286 (5th Cir. 1981) (Unit A); In re Green, 598 F.2d 
1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
 470.  See supra notes 458–464 and accompanying text; Lane, supra note 11, at 363; see 
generally Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959).
 471.  E.g., In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is usually much 
easier to decide that a petition should be denied than to decide whether or not it is frivolous.”); In
re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180–81 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wrenn v. Benson, 490 U.S. 89, 92 (1989) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S.at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brown v. Herald 
Co., 464 U.S. 928, 928–930 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 472.  Hart, supra note 470, at 88, 90. 
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Court’s ability to function.473  Such petitions may be minor if inconvenient 
wastes of time, but they cannot imperil the Court.474  No one person has the 
capacity for such mischief.475
The example of the Reverend Clovis Carl Green Jr. discussed above in 
Section II-B is instructive.  Even this paragon of prolific petitioners could 
not so encumber the judiciary as to merit an absolute proscription: The D.C. 
Circuit affirmed that Green had a “right of access to federal courts” and 
struck down an order interdicting Reverend Green,476 and even the Eighth 
and Fifth Circuits left the courtroom doors slightly ajar.477  By 1983, 
Reverend Green had targeted the Supreme Court with no less than sixty-six 
petitions and motions, to the point that justices “flinch[ed] at the sound of 
his name.”478  Notwithstanding such provocation, the Court was “content . . . 
to simply deny Mr. Green’s petitions without comment,”479 only departing 
from that practice when Green omitted the required affidavit for leave to file 
in forma pauperis.480  Critically, even then its order denying leave “applie[d] 
only to the current petition, and did not bar Mr. Green from filing unpaid 
petitions in future cases.”481  And once Reverend Green submitted the 
affidavit, the Court granted him in forma pauperis status without cavil.482  If 
the indefatigable Reverend Green—“the most prolific prison litigant in 
 473.  See Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 19 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that 
despite the Court’s processing of one thousand in forma pauperis petitions in a single term, of 
which over half were likely frivolous, “[t]he ‘integrity of our process’ was not compromised in the 
slightest . . . .”). 
 474.  See, e.g., In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180–81 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing 
petitioner as a “minor inconvenience” and opining that “the Court’s worries about the threats that 
hyperactive in forma pauperis litigants like Sindram pose to our ability to manage our docket are 
greatly exaggerated”). 
 475.  It must be said that in a day of electronic filing (or perhaps even in the days of 
photocopiers), one could imagine a litigant who files hundreds or thousands of petitions every day—
perhaps millions over a lifetime—and who could actually present a logistical hazard to the 
machinery of a court.  Such legal tsunamis are purely conjectural, however, with the most prolific 
litigants tallying lifetime totals in the hundreds, not millions.  See Linda Greenhouse, Paper Siege 
by Prisoner Provokes Ire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/04/07/us/pa 
per-siege-by-prisoner-provokes-ire.html.  The machinery of the Court can surely handle the 
equivalent of denying an average of one extra petition a week, which far exceeds the upper 
threshold of temerity of any known real-world litigant. 
 476.  In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785–87 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 477.  Green v. White (In re Green), 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); In re Green, 
598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Green v. Carlson, 649 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(Unit A). 
 478.  Greenhouse, supra note 475. 
 479.  Id.
 480.  Green v. White, 460 U.S. 1067 (1983), vacated, 462 U.S. 1111 (1983). 
 481.  Greenhouse, supra note 475. 
 482.  Green v. White, 462 U.S. 1111. 
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recorded history,” in the words of the D.C. Circuit483—could not bring the 
wheels of justice to a halt, it is implausible that anyone could. 
D. Majority — Proscriptions Are Required to Deter Meritless 
Petitions Generally from Impeding the Court 
Although the initial cases ostensibly aimed at redressing a single 
petitioner’s abuses, the majority made its reasoning more clear (and more 
creditable) in the later cases.  Even if one petitioner cannot wreak havoc on 
the Court by superfluity, if numerous petitioners were to do so, the Court 
might indeed be overwhelmed.  Those that were particularly prolific in their 
frivolous filings, therefore, must be censured and potentially interdicted to 
serve as a deterrent to such behavior.  Whilst any single miscreant—even a 
Reverend Green—poses a scant threat, interdicting that egregious example 
could serve to forestall numerous other potential meritless claims whose 
proponents might fear similar treatment.  If meritless petitioners considered 
in the aggregate threatened the Court’s function, then singling out the most 
egregious to prevent even greater numbers from swamping the Court might 
well be necessary, however distasteful.484
Indeed, the minority discerned early on that this was the majority’s true 
trajectory.  Justice Brennan recognized in McDonald that the majority’s 
“order makes sense as an efficiency measure only if it is merely the prelude 
to similar orders in regard to other litigants, or perhaps to a generalized rule 
limiting the number of petitions in forma pauperis an individual may file. 
Therein lies its danger.”485  Subsequent cases in the following months and 
years only confirmed and reconfirmed these suspicions.486  By the time Zatko
and Martin arrived, the Court’s ultimate destination had become something 
of a foregone conclusion.487
By the majority’s lights, only by meeting exceptional abuse with 
rejoinder in kind could the Court’s docket as a whole be properly 
 483.  In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 484.  See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (per curiam). 
 485.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 188. 
 486.  See In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 18–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 
177, 182 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 487.  See In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 18–19 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Two years ago, Justice 
Brennan sagely warned that in ‘needlessly depart[ing] from its generous tradition’ of leaving its 
doors open to all classes of litigants, the Court ‘sets sail on a journey whose landing point is 
uncertain.’ In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 188 (dissenting opinion). The journey’s ominous 
destination is becoming apparent. The Court appears resolved to close its doors to increasing 
numbers of indigent litigants–and for increasingly less justifiable reasons.  I fear that the Court’s action 
today portends even more Draconian restrictions on the access of indigent litigants to this Court.”). 
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constrained.488  Or as Zatko put it, “[i]n the hope that our action will deter 
future similar frivolous practices, we deny Zatko and Martin leave to proceed 
in forma pauperis in these cases.”489  Such sanctions, under that theory, 
would be rare indeed: “we take the limited step of censuring two petitioners 
who are unique—not merely among those who seek to file in forma paupers, 
but also among those who have paid the required filing fees—because they 
have repeatedly made totally frivolous demands on the Court’s limited 
resources.”490  And as Zatko taught by limiting its sanction to a single rather 
than prospective denial of leave, lesser abuses would merit lesser 
sanctions491—but as Martin would teach, obdurate persistence would 
necessitate more extreme measures as an example to discourage such 
recalcitrance by all petitioners.492
1.  The Problem of Judgment-Proof Paupers and Prisoners 
As for why that extremity meant interdiction rather than more 
traditional remedies, the majority found it followed straightforwardly from 
the unique position of in forma pauperis petitioners.493  A typical plaintiff’s 
responsibility for filing fees and costs dissuade frivolous filings.494  True, a 
wealthier petitioner intent on serially abusing the Court’s time could pay the 
filing fee to continue to do so.495  But, reasoned the Court, payment of the 
filing fee acts as a real deterrent to all but the very rich:496  Although $300 
may seem a relatively small sum, a petitioner considering a barrage of filings 
might think twice before expending, for example, the $21,900 necessary to 
file the seventy-three hopeless petitions that Vladimir Zatko had been able 
to submit gratis.497
Petitioners of means may be further deterred by the ordinary function 
 488.  See Martin, 506 U.S. at 2–3; see Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 17-18 (1991) (per 
curiam).
 489.  Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17. 
 490.  Zatko, 502 U.S. at 18. 
 491.  Id.
 492.  Martin, 506 U.S. at 2–3; see also Zatko, 502 U.S. at 18 (“Future similar filings from these 
petitioners will merit additional measures.”). 
 493.  See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 13 (1991) (per curiam); In re Sindram, 498 
U.S. 177, 180 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam).
 494.  See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13; In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180; In re 
McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184. 
 495.  See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F. 3d 307, 328 (3d. Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J., 
dissenting).
 496.  See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13 (“Filings under our paid docket require a not-
insubstantial filing fee.”); Sindram, 498 U.S. at 180; McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184. 
 497.  See Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17 (per curiam).
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of the Court’s system of assessing punitive damages under Rule 42.2.498
Historically, however, such power had been employed very rarely,499 and the 
Court had hesitated to fine litigants even for obtusely frivolous petitions.500
In the 1985 case of Talimini v. Allstate Insurance Co., moreover, the dividing 
line between the in forma pauperis majority and minority factions was 
vividly on display.501  There, the Court declined to sanction the filer of an 
appeal whose defect “competent counsel should readily recognize.”502
Justice Stevens and his usual co-dissenters concluded that denial of certiorari 
was so painless that there was no more reason for monetary sanctions than 
they would see for interdiction.503  Accordingly, the threat of onerous 
sanctions would imperil the tradition of “open access to all levels of the 
judicial system” that would animate the in forma pauperis cases.504  Chief 
Justice Burger, writing for himself and Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, 
made an impassioned plea for more liberal use of sanctions to patrol the 
Court’s docket.505  Still, given a choice between sanctions and interdiction, 
even the minority should agree monetary sanctions are better targeted and 
suited to punish serially bad-faith filings whilst still allowing through the 
 498.  In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13; see Sup. Ct. R. 42.2 (“When a petition for a writ 
of certiorari, an appeal, or an application for other relief is frivolous, the Court may award the 
respondent or appellee just damages, and single or double costs under Rule 43. Damages or costs 
may be awarded against the petitioner, appellant, or applicant, against the party’s counsel, or against 
both party and counsel.”). 
 499.  See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1069, n.7 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
concurring).
 500.  See id. at 1072–73 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
 501.  Compare id. at 1068–72 (Stevens, J., concurring) with id. at 1072–73 (Burger, J., 
dissenting).  Because Justice Powell was recused from the case, and Justice White discerned no 
jurisdiction and would thus dismiss, Justice Stevens’s concurrence for four justices was the 
controlling plurality of the Court. 
 502.  Id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 503.  Id. (“Because of the large number of applications for review that are regularly filed in this 
Court, the public interest in the efficient administration of our docket requires that we minimize the 
time devoted to the disposition of applications that are plainly without merit. Any evenhanded 
attempt to determine which of the unmeritorious applications should give rise to sanctions, and 
which should merely be denied summarily, would be a time-consuming and unrewarding task.”). 
 504.  Id. at 1070–72. 
 505.  Id. at 1072–74 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“Rule 49.2 [then providing for sanctions] has a 
purpose which has too long been ignored; it is time we applied it. I would apply it here.”). 
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potentially meritorious,506 as have commentators.507
In forma pauperis petitioners, especially prisoners, are crucially 
different.  Some may be able to afford some partial pittances,508 but the truly 
destitute are insusceptible of filing fees and functionally immune from 
financial sanctions.509  Courts have accordingly declined to fruitlessly assess 
such costs or sanctions against in forma pauperis litigants,510
notwithstanding their sure authority to do so.511  Nor can the threat of 
contempt always serve as an effective deterrent.512  A litigant at liberty, to be 
sure, will likely see the threat of incarceration as a “potent discourager”; it 
may be the “only one, in the case of prisoners.”513  But prisoners serving long 
or life sentences may quite rationally be less docile.514  Indeed, even 
prisoners serving shorter terms may not adhere to their own self-interest, 
becoming their “own worst enemy” in racking up avoidable contempt 
sentences.515  The prolific Reverend Green would have been freed in 1980 
were it not for such sentences, but instead found himself still in jail a year 
later, persevering at his trade of jailhouse lawyering and frivolous 
petitioning.516
Though there remain other remedies such as self-certification and a 
requirement for leave of court, these inevitably leave some opening for abuse 
 506.  See Talamini, 470 U.S. at 1071 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“This is not, of course, to 
suggest that courts should tolerate gross abuses of the judicial process. . . . [I]f it appears that 
unmeritorious litigation has been prolonged merely for the purposes of delay, with no legitimate 
prospect of success, an award of double costs and damages occasioned by the delay may be 
appropriate.”).
 507.  See Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1179–90 (discussing how to balance limited versions of 
monetary assessments against in forma pauperis litigants with the need to ensure access for 
meritorious claims). 
 508.  See id.
 509.  Van Vort, supra note 141, at 1165 (“Some courts attempt to deter non-indigent frivolous 
lawsuits by assessing monetary sanctions against plaintiffs or their attorneys.  Such measures, 
however, cannot be applied practically against either indigents.”). 
 510.  Id. at 1165 n.6 (citing cases); id. at 1188 & n.146 (same). 
 511.  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); see Von Vort, supra note 141, at 1188–90. 
 512.  See Procup v. Strickland, 567 F. Supp. 146, 159–60 (M.D. Fla. 1983), rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107 
(11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 513.  Duniway, supra note 23, at 1286. 
 514.  Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 159 (“Procup is presently serving a term of life imprisonment. 
The threat of receiving additional periods of incarceration for being held in contempt of court does 
not appear likely to deter Procup from his abusive practices.”). 
 515.  In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam). 
 516.  Id.
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by malicious litigants.517  Some will do so.518  Even annual limits foresee a 
regular stream of continuing litigation.519  Only proscription guarantees that 
a prolific in forma pauperis petitioner will petition no more.520  The question 
is whether the aggregate detriment to the Court from undeterred frivolous 
filings is sufficiently grave to justify deployment of the sole sure deterrent 
the Court can bring to bear against those without means.521  And answering 
that question requires taking a closer look at the demands on the Court’s time 
and thus at the numbers behind its docket itself. 
2.  The Supreme Court’s “Incredible Shrinking Plenary Docket”522
That the volume of cases taken by the Supreme Court has declined 
steadily over time has been the subject of much scholarly literature spanning 
decades.523  Some of the brightest luminaries in the legal firmament have 
written of the phenomenon.524  And this shrinking docket coincides with a 
steady increase in the number of petitions being filed, with the 
mathematically inexorable result that an ever-smaller percentage of cases are 
deemed worthy of review.525  As a function of time, petitioners—indigent or 
 517.  See Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 158–160 (discussing potential for abuse of various remedies), 
rev’d, 760 F.2d 1107 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072–73 (11th Cir. 
1986) (en banc) (per curiam) (outlining various options). 
 518.  See Green, 669 F.2d at 782–84. 
 519.  See sources cited supra notes 223-25. 
 520.  See Procup, 567 F. Supp. at 158–60. 
 521.  Compare, e.g., Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 2–4 (1992) (per curiam), with id. at 
4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 522.  David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, the Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the Supreme 
Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 779 (1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 523.  See id. (“The ‘incredible shrinking’ plenary docket of the Supreme Court has drawn 
considerable attention.”); e.g., Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s 
Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s 
Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151 (2010); 
Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard 
Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363 (2005); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The 
Supreme Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737 (2001); Arthur D. Hellman, The
Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1996); Arthur D. Hellman, The
Supreme Court, the National Law, and the Selection of Cases for the Plenary Docket, 44 U. PITT.
L. REV. 521 (1983); Gerhard Casper & Richard A. Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court’s 
Caseload, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 339 (1974); William O. Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case 
Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 404–07 (1960) (“During the last two decades, there has been a marked 
decline in the number of opinions written each term.”). 
 524.  See, e.g., Starr, supra note 523; Casper & Posner, supra note 523; Douglas, supra note 523. 
 525.  See O’Brien, supra note 522, at 779–80 & fig.1. 
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not—have faced longer and longer odds that the Court will deem their claims 
worthy of plenary review.526  Figure 5 illustrates these trends.527
Figure 5: Supreme Court Petitions and Grants, OT 1970-2015 
The burgeoning number of petitions is facially explicable: there is only 
one Supreme Court, and ever more litigants whose claims therefore filter up 
the highest court eventually.528  Why the Court has responded by steadily 
decreasing the absolute number of cases accepted, rather than increasing it, 
is a more confounding question; such a response only exacerbates the 
systemic numerical disparity.529  Legal scholars have sought to solve this 
puzzle in various ways.530
Some have adverted to the Court’s varying willingness to revisit and 
reinterpret constitutional issues and a greater call for such cases when law 
 526.  See Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 349–52; O’Brien, supra note 522, at 779–80 & fig.1. 
 527.  The data for this and further discussion of Supreme Court caseload statistics is drawn 
from that presented in the annual Journal of the Supreme Court of the United States, as published 
from 1970 to 2015.  Petitions and grants include cases in certiorari and direct appeal stances, but 
not original cases. 
 528.  See Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 352–60.
 529.  See generally Stras, supra note 523 (“The decline in the Supreme Court’s plenary docket 
over the past thirty years has puzzled commentators.”). 
 530.  See sources cited supra note 523. 
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and society are rapidly evolving;531 others have pointed to personnel: the 
strong influence of different chief justices in setting expectations for the 
Court’s docket,532 the impact of individual justices’ views,533 or ideological 
polarization in the Court’s makeup correlating to fewer grants.534
Commenting on the phenomenon, Justice Souter adverted to extrinsic 
influences, such as lower rates of legislation, antitrust enforcement, and civil 
rights litigation, as well as internal factors like fewer jurisprudential 
disagreements with lower courts, and less division within the Court calling 
for resolution.535  But whatever the ultimate causes, as early as 1959, Hart 
summed up the problem succinctly: “the fact [is] that the Court has more 
work to do than it is able to do in the way in which the work ought to be 
done.”536  Justice Douglas agreed then,537 and the problem has clearly only 
aggravated since.538
Focusing on whether a petitioner is paying or has in forma pauperis
status offers further insight.  It is unmistakable and remarkable that both 
trajectories—the increase in petitions, and the decrease in granted cases—
advanced precipitously between 1988 and 1992.539  One commentator 
suggested this “extraordinary” decline may be attributed to the “high 
turnover” of justices between 1986 and 1993.540  But this is also the very 
lustrum during which the Supreme Court was likewise precipitously revising 
its jurisprudence on in forma pauperis proscriptions.541  Perhaps there might 
be some common factor that explains these contemporaneous phenomena?  
Critically, by distinguishing between filing statuses, one can see that there 
were actually two trends at play during this pivotal lustrum, as illustrated in 
Figure 6. 
 531.  Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 352–53, 357–59. 
 532.  See O’Brien, supra 522, at 782. 
 533.  See Stras, supra note 523. 
 534.  See Owens & Simon, supra note 523. 
 535.  See O’Brien, supra note 522, at 780–82 (discussing Shannon Duffy, Inside the Highest 
Court: Souter Describes Justices’ Relationship, Caseload Trend, PA. LAW WKLY., April 17, 1995, 
at 11). 
 536.  Hart, supra note 470, at 84. 
 537.  Douglas, supra note 523. 
 538.  See supra Figure 5; Owens & Simon, supra note 523, at 1229 & fig.1; Stras, supra note 
523, at 152–53 & fig.1. 
 539.  See supra Figure 5; Stras, supra note 523, at 152–53 & fig.1; O’Brien, supra note 522, at 
780 & fig.1; id. at 782 (observing that “the plenary docket gradually declined and, then, fell sharply 
in the early 1990s.”). 
 540.  Stras, supra note 523, at 152–161. 
 541.  See supra Part III. 
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Figure 6: Supreme Court Petitions and Grants, by Filing Status, OT 1970-
2015 
From roughly 1970 to 1988, petitioners were divided equally between 
in forma pauperis and paying filings.  Notably, however, a dramatically 
higher proportion of paying filers were granted review: usually between 125 
and 175, versus between ten to thirty indigent claims.  The first set of trends 
from 1988-1992 shows that even as the number of in forma pauperis cases 
ballooned, the Supreme Court maintained its practice of accepting roughly 
the same number every year.  The result, of course, is that the portion of 
paupers received a hearing plummeted: from 0.93% in the period from 1970 
to 1980 to 0.15% in the period from 2005 to 2015, a sixfold decrease.  Paying 
petitioners did not fare markedly better.  Although the Court did not see any 
real increase in such petitions annually, the number granted fell, with the 
result that the portion of paying petitioners receiving hearings similarly fell 
by half, from 6.8% from 1970-1980 to 3.7% in 2005-2015.  In the era of the 
Court’s incredible shrinking docket, all petitioners have suffered. 
Yet the suffering is not in the same degree or for the same reason.  
Despite the drastic increase in in forma pauperis petitions, the Court has not 
granted more; if anything, the number granted has dwindled slightly over the 
last fifty years.  This suggests that the increase does not represent the sudden 
outpouring of theretofore unfiled meritorious claims, but a proliferation of 
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frivolous or at least less worthy filings that do not garner grants.542  This may 
also be evidenced by the proportion of in forma pauperis claims grants 
dropping more than those of paying petitioners.543  On the other hand, there 
is little reason to think that the more constant influx of paid claims suddenly 
became less cogent between 1988 and 1992.544  Thus the sharp decline in 
their grants likely represents the Court declining review to a higher 
percentage of meritorious claims.545  This development, correlating with the 
dramatic increase in in forma pauperis filings, lends credence to the 
majority’s view in the critical lustrum that worthy cases were not receiving 
the attention they deserved.546
With these understandings, a credible causal inference thus emerges as 
to the hidden factor underlying all of these trends.  As the majority argued, 
the explosion of in forma pauperis claims seems to have indeed reduced the 
Supreme Court’s ability to discern and grant review to meritorious claims.547
The majority couched this concern specifically in terms of unworthy paupers 
crowding out the worthy claims of their colleagues, impeding earnest in 
forma pauperis petitioners.548  There is some small evidence of this in a mild 
decline in in forma pauperis grants.549  Interestingly, however, the primary 
victims of the Court’s distraction have been paying litigants.  The Court, its 
time ever more consumed with the volume of frivolous claims, appears 
unable or unwilling to grant review to what would have, in an earlier era, 
 542.  See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1362 (writing in 1995 of the rampant abuse of in forma 
pauperis filings).
 543.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 344 (reviewing potential reasons for the plummeting 
percentage of in forma pauperis petitions granted). 
 544.  Cf. Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 367 (“The decline in the proportion of cases 
accepted for review revealed by these tables would have little significance if one believed that it 
reflected a decline in the average merit of applications for review.  But there is no basis for such a 
belief after the correction for the presumed lesser merit of the average indigent case made in Table 
17.  On the contrary, theory suggests that the average merit of the applications for review has 
increased over the period covered by our study.”). 
 545.  See id. at 369 (“A more serious consequence of the caseload increase, we said, was the 
probable reduction in the number of meritorious cases accepted for review.”); see also Owens & 
Simon, supra note 523, at 1252–54 (discussing issue of meritorious cases being overlooked as 
grants decrease). 
 546.  E.g., Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1992) (per curiam); Zatko v. California, 
502 U.S. 16, 17–18 (1991) (per curiam); In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 13–14 (1991) (per 
curiam); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 
184. (1989) (per curiam).
 547.  Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17; In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14; In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 
at 180; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184. 
 548.  In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14. 
 549.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 344. 
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been a paid claim meritorious enough to warrant plenary review.550  The 
Court’s shrinking docket thus credibly derives at least in part from the 
modern influx of pestersome paupers, as the majority feared.551  Yet the 
litigants predominantly harmed are not fellow paupers, parlous few of which 
have ever gained review, but paid filers.
3.  Lessons from the Court’s Dwindling Docket 
Whatever the cause of the decline, the Supreme Court’s dwindling 
capacity for review suggests that its concerns for preserving its ability to 
manage its docket must be given substantial credence.552  One modern 
treatise glibly quipped: “With the 10,000 or so petitions presented to the nine 
justices every year, it is amazing that they have the time to do much of 
anything.  Consequently, it is easy to become careless and overlook 
things.”553  The question remains, however, whether prospective 
proscriptions actually effect meaningful relief of the Court’s burden.554  A 
portion of the burden may be directly relieved, when highly prolific 
petitioners are banned and thus can no longer add their importunities to the 
totals of the future.555  This factor, however, can only represent a minority of 
the many thousands of petitions the Court must consider annually.556  Of 
critical import is whether such proscriptions in fact deter in forma pauperis
litigants at large from submitting frivolous claims.557
On this point the evidence is more equivocal, but there is tantalizing 
support for the majority’s view.  True, in forma pauperis petitions continued 
to rise sharply well after Martin in 1992, and after the formulation of Martin
directives in 1999, reaching their peak volume to date in 2006 with just over 
8000 petitions (totaling over 10,000 when combined with those of paying 
litigants).  But since 2006, in forma pauperis petitions have trended notably 
downwards, falling to roughly 5700 by 2015.  Indeed, by 2015, the volume 
of the indigent docket had returned to nearly where it stood in 1992, wiping 
 550.  See Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17–18; In re Amend. To Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 14; In re McDonald,
489 U.S. at 184; see also Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 369. 
 551.  Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17–18. 
 552.  Cf. Owens & Simon, supra note 523, at 1251–63 (discussing several potential negative 
results of a diminished docket). 
 553.  RONALD K. L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE JUDGE 39 (Oxford Univ. Press 2017). 
 554.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 362. 
 555.  See, e.g., Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1 (1992) (per curiam).  But see Lane, supra
note 11, at 364 (noting that through 2003, Martin “managed to file over fifteen cases with the Court 
despite being blacklisted”). 
 556.  That said, it is interesting to note that the decline in in forma pauperis numbers since 
2006 coincides roughly with unprecedented levels of Martin interdictions: It is possible the portion 
of these “missing” petitions attributable to interdicted prolific petitioners is relatively substantial. 
 557.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 363–64 (arguing there is little deterrent effect). 
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out the towering heights of the early twenty-first century.  It is entirely 
plausible that the ever-increasing list of proscribed petitioners have had the 
concomitant effect of deterring some litigants who might otherwise have 
indulged frivolous claims; it is plausible as well that this deterrent effect 
might be somewhat delayed as litigants become more familiar with the 
Court’s willingness to ban transgressors.558  (Of course, it is also the case that 
it may deter litigants with worthy claims as well.559)  This is the case even if 
one may expect in forma pauperis prisoners to be highly resilient to 
deterrence in the first place—the threat of being denied any further access to 
the Supreme Court may be the only thing that can deter someone with 
essentially unlimited time and motivation to challenge their incarceration.560
The majority thus presents a facially powerful argument, but there 
remain countervailing considerations.  In the first place, it is indeterminate 
whether lesser penalties such as annual limits, precertifications, or requiring 
leave of court might have a comparable deterrent value, or indeed 
comparable value in directly relieving petitions.  If meritless in forma 
pauperis filings could be reduced and attention to worthier claims increased 
with less infringement on the right of access to the courts, interdictions 
would be far less justifiable.  As the Supreme Court never essayed such lesser 
penalties, there are no statistics upon which to undertake such an analysis, 
even if the degree of deterrence could somehow be detected from the raw 
data.  The experience of the lower courts suggests that such regimes can 
prove effective: although spurned by the Eighth and Fifth Circuits, other 
courts facing prolific petitions have relied on these lesser measures.561
More damningly, the reduction in in forma pauperis filings from its 
peak in 2006 has not had the desired effect.  That is, even if the Supreme 
Court’s regime of Martin directives has dissuaded frivolous filings, the 
Supreme Court has—for whatever reason—not responded by increasing the 
number of cases on which it grants plenary review.  To the contrary, from 
2005 to 2015, that number has not changed appreciably.  The Court and its 
petitioners are hardly injured by baseless filings if worthy petitioners are no 
 558.  Cf. Franklin, supra note 93, at 203 (quoting Michelman, supra note 22, at 559) 
(discussing differential potentiality for deterrence from access fees). 
 559.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 364. 
 560.  See Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 366 (“In many cases, perhaps, the benefits to the 
applicant for review if he obtains a reversal of the lower court’s judgment are so great, or the costs 
of applying for Supreme Court review so small, that even a substantial decline in the probability of 
obtaining review will not deter the application.  A good example is provided by applications 
submitted by prisoners.  The benefits to the applicant if his case is accepted for review and the 
judgment reversed may be very great—his liberty—and the cost of seeking review, which consists 
primarily of the opportunity costs of the prisoner’s time, may be very low.”); Sturtz, supra note 58, 
at 1362–63. 
 561.  See supra Section II-B-1. 
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more likely to gain an opportunity for relief.562  Reduction of in forma 
pauperis filings is not an end in and of itself, notwithstanding certain 
comments implying as much by the majority;563 it is defensible only insofar 
as it permits the Court to focus on meritorious work.564  Because this has not 
demonstrably happened, the majority’s best argument remains potent but 
unproven (though hardly disproven), reducing its weight.  This is doubly so 
given the many alternative explanations provided by eminent scholars for the 
Court’s reduced plenary docket and concomitant pretermitting of more 
meritorious claims.565
E. Minority — Proscriptions Will Improperly Impede an 
Indigent’s Meritorious Claims 
The majority and dissent both expressed concern about frivolous claims 
impeding the claims of meritorious in forma pauperis litigants.566  As has 
been noted, the data indicate that the victims of the Court’s increasing 
caseload have been predominantly paying rather than indigent litigants,567
contrary to the majority’s fretting about the rights of the indigent.568  On the 
other hand, interdicting an indigent claimant ipso facto impedes all future 
claims from that claimant, an argument that the dissent raised several 
times.569  On its face, this is a potent protestation: surely the Court cannot 
know with certainty that all of a prolific petitioner’s future output will be as 
frivolous as the past.570  Or as Justice Marshall put it lyrically: 
[W]e should not presume in advance that prolific indigent litigants 
will never bring a meritorious claim.  Nor should we lose sight of 
 562.  See Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 17–18 (1991) (per curiam) (explaining the rationale 
for its decision as preserving Court resources for petitioners who did not abuse the Court’s process); 
In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 13–14 (1991) (per curiam) (similar); In re Sindram, 498 
U.S. 177, 179–80 (1991) (per curiam) (similar); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per 
curiam) (similar). 
 563.  E.g., In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 17–18 (per curiam) (proscribing petitioner for abuse 
without reference to ensuring access to other petitioners). 
 564.  See Zatko, 502 U.S. at 17–18; Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13–14; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 184. 
 565.  See supra notes 523-528 and accompanying text. 
 566.  See, e.g., In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13–14; In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 567.  See supra Section V-D-2 & V-D-3 
568. See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 13–14; cf. In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I continue to find puzzling the Court’s fervor in ensuring that rights 
granted to the poor are not abused.”). 
 569.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 
187–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 570.  Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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the important role in forma pauperis claims have played in shaping 
constitutional doctrine.  (citation omitted).  As Justice Brennan 
warned, “if . . . we continue on the course we chart today, we will 
end by closing our doors to a litigant with a meritorious claim.”  
(citation omitted).  By closing our door today to a litigant like 
Michael Sindram, we run the unacceptable risk of impeding a 
future Clarence Earl Gideon.571
Yet there is less here than meets the eye.  True, there is some chance 
that a petitioner whose past behavior had been so irresponsible as to merit 
proscription might have mended his ways in the future, given the chance.572
But though the past is no guarantee of the future, it is certainly a fair basis 
for prediction.573  Petitioners who have demonstrated an inability to restrain 
themselves from frivolous claims are more likely to reoffend in the future.574
Justice Brennan readily admitted that he thought it highly unlikely that Jessie 
McDonald would ever come up with a meritorious claim—rather, he 
objected on principle to even a vanishingly small possibility being 
foreclosed.575  Even blessed with a claim more than frivolous, it remains 
highly improbable that the Court will grant review:576  Innumerable 
meritorious petitions are denied every year for lack of time to hear them 
all.577  In short, there is only a fleeting chance of a serially frivolous petitioner 
actually rather than notionally being injured, as all on the Court agreed.578
And the loss of that chance is in many ways a self-inflicted injury.  
Nothing compels litigants to present their every imagined claim to the Court 
other than their own obstinacy,579 and those who opt to make numerous 
frivolous filings can object but faintly when their demonstrated lack of 
discernment is used as a basis to predict that they will continue to exhibit 
 571.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 572.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 573.  See, e.g., In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 180–82, 184 (per curiam) (noting the volume of 
past frivolous petitions and barring the “continual processing of petitioner’s frivolous requests”); 
In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 574.  Cf. In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446; Wasby 1990, supra note 12, at 114–16. 
 575.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 576.  Cf. id. at 184 (per curiam) (“It is perhaps worth noting that we have not granted the sort 
of extraordinary writ relentlessly sought by petitioner to any litigant–paid or in forma pauperis–for
at least a decade.”). 
 577.  See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kapral v. 
United States, 166 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding 0.45% chance of review being granted). 
 578.  Compare In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 183–84 (per curiam), with id. at 187–88 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
 579.  See Sturtz, supra note 58, at 1362–63; Lane, supra note 11, at 363–64. 
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that failing.580  Should a petitioner wish to avoid such a fate, there is a simple 
solution: forebear from bringing tenuous claims so that the Court may view 
the meritorious ones more favorably when presented.581  It is not without 
reason that “the boy who cried wolf” is a cautionary tale as old as Æsop’s 
Fables.582  No petitioner has the right to be heard by the Supreme Court,583
and denying those that have demonstrated themselves chronically unable to 
frame a claim does relatively little actual harm to the petitioner in propria 
persona.584  (Clarence Earl Gideon, after all, was no prolific petitioner.585)
Thus it is the majority that narrowly has the better of the argument here: 
as the data suggest, dockets flooded with the frivolous petitions of 
pestersome paupers would indeed make it more likely that any given 
meritorious petition will be overlooked.586  Those petitioning sparely and 
wisely are more likely to present a proper claim, and thus more likely to 
suffer harm if their claim is overlooked.587  By contrast, a court’s deliberately 
pretermitting the likely frivolities of its most prolific petitioners occasions a 
lower chance that the court will in fact deny a meritorious petition in error.588
If errors are to be made—as inevitably they will by any human decisor,589
 580.  See In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing 
between barring the petitioner, whom Brennan doubted would ever file a meritorious claim, from 
the more abstract question of whether issuing such order might one day bar another petitioner with 
a worthy claim). 
 581.  Cf. In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 17 (1991) (per curiam) (“Petitioner remains free under the 
present order to file in forma pauperis requests for relief other than an extraordinary writ, if he 
qualifies under this Court’s Rule 39 and does not similarly abuse that privilege.”); In re Sindram, 
498 U.S. 177, 184 (1991) (per curiam) (similar); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 185 (per curiam)
(similar). 
 582.  Æsop, ÆSOP’S FABLES 9–11 (Jan Fields trans. 2012) (“When you are known as a liar, no 
one believes you even when you speak the truth.”). 
 583.  See supra notes 459-464 and accompanying text. 
 584.  See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S 13, 14 (1991) (per curiam) (“The Rule applies only 
to those filings that the Court determines would be denied in any event, and permits a disposition 
of the matter without the Court issuing an order granting leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). 
 585.  See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 28–41 (Vintage 1964). 
 586.  See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1992) (per curiam) (“But it will free this 
Court’s limited resources to consider the claims of those petitioners who have not abused our 
certiorari process.”); supra Sections V-D-2 & V-D-3. 
 587.  See Casper & Posner, supra note 523, at 366–69; cf. Duniway, supra note 23, at 1285–
86 (“My objections to the statute are twofold.  First, it does not do enough for the litigant with a 
meritorious cause.”); Feldman, supra note 29, at 437. 
 588.  See, e.g., Duniway, supra note 23, at 1285 (“The fourth group is made up of in propria 
persona litigants—a few of whom plague every court—who have an imaginary grievance and a 
compulsion to litigate continually.  The man involved in meritorious litigation who uses the statute 
is a rara avis.”). 
 589.  I. J. Good & Gordon Tullock, Judicial Errors and a Proposal for Reform, 13 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 289 (1984) (“[W]e argue that it is possible for a judge or court, specifically the Supreme 
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especially one beset with as many supplicants as the Supreme Court590—then
better they be made in circumstances that minimize the damage done.591
There are few more likely circumstances than cases proponed by serially 
frivolous prolific petitioners.592
F. Minority — Proscriptions Institutionalize Unseemly 
Discrimination on the Basis of Wealth 
But even if pestersome paupers are losing little real opportunity to be 
heard, and diverting some quantum of attention from more meritorious cases, 
nonetheless the Supreme Court’s ballooning use of Martin directives may 
compromise the Court in a most crucial way: By undermining public 
confidence in the equal and evenhanded administration to justice to all 
Americans, be they rich or poor.593  Of late, the Court has repeatedly returned 
to the importance of such public confidence in other postures: Avoiding even 
the appearance of impropriety in cases where judges might be accused of 
improper bias, and extirpating any insinuation of invidious racial 
considerations infecting the judicial system.594  These laudable programs to 
promote both the appearance and actuality of fairness generally shed 
clarifying light on how the Court should approach divisions based on 
wealth.595
This concern is amplified by the unhappy reality that early civil society 
expressed rather benighted biases against the impoverished.596  Courts 
associated poverty with moral degradation or improbity,597 up to and 
including the Supreme Court, which infamously held in 1837 in City of New 
York v. Miln that it is “as competent and necessary for a state to provide 
Court of the United States, to be wrong.”); cf. ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM 31 
(Floating Press 2010) (“To err is human . . .”). 
 590.  See Collins & Skover, supra note 553; supra Section V-D-2. 
 591.  Cf. Good & Tullock, supra note 589, at 294–97 (proposing the Court reserve close 
decisions for a second review in order to minimize the chance of error). 
 592.  See Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1992) (per curiam); In re Amend. to Rule 
39, 500 U.S. 13, 14 (1991) (per curiam).
 593.  See Feldman, supra 29, at 437 (“Moreover, any appearance of judicial impropriety would 
be undermined.  The initial screening of frivolous complaints would not appear merely as a means 
for district courts to sweep the poor from their dockets.  Rather, the screening would be a means of 
identifying those complaints worthy of further serious consideration.  Only then would the federal 
courts be truly open to the poor.”); Lane, supra note 11, at 363. 
 594.  See infra Section V-F-1. 
 595.  See infra Section V-F-2. 
 596.  See Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CAL. L. REV. 407, 
416–17 (1966); Feldman, supra note 29, at 413; Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 657. 
 597.  See Bendich, supra note 596, at 416–27; Catz & Guyer, supra note 20, at 657 (citing 
Stefan A. Reisenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CALIF. L. REV.
175, 175–200 (1955)). 
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precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, 
and convicts, as it is to guard against the physical pestilence may arise from 
unsound and infectious articles imported.”598  Thankfully, the Court has 
since repudiated such language and philosophy in firm terms—albeit after 
the lapse of over a century, in 1941.599  Nonetheless, remnants of such 
prejudices have persisted even into the relatively recent past, including the 
familiar rhetoric that advocates for the poor were “using dilatory tactics or 
raising frivolous points.”600  Even the Court has at times inspired more 
modern dissents pointing to the persistence of class bias in its own 
holdings.601  As other contexts indicate, such a history underscores the 
importance of affirmatively rebutting any hint of bias or discriminatory 
treatment to ensure public confidence in the judicial system.602
1.  Avoiding the Appearance of Bias and Preserving Public Confidence 
Most fundamentally, public confidence in the judicial system is fatally 
compromised when litigation is presided over by judges whose impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.603  The Supreme Court gave this doctrine 
greater constitutional ambit in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,604 in which 
a justice on the West Virginia Supreme Court cast the decisive vote reversing 
a $50 million judgment against his largest campaign contributor.605  Four 
times, the justice had refused to recuse himself after conducting “a probing 
 598.  City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 142 (1837) (cited in Catz & Guyer, 
supra note 20, at 657 n.12); accord The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 457 (1849) (Grier, 
J., concurring).
 599.  Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (“Whatever may have been the notion 
then prevailing, we do not think that it will now be seriously contended that because a person is 
without employment and without funds he constitutes a ‘moral pestilence.’  Poverty and immorality 
are not synonymous.”). 
 600.  Robert D. McFadden, Some Judges Held Hostile to Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 1970), 
at 52. 
 601.  See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 n.9 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting the 
relevant passage from Miln and “regretfully conclud[ing] that today’s decision is ideologically of 
the same vintage”); see also Hicks v. District of Columbia, 383 U.S. 252, 256–57 (1966) (Douglas, 
J., dissenting). 
 602.  See infra Section V-F-1. 
 603.  See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009) (“The Conference 
of the Chief Justices has underscored that the codes are ‘[t]he principal safeguard against judicial 
campaign abuses’ that threaten to imperil ‘public confidence in the fairness and integrity of the 
nation’s elected judges.’”). 
 604.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889. 
 605.  This greatly simplifies the situation; the reader interested in the political arcana of judicial 
elections in West Virginia is best directed to the thorough recapitulation in the case itself.  Id. at 
872–76. 
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search into his actual motives and inclinations” and finding no fault.606  The 
Court, however, ruled that subjective inquiry was not sufficient; an objective 
assessment of whether the “probability” or “risk” of bias was too great was 
also required.607  This holding accorded with prior cases finding that actual 
bias was unnecessary; what mattered was whether an “average judge” 
similarly situated had a “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”608  The Court 
subsequently reaffirmed this rule in Williams v. Pennsylvania only seven 
years later.609
To be sure, there is no evidence that the modern Supreme Court is 
operating under some institutional animus against the poor in promulgating 
Martin directives; the mandate against actual judicial bias is not at play.610
However, the Court’s insistence on recusal even when no actual bias has 
been shown to avoid any possible appearance thereof teaches an important 
lesson: ultimately, the lodestar is objective public perception of impropriety, 
not the existence thereof.611  Such a broad brushstroke emphasizes how 
vitally important confidence in the fairness of the judicial system really is.612
Especially when the past reveals invidious preconceptions by yesteryear’s 
judges against a particular group, it is all the more important for the modern 
bench to extirpate any sense that such a bias might linger.613
Closer to home is a slightly different sort of failing of the judicial 
system: when litigants’ cases are adjudicated not on their merits, but on the 
basis of some invidious outside factor irrelevant to the claims at issue.  The 
most archetypal of such invidious factors, given aspects of the nation’s 
 606.  Caperton, 556 U.S. at 882. 
 607.  Id. at 882–87. 
 608.  Id. at 881 (discussing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) and Mayberry v. 
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971)); see id. at 878–79 (discussing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 
475 U.S. 813 (1986), Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 
(1927).) 
 609.  Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2016) (“The Court asks not whether a 
judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, ‘the average 
judge in his position is “likely” to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional “potential for 
bias.”’”) (quoting Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881). 
 610.  Some of the more fiery dissents in the in forma pauperis cases, however, at least approach 
such an accusation; see, e.g., In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180–82 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
but that is likely best put down to rhetoric than a serious accusation.  But see cases cited supra note 
601.
 611.  Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1908–09 (“This risk so endangered the appearance of neutrality 
that his participation in the case ‘must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be 
adequately implemented’”) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47  (1975)); Caperton, 556 
U.S. at 889; Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (quoted by Caperton, 556 U.S. at 889). 
 612.  Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1908–09; Caperton, 556 U.S. at 888–89; White, 536 U.S. at 793. 
 613.  See supra notes 596–601 and accompanying text. 
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history, has been race.614  The Court has long denounced any use of race as 
a judicially cognizable consideration, perhaps most famously in Batson v. 
Kentucky.615  There, as need hardly be recounted, the Court overturned the 
contrary Swain v. Alabama616 and declared that exclusion of jury members 
on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause.617  This marked a 
culmination of the Court’s self-described “unceasing efforts to eradicate 
racial discrimination in the procedures used to select the venire from which 
individual jurors are drawn.”618  Of particular importance, the Court 
recognized that “procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from 
juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.  
Discrimination within the judicial system is most pernicious . . . .”619
The passage of time has not diminished the Court’s concern with this 
public confidence.  In 2016, Chief Justice John Roberts reaffirmed Batson
and its progeny for a near-unanimous Court and reversed the petitioner’s 
conviction based on two racially-motivated peremptory strikes;620 Justice 
Alito added in concurrence that “[c]ompliance with Batson is essential to 
ensure that defendants receive a fair trial and to preserve the public 
confidence upon which our system of criminal justice depends.”621  A year 
later, Chief Justice Roberts again wrote to reverse the death sentence 
rendered by a jury informed by an expert that the defendant “was more likely 
to act violently because he is black.”622  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
once more decried discrimination in terms of public confidence in the 
judiciary, relying on considerable authority: 
“Discrimination on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is 
especially pernicious in the administration of justice.” Rose v. 
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979).  Relying on race to impose a 
criminal sanction “poisons public confidence” in the judicial 
process. Davis v. Ayala, 135 S.Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015).  It thus 
 614.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, No. 
17–965, slip. op. at 38 (U.S. June 26, 2018), as recognized id. at 28 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 347 
U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 615.  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 616.  Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S. 79. 
 617.  Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 & n.25. 
 618.  Id. at 85. 
 619.  Id. at 86–87 (citations omitted). 
 620.  Foster v. Chapman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).  Only Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.  
See id. at 1761–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 621.  Id. at 1760 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 622.  Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 767 (2017). 
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injures not just the defendant, but “the law as an institution, . . . 
the community at large, and . . . the democratic ideal reflected in 
the processes of our courts.” Rose, 443 U.S. at 556.623
And only a month later, the Court ruled that even the hallowed 
inviolability of jury deliberations could be penetrated if racial discrimination 
was credibly alleged.624  Yet again, the Court found allowing such bias to 
stand would “risk systemic injury to the administration of justice,”625 and 
redressing it even after a verdict was “necessary to prevent a systemic loss 
of confidence in jury verdicts, a confidence that is a central premise of the 
Sixth Amendment trial right.”626  In short, discrimination not only does harm 
to its target, but also to the judicial system, and to the society at large that 
depends upon its scrupulousness—and is thus to be avoided at all costs.627
2.  Equal Access to Justice as a Right Rather Than a Privilege 
Discrimination on the basis of wealth is not the same as that on the basis 
of race;628  jurisprudentially, race is a “suspect” classification entailing the 
strictest scrutiny,629 and wealth is not.630  Moreover, the in forma pauperis
regime cannot and does not afford all litigants equal means to pursue and 
prove their claims; it serves the far more modest goal of affording everyone 
the opportunity to be heard.631  Given already pervasive disparities between 
 623.  Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 778 (parallel citations omitted). 
 624.  Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 866–69 (2017). 
 625.  Id. at 868. 
 626.  Id. at 869. 
 627.  E.g., id. at 871; Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 767. 
 628.  See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (“The same cannot be said about racial bias, a 
familiar and recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration 
of justice. This Court’s decisions demonstrate that racial bias implicates unique historical, 
constitutional, and institutional concerns.”); see also Feldman, supra note 29, at 436 (“Had the 
Court recognized indigency as a suspect classification, different treatment of in forma pauperis 
plaintiffs would probably violate equal protection, and the problem of how to define a fundamental 
right of access to the courts would be bypassed.  But because indigency is not recognized as a 
suspect classification, the search for equality focuses on the identification of fundamental rights, 
whether under equal protection or substantive due process.”). 
 629.  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 US 200, 215–227 (1995) (discussing history of 
race as a “suspect” classification requiring strict scrutiny and overturning theory of intermediate 
scrutiny for “benign” discrimination); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll 
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect . . . 
[and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”). 
 630.  Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988); Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297, 323 (1980); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); accord
Feldman, supra note 29, at 435 (citing Harris and San Antonio in stating that “indigency is not a 
suspect classification”). 
 631.  See supra Section I-C. 
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the resources enjoyed by litigants, therefore, one might argue that closing the 
courthouse doors against those who putatively abuse the judicial system is 
small offense.632  (Others might call it adding insult to injury.633)  After all, 
those of meager means who have serially presented frivolous and thus 
unwinnable claims are vanishingly unlikely to prevail; regardless of any 
Martin directive, not only can they expect no hearing from the Court, they 
can also expect no redress on meritless petitions.634
Nevertheless, the wound to public confidence remains dire when 
discrimination of any sort is afoot.635  This message of bias was the most 
recurrent theme of the dissent’s objections, and the most puissant: Justice 
Brennan said so in McDonald,636 and Justice Marshall said so in Sindram,
Demos, and Rule 39.637  Justice Stevens too wrote in Rule 39 that 
“[t]ranscending the clerical interest that supports the Rule is the symbolic 
interest in preserving equal access to the Court for both the rich and the poor.  
I believe the Court makes a serious mistake when it discounts the importance 
of that interest.”638  In Zatko, he amplified this concern: “[T]he symbolic 
effect of the Court’s effort to draw distinctions among the multitude of 
frivolous petitions . . . is powerfulFalse[T]he message that it actually 
conveys is that the Court does not have an overriding concern about equal 
access to justice for both the rich and the poor.”639  And in Martin, he
concluded that whatever “theoretical administrative benefit the Court may 
derive from an order of this kind is far outweighed by the shadow it casts on 
 632.  Michelman, supra note 22, at 1163–64; cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19–25 (considering 
“whether the relative––rather than absolute––nature of the asserted deprivation is of significant 
consequence” and finding it is). 
 633.  See In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 181 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. cases cited 
infra note 661 (discussing liberal treatment of pro se litigants). 
 634.  See Michelman, supra note 22, at 1163–64.  This is essentially the in propria persona
argument presented in Section V-E. 
 635.  See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson to 
gender-motivated strikes); Smith Kline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 486 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (extending Batson to strikes based on sexual orientation). But see United States v. 
Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2005) (expressing doubt Batson would apply to strikes based on 
sexual orientation). 
 636.  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186, 188 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 637.  In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 15 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re 
Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 19 (1991) (finding the Court’s action could “only reinforce in the hearts and 
minds of our society’s less fortunate members the unsettling message that their pleas are not 
welcome here”); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 182 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (finding the 
Court was “conveying an unseemly message of hostility to indigent litigants”). 
 638.  In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 639.  Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 19–20 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court’s history prior 
to its unprecedented decisions.”640
So it is.  To preemptively bar the courthouse doors prejudges 
pestersome petitioners’ future claims based on their past and does so only 
when they lack the means to pay filing fees.641  Such institutionalized 
prejudice does injury to a judicial system premised on the idea that all have 
the right to have their claims adjudicated exclusively on their own merits.642
Courts surely have the inherent right to protect themselves and their process 
against abuse643—but the generally accepted recourse for courts against 
litigants who abuse their process include prescreening measures, sanctions, 
and contempt, not everlasting exile from judicial process.644  In the end, a 
prolific petitioner’s sin is only a flurry of frivolous filings.645  Especially on 
account of so petty an offense, to banish anyone—rich or poor—from ever 
petitioning a court again seems contrary to basic American values.646  Indeed, 
banishment has not been meted out as a penalty for even threats of violence 
to the judiciary.647  Perhaps most ominously, paupers barred from the legal 
system will have no recourse for redress but extralegal “self-help.”648
The Court has sought to justify this banishment because the payment of 
filing fees deters frivolous claims, and therefore those excused from that 
requirement warrant greater oversight.649  Properly viewed, goes this 
reasoning, nobody has been banished: The privilege of feeless filing has 
simply been withdrawn because of serial abuse, and abusers remain free to 
 640.  Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 641.  See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785–86 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Feldman, supra note 29, at 437. 
 642.  See Feldman, supra note 29, at 437. 
 643.  See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1071 (1985) (“This is not, of course, to 
suggest that courts should tolerate gross abuses of the judicial process.”); supra notes 440-449 and 
accompanying text. 
 644.  See Talamini, 470 U.S. at 1071; Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072–73 (11th Cir. 
1986) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 645.  See Wasby 1995, supra note 12; Wasby 1990, supra note 12. 
 646.  See supra Part I. 
 647.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Corbin, 850 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1988) (upholding the gagging of 
defendant after, inter alia, threatening the judge); cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. McPherson, No. 
1450-WDA-2013, 2014 WL 10790341, at *7–-*8 (Penn. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2014) (reversing trial 
court that banned appellant from entering a town because of threats to town officials) (“THE 
COURT: . . . I don’t know if it is legal to ban him from a community. Is it legal? [Appellant’s 
counsel:] I don’t think so, Your Honor. THE COURT: . . . I don’t think it is. I don’t think it is either, 
but I think I’m going to do it anyway. I think I’m going to make it illegal under the unique 
circumstances in this case . . . .”). 
 648.  See Talamini, 470 U.S. at 107071; Lane, supra note 11, at 335; Michelman, supra note 
22, at 1194, 1198. 
 649.  See In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S 13 (1991) (per curiam); In re Sindram, 498 
U.S. 177, 180 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam); see 
also Lane, supra note 11, at 359–60. 
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file whatever they wish as long as they are willing to pay for it.650  But that 
very reasoning lays bare the flaw in the argument: To insist that those who 
cannot pay must pay is to forbid them, whatever the semantics.651 In forma 
pauperis filings vindicate the foundational American project of allowing all 
to access the courthouse;652 it is not a privilege that can (or rather should, as 
Martin illustrates) be blithely retracted, but the quintessential necessity of an 
equitable justice system.653  The judicial system has a monopoly on state-
sanctioned compulsory relief.654  If the price of a system open to all is that a 
tiny minority will misuse that openness, then that is a price the system must 
pay unless it faces an insuperable and existential threat.655  Pestersome 
paupers do not pose such a threat, singly or collectively.656
Moreover, and perhaps more damning, the Court’s rule only poorly 
serves its avowed purpose of reducing the frivolous filings it must consider: 
a nominal filing fee is unlikely to deter the wealthy, and therefore imposing 
such a requirement serves only to categorically bar the destitute (however 
worthy their claim) rather than deter meritless petitions by anyone else.657
The Court itself has said “again and again” that a large proportion of 
 650.  Peck v. Hoff, 600 F.2d 371, 374 (8th Cir. 1981) (explaining that “the court’s order does 
not bar Peck from bringing civil rights actions but rather limits his use of the cost free privileges of 
filing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915”); see In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 17 (1991) (per curiam) (“If 
petitioner wishes to have one or both of these petitions considered on its merits, he must pay the 
docketing fee required by Rule 38(a) . . .”); see also Lane, supra note 11, at 358. 
 651.  M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–112 (1996); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 
374–377 (1971); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 16–20 (1956). 
 652.  Talamini, 470 U.S. at 1070–71 (“Freedom of access to the courts is a cherished value in 
our democratic society. . . .  This Court, above all, should uphold the principle of open access.”); 
see supra Part I. 
 653.  See Franklin, supra note 93; Lane, supra note 11; e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 
140, 153 (1992) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)); Talamani, 470 U.S. at 
1070–71; Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374–377; Chambers, v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 
1488 (1907).  To be clear, the Article does not argue that the Court’s Martin directives are 
unconstitutional, but rather than the essential goal of establishing public confidence in the judicial 
system is crucially undermined by their existence and thus makes for bad policy.  Nonetheless, the 
constitutionality of such bars against the indigent is not assured either—there are legitimate 
concerns about a system that prejudges the claims of the indigent as unworthy, but not those of the 
wealthy. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. at102, 110–112 (1996); compare Lane, supra note 11, at 
335–58 (considering and rejecting a constitutional argument against Martin directives), with
Franklin, supra note 93 (opining that the PLRA “three strikes” provision is unconstitutional). 
 654.  See Michelman, supra note 22, at 1178–85, 1198; see also Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374–77 
(1971).
 655.  See, e.g., In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 180–182 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re
McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–188 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 656.  See supra Sections V-C & V-D. 
 657.  See Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 302, 331 (3d Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J., 
dissenting); Franklin, supra note 93, at 202. 
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certiorari petitions (of every ilk) are “wholly frivolous and ought never to 
have been filed.”658  As Justice Marshall observed repeatedly, the Court’s 
paying customers manage plenty of frivolous filings themselves, despite the 
fact that they can presumably afford counsel to advise against such waste.659
Instead, counsel for the rich can often disguise meritless claims more 
effectively by artful pleading, thus increasing the challenge for the 
justices.660  It is precisely because pro se litigants lack counsel that their 
filings are read more indulgently to winkle out a poorly pled but persuasive 
claim.661  If the Court truly wishes to prune back frivolous filings whilst 
entertaining the worthy, it must cut with a sharper scalpel than simply 
silencing the impoverished662—for example, by denying them on their (lack 
of) merit as was its long tradition,663 or limiting annual filings.664
Meanwhile, the proposition that public confidence in the justice system 
has been compromised by a perception that money can buy results is hardly 
speculative.  Much scholarship has been expended in documenting disparate 
treatment of the rich and poor in American courts.665  Polls regularly show 
that Americans believe that courts afford the wealthy a different brand of 
justice than the poor.666  One metaanalysis summarized that “[o]ver twenty 
 658.  Hart, supra note 470, at 88. 
 659.  In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 14 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re Sindram,
498 U.S. at 181 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 660.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 181.
 661.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam) (“A document filed pro se is ‘to 
be liberally construed,’ and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less 
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Hart, supra note 470, at 90 (referring to “ferreting out the occasional 
points of merit” in in forma pauperis petitions). 
 662.  See In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 17–18 (Marshall, J., dissenting); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 
181 (“To single out Sindram in response to a problem that cuts across all classes of litigants strikes 
me as unfair, discriminatory, and petty.”). 
 663.  See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. at 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wrenn v. Benson, 
490 U.S. 89, 92 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–87 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 664.  See, e.g., Rubins v. Roetker, 737 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (D. Colo. 1990) (one per year), 
aff’d, 936 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991); Cello-Whitney v. Hoover, 769 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D. 
Wash. 1991) (three per year); In re Tyler, 677 F. Supp. 1410, 1414 (D. Neb. 1987) (one per month). 
 665.  See generally, e.g., JEFFREY H. REIMAN & PAUL LEIGHTON, THE RICH GET RICHER AND 
THE POOR GET PRISON (10th ed. 2012); JEFFREY H. REIMAN, . . . AND THE POOR GET PRISON:
ECONOMIC BIAS IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Allyn & Bacon 1996); John R. Lott, Jr., Should 
the Wealthy Be Able to “Buy Justice”?, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1307 (1987). 
 666.  E.g., Matt Murphy, ACLU Poll: Mass. criminal justice system ‘biased’, NEWBURYPORT 
NEWS, July 13, 2017 (“It clearly shows that Massachusetts voters feel the criminal justice system 
is broken and biased. For far too long, the system has given preference to the connected and 
wealthy”); Rodney Ellis, Texas still has a way to go for fair justice, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Nov. 1, 2013; David B. Rottman & Alan Tomkin, Public Trust and Confidence in the Courts: What 
Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, COURT REV., Fall 1999, at 24; David B. Rottman, On 
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years of surveys, the same negative and positive images of the judiciary 
recurred with varying degrees of forcefulness across all of the national and 
state surveys,” and noted the ubiquitous “concern that the courts are biased 
in favor of the wealthy and corporations.  Indeed, the perception of 
economic-based unfairness in civil cases seemed to rival the perception of 
judicial leniency in criminal cases as a source of public dissatisfaction.”667
And the issue transcends politics: A bipartisan editorial in July 2017 by 
Senators Kamala Harris and Rand Paul decried the dysfunctional and 
discriminatory effects of the prevailing approach to bail on those of little 
means, concluding that reform “would help restore Americans’ faith in our 
justice system.”668
To be heard by the Supreme Court is an honor afforded only to a few—
and ever fewer over time—but it must be a honor granted on the merits of 
petitioners’ claims, not on the balance in petitioners’ bank accounts.669  The 
Court has been admirably dogged in rooting out any hint of other sorts of 
bias throughout the judicial system—and long may that remain.670  But that 
doggedness only underscores the anomaly of its willingness to treat the 
destitute differently when they seek redress.671  All must have a right of 
access to the courts; that access is not a privilege but the foundation of civil 
society, and thus denying access on the basis of wealth is wrong, whatever a 
petitioner’s past sins.672  The Supreme Court is the forum to which eyes turn 
as a bellwether of equity, probity, and impartiality,673 and thus it is the Court 
Public Trust and Confidence: Does Experience with the Courts Promote or Diminish It?, COURT 
REV., Winter 1998, at 14. 
 667.  Rottman & Tomkin, supra note 666, at 25. 
 668.  Kamala D. Harris & Rand Paul, Op-Ed., To Shrink Our Jails, Let’s Reform Bail, N.Y.
TIMES, July 21, 2017, at A27. 
 669.  See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110–112 (1996); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 16–
20 (1956); Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 302, 331 (3d Cir. 2001) (Mansmann, J., dissenting); 
cf. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (explaining the 
Court’s process for granting certiorari and its meaning); O’Brien, supra note 522 (same). 
 670.  See supra Section V-F-1. 
 671.  See McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–88 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 672.  See Talamini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 470 U.S. 1067, 1070–71 (1985); Franklin, supra note 
93; Lane, supra note 11, see generally supra Part I. 
 673.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865–66 (1992) (“The Court must take 
care to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims 
for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political pressures 
having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the 
Court’s legitimacy depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances in which 
their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.”); Republican Party 
of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoted by Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009)); see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 
U.S. 655, 687 (1992) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“The way that we perform that duty in a case of this 
kind sets an example that other tribunals in other countries are sure to emulate.”). 
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and nation even more than the individual petitioner that lose most when the 
highest court institutionalizes divisions between Americans based on their 
means,674 abjuring the judicial oath unchanged since before Marbury v. 
Madison to “do equal right to the poor and to the rich . . . .”675
Conclusion
All in all, the Supreme Court has seemingly been dismayingly high-
handed in rebuking its most troublesome supplicants.  To be pretermitted 
with no more process than a rubber stamp of an order based on past sins is 
an unkind cut to those least able to bear it.676  But perhaps some context is in 
order: the Bible provides the response of an even more Supreme Authority 
to pestersome petitions of questionable quality: 
Then the LORD answered Job out of the whirlwind, and said, Who 
is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?  Gird 
up now thy loins like a man; for I will demand of thee, and answer 
thou me.  Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the 
earth? declare, if thou hast understanding.  Who hath laid the 
measures thereof, if thou knowest? or who hath stretched the line 
upon it?  Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who 
laid the corner stone thereof; When the morning stars sang 
together, and all the sons of God shouted for joy?  Or who shut up 
the sea with doors, when it brake forth, as if it had issued out of 
the womb?  When I made the cloud the garment thereof, and thick 
darkness a swaddlingband for it, And brake up for it my decreed 
place, and set bars and doors, And said, Hitherto shalt thou come, 
but no further: and here shall thy proud waves be stayed?677
So too the experience of the average petitioner to the Supreme Court, 
who will be afforded no further adjudication than a reasonless denial of 
certiorari: there shall their proud claims be stayed.678  Fair enough, so long 
 674.  See cases cited supra notes 636-640. 
 675.  Compare Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803), with In re Amend.to 
Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 15, n.* (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Doyle, supra note 68, at 
407 (sitting judge quoting the oath and then stating: “Upon a showing of financial inability to 
prepay these fees and costs, prepayment may be dispensed with, and any indigent non-prisoner can 
sue anyone else (28 U.S.C. §1915(a).)  Within the time fixed by the rules, the defendant is obliged 
to respond.  There is a lawsuit.  So must it be with prisoners.  No less.”). 
 676.  Though perhaps not “the most unkindest cut of all.”  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE
TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, act 3, sc. ii. 
 677.  Job 38:1–11 (King James). 
 678.  See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 491–97 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (discussing 
Court’s approach to certiorari); e.g., Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1999) 
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as all petitioners’ cases are treated equally.679  But why should the disfavored 
poor be categorically afforded a lesser opportunity—even a marginally lesser 
one—than the wealthy for lack of a filing fee?680
True, the Supreme Court has infinitely fewer resources to decide 
appeals than the Supreme Judge of the world appealed to in the Declaration 
of Independence.681  The Court is not misguided in attempting to ensure that 
the greater body politic enjoys the most effective exercise of its judicial 
oversight.682  But the Court’s increasing issuances of Martin directives are 
disproportionate, seeking to swat mosquitos with cannonades.683  The 
dissents in the cases leading through Martin make the convincing argument 
that such extreme measures are more convenient than compulsory to the 
Court’s good function, and that convenience should not shut the courthouse 
doors against the poor.684  The evidence that the average petition—especially 
the average frivolous pro se petition—occupies only a few minutes of 
institutional effort means that whatever extra time is occasioned by the 
Court’s most pestersome, that time remains de minimis in the ocean of its 
overall workload.685
Notwithstanding the gravamen of the previous discussion, the Court’s 
present approach does injure the petitioner directly, not just society: it is 
possible that some of those pestersome paupers might be the victims of some 
grave miscarriage of justice crying out for relief, only to be mechanically 
barred from even filing for certiorari because of their penury and past 
peccadillos.686  And that risk increases with every interdiction.687  In the end, 
(adverting to a mere 0.45% chance of review being granted in assessing whether courts of appeals 
decisions are effectively final). 
 679.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 361–66 
 680.  See id.; Feldman, supra note 29, at 437. 
 681. We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General 
Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the 
rectitude  of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People 
of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these united Colonies are, 
and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States . . . . 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 
 682.  See, e.g., In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1991) (per curiam); In re McDonald, 489 
U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (per curiam); see also Lane, supra note 11, at 365. 
 683.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 361–63. 
 684.  See supra Part III. 
 685.  See In re Amend. to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 15 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); In re 
McDonald, 489 U.S. at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hart, supra note 470, at 88–91; see also Lane, 
supra note 11, at 361–63. 
 686.  See In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 18–19 (1991) (Douglas, J., dissenting); In re Sindram, 498 
U.S. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting);  In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 187–88. 
 687.  In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (an “unacceptable risk”); In re McDonald, 489 U.S. at 
187–88 (“I am most concerned, however, that, if, as I fear, we continue on the course we chart 
today, we will end by closing our doors to a litigant with a meritorious claim.”). 
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after all, we learn that the beleaguered Job did get the relief he was looking 
for (and much more): 
[T]he LORD gave Job twice as much as he had before.  Then came 
there unto him all his brethren, and all his sisters, and all they that 
had been of his acquaintance before, and did eat bread with him 
in his house: and they bemoaned him, and comforted him over all 
the evil that the LORD had brought upon him: every man also gave 
him a piece of money, and every one an earring of gold.  So the 
LORD blessed the latter end of Job more than his beginning: for he 
had fourteen thousand sheep, and six thousand camels, and a 
thousand yoke of oxen, and a thousand she asses.  He had also 
seven sons and three daughters. And he called the name of the 
first, Jemima; and the name of the second, Kezia; and the name of 
the third, Kerenhappuch.  And in all the land were no women 
found so fair as the daughters of Job: and their father gave them 
inheritance among their brethren.  After this lived Job an hundred 
and forty years, and saw his sons, and his sons’ sons, even four 
generations. So Job died, being old and full of days.688
Paupers petitioning the Supreme Court should be so fortunate!689
Indeed, much fortune is required for those not interdicted to obtain a hearing, 
let alone such bounteous relief.690  And those on the proscribed list lack even 
that faint hope at winning the judicial lottery of a hearing at the highest 
court.691
Yet ultimately, the greatest injury is to a society expecting the judiciary 
to be a model of evenhanded fairness.692  What the Supreme Court loses in 
institutional gravitas and public confidence surely outweighs the mild cost 
occasioned by the briefest review of serially frivolous claims.693  Setting 
aside whether Martin directives are constitutional or not, they make for 
powerfully poor public policy.694  The Court would be better served in 
weaning itself off of such practices and returning to its prior practice of 
permitting even the most pestersome paupers a few minutes of its clerks’ 
 688.  Job 42:10–17 (King James). 
 689.  Compare Douglas, supra note 523, at 406–08 (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment 
of in forma pauperis petitions from a uniquely personal perspective), with In re Demos, 500 U.S. 
at 18–19 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 690.  See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 691.  In re Demos, 500 U.S. at 18–19; In re Sindram, 498 U.S. at 182. 
 692.  See supra Section V-F-2. 
 693.  Id.
 694.  Id.
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time.695  As Justice Stevens mused hopefully in his last substantive comment 
on the subject: “Perhaps one day reflection will persuade my colleagues to 
return to ‘the great tradition of open access that characterized the Court’s 
history prior to its unprecedented decisions in In re McDonald and In re 
Sindram.’”696  If not, Lane’s recommendation, now fifteen years old, that 
Congress supersede the Court’s practice of proscription by statute may be 
the only remedy.697
 695.  See supra Section V-F-2; see Lane, supra note 11, at 361–65. 
 696.  Attwood v. Singletary, 516 U.S. 297, 298 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Martin v. D.C. Ct. App., 506 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
 697.  See Lane, supra note 11, at 335. 
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